

ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS?

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The Techniques of Japanese Occupation



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INTRODUCTION BY LAURENCE SALISBURY



UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO • ILLINOIS

To L.S.

WHOSE COMPLETE INTEGRITY AND PROFOUND
UNDERSTANDING OF ASIA COULD STILL BE
OF GREAT AVAIL TO HIS OWN COUNTRYMEN

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Published 1945. Composed and printed by the
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

INTRODUCTION

THIS book has significance for all of us: those who know Asia and those who do not. Basically it is a factual description of Japanese techniques of occupation, acutely analyzed. But it is not a book that will lose its importance as soon as the Japanese have been rolled back to their home islands.

Since the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, they have learned a great deal; and that which they are doing in occupied areas is not of temporary significance. There is a long-range importance which ties in with the Japanese theory that the present war is the first stage in a hundred-year war of which the coming peace, as far as they are concerned, will be only an armistice—a breathing space to prepare for renewal of armed conquest. Japan's methods of conquest and occupation are planned not only for the present but for the remote future as well. It is for that reason that this book has a continuing significance.

Mr. Ward's factual description deals chiefly with Hong Kong, where he was on duty as a Foreign Service officer that Christmas Day of 1941 when the British governor of the Crown Colony surrendered to the invading Japanese after eighteen brief days of resistance and some three hours after he had informed the people of the colony that there was no reason why Hong Kong could not be held indefinitely. Mr. Ward was held by the conquerors for six months. The techniques of occupation, with their long-range implications, that he witnessed are the techniques the Japanese have employed and are employing elsewhere.

I was, for example, in Peking when Japanese forces marched through the ancient gates and took over control of the city. That was in the summer of 1937. Six years earlier, on the night of September 18, 1931, the Japanese had broken loose in Manchuria. In the following four weeks I visited each city and town which Japanese forces had by that time occupied: Antung, Yinkow, Mukden, Changchun, Kirin, Tunhwa, and Taonan. The methods of control which Mr. Ward describes—the Japanese methods of 1942—were the methods of

1931 and 1937, with a difference only of degree. The methods of 1942 were more efficient, more encompassing, with greater appreciation of the requirements for the future if Japan is to rule the world sometime in the next century. These are the methods which are in process today in the Dutch East Indies, in Indo-China, in Singapore, in Burma . . . an important section of the world's land mass and population, important to the future peace and well-being of the United States.

Japan's plans and methods are based in part on knowledge of the past lack of wisdom of Western powers and on the probability that a similar lack of wisdom will continue after the conclusion of the current hostilities.

In no respect "anti-British," Mr. Ward describes succinctly the lack of awareness of the danger of attack on the part of the defenders of Hong Kong—the curious mentality which existed there until the morning of Pearl Harbor, as it existed also in Hawaii, in Manila, at Washington. That mentality remained "curious" even when the defenders knew that the island-city would fall, as shown by the failure of the British authorities to destroy vast stores of supplies which, as a result, fell practically intact into the hands of the Japanese invaders—to be used by them in aggression elsewhere. And, after the occupation by the Japanese, there were white men who could still give credence to a rumor that the conquerors were going to appoint an Englishman as governor "to maintain British authority on the island just as it had been prior to the fall."

That mentality still exists in varying degree among Westerners today because we still do not "know" the Japanese, still underestimate them, and suffer from a new complacency. This book is intended to help correct that situation.

We hear of the crimes of the Japanese against the peoples of occupied areas. It is natural for us to assume that the conquered Asiatics will rejoice to have the savage Japanese driven out by the forces of the United Nations and to have the Western powers re-establish themselves as before Pearl Harbor. We do not realize that there are many Asiatics who have heard little more than whispers of Japanese savagery but that there are few Asiatics who are not having dinned into their ears day and night, over the Japanese-controlled radio and in the Japanese-controlled press, "the crimes of the white man." The

Asiatics are told by the Japanese that Japan has come with a sword to "liberate" them from the white man, who plans again to subjugate them. We may laugh at that, but laughter is not a weapon which will defeat the plans of the Japanese.

Mr. Ward saw the Chinese population of Hong Kong submitting to Japanese rule. There were some who submitted for profit and some who submitted because they felt betrayed by the white man's inadequate preparation and inadequate defense of Hong Kong. But the majority of the population submitted as a result of the ruthless but skilful techniques of the Japanese.

The Japanese enter a newly won territory with four aims: (1) defense; (2) exploitation of the territory for further aggression; (3) assimilation politically and economically into a Pan-Asian system controlled by Japan; and (4) use of the area as a base for further progress in assimilation. Mr. Ward shows how the Japanese succeeded measurably in attaining their ends, although "no one . . . will doubt that the British government was incomparably the better one." The accumulation of evidence, as presented by the author from his own experiences and from documents which he smuggled out of Hong Kong, shows that, though the Japanese have overreached themselves in this war, preparations are being made for the next.

One may say that Asiatics do not believe Japanese propaganda, that the Asiatics will not forget the suffering to which they have been subjected. But Japan knows that, with the passing of time, the Asiatics may remember only that propaganda if, as Japan hopes, the Western powers continue their unsound policies in Asia after this phase of the war. Much of what Japan has done and is doing is preparation for a more successful effort ten, twenty, or perhaps thirty years hence. So she has granted "independence" to some of the occupied areas and has promised "independence" to other occupied areas. In short, Japan is making her fellow-Asiatics politically more conscious than they have ever been before.

Political instruction is only one aspect of Japan's technique. As Mr. Ward points out, Japan is intent on destroying respect for the white man. The first statue to be removed from its pedestal in Hong Kong and melted down was that of Queen Victoria. Perhaps Westerners will be astonished that this act did not horrify all the Chinese of

the city. One Chinese wrote after the fall of Hong Kong but before Singapore fell: "Singapore will be another Hong Kong . . . there are the same type of supine colonial administrators and sycophant minor officials, all suffering from . . . a slow corrosion of mental and physical processes." That Chinese had been an editorial writer for a British paper before Pearl Harbor. It may be that in the opinion of many Asiatics, embittered by the defeats of the West and the sufferings which came from unpreparedness, the "slow corrosion" is not limited to British officials.

It is evident in this book that many of the acts of Japan in dealing with the peoples of occupied areas are predicated on the probability that upon return to those areas the Western powers will miss their opportunity to make the people glad of that return, after the first period of relief from Japanese domination has passed. "The very essence of Japanese cunning finds expression in the success with which they have woven into one tight fabric the rope of Yamato rule and the silk of a Free Asia." As Mr. Ward says, if we follow after the close of the war a course which brings the peoples of Asia to believe that the Japanese were not deceiving them, then we (the West) shall have lost a battle of incalculable proportions, even though we have utterly defeated the armies and navies of Japan.

The first hurdle of the victorious United Nations will be economic. Too often, in peace as well as in war, the West has put out of its mind the terrible poverty and suffering of the masses of the East. Preparation for coping with that problem has begun by creation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and by the Bretton Woods conferences in 1944, but much more remains to be done. Politically the Western powers have much to do if the Japanese plans are to fail. Mr. Ward hopes for the establishment of an international trusteeship for colonial peoples in a form acceptable both to the colonial powers and to the peoples of the colonies. The Western powers must make sure that the people of the East will gain through the defeat of Japan. Otherwise, those peoples may some day look back to the promises of the Japanese and wonder if, after all, Japan was not right—if, after all, Japan had not come to free them from enduring submission to alien races. If that happens—and during the years after this war the agents of Japan will be persuasively working among the

peoples of Asia to point out each failure which the Western powers make—then in the next war there may be ranged on one side a united and vigorous Asia and on the other a rigid but decaying imperialism yielding only to the force of arms held by peoples who want to be free.

With the victories of the forces of the United States and of other Allies over the Japanese, complacency is again growing: the Japanese will be so utterly defeated that they can never rise again. Complacency was a major cause of our defeats in the first six months of the war. The new complacency will facilitate a future war of aggression by Japan, possibly with an Asia solidly behind her. Mr. Ward's book presents that problem clearly.

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NEW YORK CITY
April 15, 1945

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I WANT to express my sincerest appreciation to Dr. Irving S. Friedman, representative of the United States Treasury in China, for his helpful assistance in the preparation of Chapter 11; to Mrs. Audrey G. Menefee, chief of the Far East Division of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal Communications Commission, who supplied me with pertinent Japanese propaganda intercepts; and to the Far Eastern Unit of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce for the opportunity to complete the original study on which this book is based.

R. S. W.

TIHWA, SINKIANG, CHINA
January 1945

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YAMATO PATTERN



THE pattern of Japanese conquest, wherever it takes place, is very ingeniously woven of two contrasting strands. The first of these is a cold, hard, realistic, and relentlessly pursued objective; the second is the dim vision of a glorious mission, worthy of the most unselfish sacrifice.

The first—the objective, the never-to-be forgotten purpose—was borne forward from the birth of the race and burned into its mind with its first painful mastery of the means of writing taught the Japanese by the Chinese. The rulers of Japan, those among her people who completely represent her spirit and her aims, were then—as they always have been—the military classes. From the wealth of Chinese culture they took what they could use. They built their religion upon *Wu Shih Táo*, “The Way of the Warrior,” which they call “Bushido,” representing a forgotten phase of the Chinese philosophy of the latter days of the Chou Dynasty, some five hundred years before Christ, in the period of the Warring States. For the Chinese the phrase connoted a code of behavior for the soldier; for the Japanese it is a way of life.

Nor did their curious reading of the annals stop there. The followers of Bushido—and this is even more important for our narrative—have steeped themselves in a twisted interpretation of the history of the times out of which their law has come, and consequently they visualize the present world in terms of the struggle for hegemony among the many independent and powerful Chinese states who in that ancient time thought that they were the world. For five hundred years there was a conscious struggle by war and diplomacy among those states, each seeking to secure sufficient power to reduce all the others. They, too, had their League of Nations; and among them, too,

one proud and wealthy state after another collapsed and came to ruin through decadence or diplomatic ineptitude. Finally, the poverty-stricken, half-barbarian state of Ch'in was successful, after two hundred years of warfare and many reverses, in accomplishing the "pacification" of China. So it is that Japan has for decades sought, by the reduction of the states closest at hand, and by force or wile, as best fits her purpose, to place herself in the most favorable position possible for that coming struggle for ultimate hegemony among the world's great states which the analogy of ancient Asiatic history presents to the minds of her leaders as inevitable.

This, then, is her objective, the first strand in her pattern. And the reading of classic Chinese history out of which this purpose has emerged taught her also the value of patience: against a background of three thousand years a century is nothing. There is thus a quality of timelessness in her concept of the ultimate end. As long as there exists a military caste in Japan to believe in Bushido, just so long will the dream of world hegemony dominate the unconscious thinking of the Japanese.

If this first strand stretches changeless from the past, the second, woven over against it, binds it to our own day and time and gives it an immediate and very sharp meaning in relation to the political realities of the Asia of the twentieth century.

What are these realities? The most vital of them arise from the position of Asia vis-à-vis the West. Because of the relatively greater internal instability of the Western social order, in which the germ of Greek scientific thought worked like a ferment, the industrial revolution had come first to northern Europe. While the Western scheme of life was being remade by the machine, its only Eastern rival, the Chinese social system, continued to offer its individual members more than did that of contemporary Europe: the examination system opened for talent the road to power, and the "right of revolution" gave any able but frustrated man an ultimate alternative. There was no need for steam engines.

But certain of the characteristics of these machines and of the materialistic civilization erected to house them soon made any consideration of whether they brought more happiness than they destroyed almost completely irrelevant. To begin with, they were very efficient in producing cloth from cotton and many other finished products from raw materials. There had to be markets for these

products as well as sources from which to draw more raw materials to make more products. And, more fateful still, the same northern European who invented the machine could exploit it for another purpose: he could use it to propel ships and engines of war against which the most profound philosophies of Asia offered no shield. The material superiority of the white man could thus not be challenged; the millions in Asia had to be clothed in his cotton and buy his products, returning in exchange the things that he wanted. From this situation there developed the Asiatic colonial empires of the Western European states.

The Japanese saw the implications of this superiority more quickly than did the other peoples of Asia. The process of learning a new order of life was easier for them by reason of the fact that the one under which they were living had also been borrowed almost in its entirety—from China—and a half-unconscious fear and envy of the Chinese on that account gave them another impetus toward the West. They thus easily acquired the same primacy in Asia that Europe had acquired in the world.

The industrialization of Japan was followed in no long time by a similar if slower development in other areas of the East: the industrial revolution was gradually completing its encirclement of the globe. It might have been expected that, with the passage of decades and in the natural course of history, the system of colonial empires built upon the industrial precedence of the West would be basically altered and in the end completely liquidated to accord with the fact that that precedence had disappeared, had not the followers of Bushido found in this situation the second strand with which to weave their pattern.

For a hundred years the "superiority" of the white man implied in his scientific advancement and in his vastly enhanced military power had rankled in the Japanese breast, as it had caused a milder and more introspective but still very strong reaction throughout the rest of Asia. Here, then, was a wonderful rallying cry, a sword ready-made for the warrior's hand: "Down with the White Man! Asia for the Asiatics!" The fact that among enlightened white men, and especially for those in the Western democracies, the continued subjugation of large areas of Asia was no longer a tenable objective for any considerable period of future time, and the liquidation of political control was in some cases—as in the Philippines—actually proceeding, did not make the issue less attractive to the military caste that controlled

the destinies of the Yamato race. This was their historic mission: "to free Asia from the white man's thrall!"

It was a magic fabric that the followers of Bushido hoped to weave with these two strands. To accomplish their objective, to prepare for the larger struggle still to come, they had to conquer Asia. But was not that conquest at the same time a great crusade of liberation? Would not millions and millions of the inhabitants of the countries of the East willingly enlist under the banners of the Yamato race if they were inscribed with the promise of freedom from the white man?

These two widely divergent motivations have from the very start had within themselves irreconcilable elements of conflict, even if we accept the oversimplified and partially false concepts on which they are based—but that fact has in no wise deterred the military caste of Japan. They do not see that conquest in the name of freedom is worse than mockery and bears the seed of its own defeat. The poverty in which many of the individual officers were born, their self-dedication to the service of their country, the strict discipline and Spartan simplicity of their lives—all dispose them to embrace their "mission" of "liberation" with a profound and radical fervor. At the same time, devoted as they are to their Emperor, it seems to them obvious and proper that all Asia should be under his sway. Thus they achieve, within themselves at least, an apparent harmony between obviously conflicting elements.

It is our purpose here to test how well they have so far succeeded in working these disparate elements into one consistent design of conquest in Asia, to examine as thoroughly as we can the details of that design in a typical instance in which Japan has taken over the control of territory through conquest. We may accept at the outset the premise—which in later pages will be amply supported—that the Japanese have followed consistent methods of exploitation in the areas which they have conquered; that they tended, in general, to follow the same techniques of occupation in Hong Kong that they have used in the Philippines, in Singapore, and in the Dutch East Indies. Proceeding from that premise, we will undertake to review the practical steps they have taken, to recount the things that they have actually done, in a particular area which they have occupied. On the basis of such an examination we may be able roughly to assess the degree to which they have achieved their goals.

The area which we have selected as the primary object of our in-

vestigation is the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. This city was chosen in the first instance because the writer lived there prior to Pearl Harbor, was interned there for six months, and was able to bring away with him not only the recollection of the things that he saw but a fairly complete file of the Japanese-controlled English-language newspaper in which most of the official acts, as well as many of the related developments, were recorded. But, apart from this circumstance, the erstwhile British colony is an excellent case in point: there a typical British colonial administration was succeeded by the armies of Japan, and against the background of that succession the aims of the Japanese, and the means they use to attain them, stand out as clearly as they could anywhere.

For present purposes we shall thus be more interested in what the Japanese did in Hong Kong after the capture of the colony than in how they effected that capture; but, since the story of the attack on the colony serves as an essential prologue without which the subsequent action would be, in part at least, unintelligible, our account has been carried back to the opening of the Pacific war. In Hong Kong, as in Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, the manner in which the Japanese conquest came about conditioned the local populace, making it receptive to Japanese control and simplifying the problems of the conqueror. (Only in the Philippines were the Japanese unsuccessful to a considerable degree in their technique, as shown by the resistance offered by many of the *tao's*, or "little" men.) We could not hope to understand the quiescence of the Hong Kong Chinese after the conquest, or their reaction to the British defeat, without knowing something of the experiences through which the colony passed in the course of the fighting.

In this sense the manner of the colony's capture was a considerable element favoring the rapid absorption of the area into the Japanese system of conquests. A more detailed description of the actual fighting will be given in due course; we need only note here the broad outlines of the action, which began with the surprise Japanese attack in the early morning of December 8, 1941. The course of the siege may be divided into three periods: first, the resistance on the mainland, which ended abruptly with the collapse of the British left flank and the withdrawal of all British forces across the harbor to Hong Kong, this movement having been completed by Friday, December 11; second, the intensified bombing and shelling of the island, which was marked

by the deepening gravity of siege conditions, the disruption of communications, widespread destruction, and the growing fear on the part of the authorities of large-scale fifth-columnist activities; and, third, the fighting on the island itself, which opened on the night of the seventeenth with a successful Japanese landing at North Point and closed when, on December 25, the defense collapsed and the governor surrendered Hong Kong.

With one of the bastions of the British Empire in Asia at their mercy after eighteen brief days of fighting, the Japanese immediately set about to accomplish their own empire's aims in the erstwhile colony. These aims were: (1) to defend the colony, a primary essential to which everything else had to be subordinated; (2) to exploit to the limit Hong Kong's potential contribution to the prosecution of the war; (3) to assimilate the colony politically into the Japanese Empire and economically into a Pan-Asian system controlled by Japan; and (4) to employ it as a base from which to activate other areas of Asia, in the hope of hastening the time when they, too, would be assimilated.

It is obvious that the accession of the populace to these aims that had been set for them would not follow, *ipso facto*, from the city's capitulation, however deeply the prestige of the colonial power may have been involved in the fall. To this problem the conquerors applied a simple technique: the withdrawal of security. Formal capitulation had been effected on December 26, and the Japanese Army had entered the city on December 27. There then followed a prolonged period of chaos, characterized by murder, rape, an orgy of looting, the withdrawal of all sanctions, and the disappearance of any sense of security. This condition lasted until the leading Chinese were forced to accept co-operation with Japan to preserve the precious virginity of their daughters and to save their own lives. When they had been brought around to a properly responsive attitude, the Japanese military suggested to them that they form a committee of assistance, and they promptly set up the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee.

Of a piece with this coercion by anarchy were the steps taken to reduce the wealthy and one-time influential members of the community to a position of dependence—to make them accessible to control. For months before the attack on Hong Kong the wealthy Chinese in the colony had been hoarding their wealth in gold, precious stones, and the large denominational notes of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. The Japanese must have known of

this practice, and they must also have realized that the quickest way to reduce this whole class to poverty and a position of dependence upon them would be to render valueless these holdings of large notes, since, with most of the money worth no more than paper, there would then be small chance even of turning the gold and precious stones into anything like their equivalent value in cash. In any case such a declaration—that Hong Kong notes above the value of ten dollars could no longer be accepted in the “Conquered Territory”—was immediately issued in the name of the general commanding the occupying army, and it had the effect which must have been anticipated.

Many others of what appeared to be systematic practices all worked to the same end, as it seems only prudent to suppose they were intended to do. The sealing of most of the better houses and residences, rendering their owners homeless; the vast exactions which had to be met and the bribes which were demanded at every turn; the exorbitant cost of gas, light, and water; the scarcity and very high price of food; the setting of the exchange for Hong Kong money at two and later four dollars for one military yen; the subsequent complete devaluation of that currency; the forced sale of property for military yen; the outright confiscations—all tended to wipe out vested interests and to leave few residents with any support beyond that which the Japanese authorities graciously vouchsafed them.

Repatriation, described in detail in Chapter 8, amounts to another of the means whereby the population was rendered more accessible to control and manipulation in any situation that might confront the city: in this instance the reduction was in actual numbers, half of the people in the city being sent out of it. The systematic expulsion of almost a million people solved the problem of overcrowding; even the food supply was manipulated to encourage this large-scale “return to the villages.” A rice famine was followed by rice-rationing; the individual rations were insufficient, and the authorities used the issuance of ration cards as only another rope around the neck of the local resident.

But perhaps the most characteristic means which the Japanese had of securing this required access to the individual Chinese was through the use of groups, some of which were taken over as they stood, such as the trade guilds, and others, like the medical and dental associations, which were formed along lines familiar to the people who composed them. Through the skilled manipulation of these organizations it

was possible to pyramid power in such a way that control at the top gave a small group of Japanese adequate access to whole sections of the population; by multiplying this procedure through the various phases of the city's life, any individual resident could be subjected to countless facets of control.

The closest and most intimate of these channels of access is that afforded by the control of the press, of education, and of propaganda: through them the individual is formed, or directed, or changed as the controller wishes him to be formed, directed, or changed. If in these other techniques to which we have alluded—those which served to effectuate the immediate seizure of physical power—the Japanese were largely successful in what they sought to do, it has yet been in this latter field, that of social and cultural controls, that they are achieving their greatest success. In Hong Kong, as well as in every other area in which the followers of Bushido have taken over the functions of government, Japanese has long since become the basic language; the training requirements of teachers and the regulations governing schools have turned the educational system into an integrated “East Asia” indoctrination machine; and the flood of anti-white propaganda poured over the people in Hong Kong and sprayed out from the colony in all directions may well leave marks that this generation will not erase.

Here the bright and subtle color of our second strand comes again to dominate the pattern: it is through the control of thought that the Japanese are able to exercise the most elusive, and yet perhaps one of the most effective, of their “techniques.” By its means they achieve the adumbration of the hazy vision of their world of the future which they offer to the people whom they subjugate in exchange for all the losses and sufferings to which these people have been subjected. That world is one ruled by the sacred virtue of the Imperial Way, from which the materialism of the white man is forever banished, where all men are brothers, leading a life made warm and full and fruitful by the Japanese spirit. In this vision many Japanese have the most fanatical faith, even though they see it obscurely and could not define it. Many thousands have died for it, and, like an erotic impulse, it has been held to excuse every form of the basest crimes.

It is true that in Hong Kong, as elsewhere in the conquered territory, the disregard which the Japanese exhibit for the welfare of the people has bred a deep hostility to their rule. The excesses of the sol-

diery, the driving-out of a great part of the propertied classes, the confiscation of factories and homes, the deliberate depression of the living standards of large sections of the population—all have made the Japanese many bitter enemies among the Chinese whom they claim they came to liberate. A Chinese resident driven out of Hong Kong after being robbed of all his property, or an American businessman returning on the first or the second trip of the "Gripsholm" after seeing his business liquidated and being held for six months or two years in internment, will neither of them bear witness to anything but the blight the Japanese bring. Everything that Hong Kong—or Shanghai or Manila—meant to them has been destroyed by Japan; they cannot forget the starvation and the suffering and the hateful acts.

But the first vitally important fact in the whole account of the occupation of Hong Kong is simply this: every step that the Japanese have taken in the colony has contributed to the prosecution of their aims. They want to assure the security of their forces of occupation: they turn the police control of the city over to the gendarmerie. They want to force the Chinese to co-operate with them: they subject the whole colony to a dose of the worst anarchy. They want to strengthen the defense of the island: they drive out the surplus population that so embarrassed that defense when they were the attackers. They want to assure their control of the population that remains: they impoverish the upper and middle classes, making all alike helpless and dependent on them. There is nothing that they would not do, however savage it might be, and no sacrifice that they would not make, however costly it might prove in the lives and treasures of their subject peoples, if they believed that it would serve the ends that they have so clearly in mind. Under the British, the shell was brittle and fragile, for all the firmness of its look and even though the substance inside was abundant and fresh; under the Japanese the shell is as hard as steel, even though the contents have been sucked almost dry.

And the second vitally important fact is this: in the world which the Japanese create within the areas which they control, the people hear only occasional whispers of savagery and ruthlessness on the part of the conquerors; the crimes that are dinned into their ears are the crimes of the white man. Japan is the Yamato warrior come on a mission of mercy, and the lightning of his sword is dawn in Asia. In the language that the conquered hear it is the Japanese who came not

to subjugate but to liberate, and the white man who comes not to liberate but to subjugate.

We cannot read the lesson of the past if we will not look at the page on which it is written; we cannot hope to unravel the fabric of Japanese conquest and weave a new cloth if we will not study its pattern. If now we will pay no heed to the diligence with which the Japanese has so long worked in his conquered lands to prepare our destruction, *ours will be no victory* when those lands are cleared of our enemy, and we shall be as unready to meet the issue that will ultimately be joined in Asia as we were to defend Pearl Harbor on a December Sunday in 1941.

BEFORE THE DELUGE

ON SEPTEMBER 10, 1941, in the centenary year of the founding of the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young, the then newly appointed governor of the colony, was formally inducted into office. The ceremony took place in the King's Theatre on Hong Kong Island, on a stage bedecked with flowers and the British flag, where there were seated the select of His Britannic Majesty's Chinese servants in Hong Kong as well as the ranking members of the military and naval staffs of His Excellency the Colonial Governor. The audience was composed of the staffs of the various consulates—including the Japanese consul-general and two subordinates—and the ranking members of British, American, and Chinese business concerns and organizations in the colony. The audience stood up as the governor marched down the aisle, followed by the faithful supporters of his government, led by Sir Robert Kotewall and Sir Shouson Chow; a military band, complete with bagpipes, played "God Save the King." When the governor's party had reached the stage, and the audience had resumed its seats, Sir Robert Kotewall read a fervid address of welcome, and the show was on.

Five months and fifteen days later—on February 25, 1942—a similar performance was re-enacted in the same theater: if anything, Sir Robert was even more fervid. But there were differences. The governor who made the response was Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, long a student of China and sometimes called by Chinese—before the Sino-Japanese War—"the Doihara of South China" because of his political interest in the Pearl River Delta. Now, although no stranger, he was playing a new role. The British and Americans who had attended the earlier showing were in filthy internment camps, the bagpipes were missing, and the music was the Japanese national

anthem. Sir Robert was now Law (or alternately Lo) Kuk-wo, and at the end of the performance he felt called upon to lead the audience in three rousing "Banzais."

When this second showing took place, the colony had already been the "Conquered Territory of Hong Kong" for two months; but, of all those present or participating in the earlier performance, perhaps only the grinning Japanese consul-general had even the remotest presentiment that within three months the island would be suddenly attacked or that in less than six it would have a new government and a new governor. If anyone had pretended to suggest in the midst of the show of loyalty that marked the first inaugural that in five months and a half the same protestations would be poured by precisely the same people into the ears of a hated enemy, that individual would have been arrested as an Axis agent or clapped into a madhouse.

But in cold and historic fact it so happened, and it must be recorded that the fanfare of Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai's induction into the office of governor-general of the "Conquered Territory" was more than a personal triumph: it symbolized the considerable and quick success which the Japanese had attained in securing control over the colony's life and population, a victory as meaningful as was the rapid military conquest of the island "fortress." No other single incident in the course of the occupation could bring into such sharp focus the sudden sea-change which Hong Kong had undergone. How was it possible? By what means was it brought about? The answers to these questions will not be fully clear to us until we have completed the study which we have here undertaken of the Japanese techniques of control; but let us first glance backward for a moment to see what the record says of Hong Kong *avant le déluge*, before it had any experience of those techniques.

An official report published in 1937 by the colonial government covering 1936—the last fully normal year of British rule—described that government as being administered, under letters patent of February 14, 1917, and royal instructions of the same date and subsequent dates, by a governor aided by an executive council, composed of six official and three unofficial members, and by a legislative council composed of nine official and eight unofficial members.

The six official members of the Executive Council were the senior military officer, the colonial secretary, the attorney-general, the secretary for Chinese affairs, the colonial treasurer, all of whom were mem-

bers *ex officio*, and the director of public works, appointed by the governor. The three unofficial members, one of whom was Chinese, were appointed by the governor.

The six official members of the Executive Council were also members of the Legislative Council; the other three official members of this council, who were appointed by the governor, were the inspector-general of police, the harbor master, and the director of medical services. Of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council, two were appointed by the governor on the nomination, respectively, of the justices of the peace and of the Chamber of Commerce; the governor also appointed the remaining members, three of whom were Chinese. Appointment in the case of unofficial members was for five years for the Executive Council and four years for the Legislative Council.

The daily administration was carried out by the twenty-eight government departments, all officers of which were members of the civil service. The most important of the purely administrative departments were the Secretariat, Treasury, Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, Post Office, Harbor, Imports and Exports, and Police and Prisons. There were seven legal departments, including the supreme court and the magistracies; two departments, Medical and Sanitary, dealt with public health; one, Education, with education; and another, the largest of all the government departments, Public Works, was concerned with roads, buildings, waterworks, piers, and analogous matters.

Viewed objectively, the government which this excerpt—I have used the words of the official report—describes so succinctly is that of a small group of selected Englishmen who held all its important posts: with the exception of the senior military officer—a general in the British Army—they were all members of the Colonial Service, and they were supported by a civil service recruited from among their own countrymen who controlled the subordinate but all-important administrative functions of the colony. The reader will have noted that the six official members of the Executive Council, whose votes controlled that body, were there by virtue of the fact that they were the heads of the vital administrative departments. The senior military officer commanded the troops; the colonial secretary was the head of the Secretariat; the colonial treasurer was the head of the Treasury,

the secretary for Chinese affairs was the head of the secretariat controlling those affairs, etc.

These same six officers were also *ex officio* members of the Legislative Council, where, with the votes of the three other official members of the latter body—also chosen because they were the heads of other important administrative departments—they controlled that council also. The executive, legislative, and administrative functions of the British government of Hong Kong were thus all in the hands of the governor and the same small group to whom every officer in any administrative department of the government (they all had to be members of the civil service of the colony which was exclusively English) was responsible and on whom his career and future depended.

At the high level on which it functioned this relatively small group of controlling officials would appear to have admitted only four Chinese into its membership. These were appointed by the governor, and, although they undertook to speak for the Chinese who formed well over 97 per cent of the population of the colony, they could not be expected unfailingly to afford them vigorous representation. They were in fact little more than instruments of the British colonial government, and, whether as the result of deliberate selection or *faute de mieux*, they were men who were rarely highly regarded by the Chinese themselves, and often they were not actually Chinese.

Such a person was Sir Robert Kotewall, recognized in the years preceding the opening of the Pacific war as the outstanding leader of the Chinese community in Hong Kong. A Parsee with Chinese, Portuguese, and probably English blood, his intense and swarthy face, with its shifting cocked eyes and its smirking smile, has already twice pushed its way into the pages of this narrative and will appear on them more than once again. A clever if unscrupulous man, his eminence in the colony was signalized by the fact that he was the one Chinese member of the Executive Council; he was also one of Hong Kong's wealthiest businessmen. The principal of a company bearing his own name, the managing director of another, and a director in various others, he had not neglected those activities which establish prestige: in the imposing list of his honorary nominations were such titles as "president, Chung Sing Benevolent Society," "vice-patron, St. John's Ambulance Association and Brigade," "vice-president,

Children's Playgrounds Association," and "president, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children."

Sir Robert Hotung, another of the men who received the patronage and support of the British colonial administration, wore Chinese clothes and married a Chinese; by blood he was at most only half Chinese and looked and seemed to be less than that. By wide repute the son of Sir Robert Jardine, he amassed great wealth in his own name, succeeded to his putative father's position as the head of the great concern named Jardine's, and gained a knighthood. He raised a large family, had numerous grandchildren, and in 1941 was a tall, spare, dignified old man.

The leader of the Chinese community preceding Kotewall had been Sir Shouson Chow. Although relatively less effective, and less completely committed to certain phases of the colonial administration, he is of good Chinese blood and not a born quisling. Highly regarded everywhere and comfortably well-off for most of his life, he was never wealthy; financial difficulties are supposed to have had a part in his displacement by Sir Robert Kotewall, to whom he never willingly yielded primacy. Later his hair was to turn completely white in Japanese detention, and he was to emerge from it a pathetic figure, attempting repeatedly to communicate to the Chungking government his entreaty that they withhold judgment on him.

In spite, however, of the individual limitations of these handpicked Chinese, and of the very restricted degree to which, through them, the Chinese community was able to participate in its own governance, the administration of Hong Kong was widely accepted as efficient and honest; and in practice the interests of the small foreign community were so interwoven with those of the Chinese residents that the latter were nearly always able—particularly if they belonged to the educated or wealthy classes—to bring their grievances effectively before the government in one form or another.

Nor were there lacking many evidences of Chinese confidence in the fundamental fairness and tolerance of the colony's British rule. Perhaps the most striking of these was the presence in Hong Kong of numerous political refugees, representing every conceivable shade of opinion and having in common with one another only the fact that they had, all of them at one time or another, found it necessary to flee for their personal safety from the mainland to this island for haven. Madame Sun Yat-sen, the gracious and truly revered widow of

the leader of the Chinese revolution, had for several years prior to the opening of the Pacific war made Hong Kong her home. Dr. Ch'en Han-seng, the brilliant leftist intellectual, lived there, as did also the Communist son of an "Elder of the Revolution." Eugene Ch'en, co-negotiator of the Ch'en-O'Malley Agreement and once regarded as an archenemy of Great Britain, was there, too; W. W. Yen, like Ch'en a one-time foreign minister of China, who so ably defended the interests of his country when the Manchurian "Incident" was before the League of Nations, was also a resident.

Much more numerous were those who came simply to escape or find a respite from war, as—for a while—did Mesdames H. H. Kung and Chiang Kai-shek.

The swollen state of the city's population was to become one of the major problems confronting the Hong Kong government in its efforts to defend the colony. In 1931 there had been 852,932 persons, including 20,000 non-Chinese, resident in the colony. According to an estimate of the population made as of the middle of 1936, it had then reached 988,190, of whom 21,832 were non-Chinese. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities in the summer of 1937, and their envelopment of the Yangtze Valley which followed in the fall, a very rapid immigration from North and Central China into Hong Kong began. It continued through 1938, 1939, 1940, and 1941, with the result that, on December 8 of the latter year, when the Japanese attack on Hong Kong began, the population of the city was, according to an official of the colonial government, very close to two million.

Beyond and above the inevitable complications following upon so abnormal an accretion in numbers, the population was characterized by a further factor increasing its instability: it was highly fluid. In 1936—prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the last normal year in the colony's history—2,977,205 persons entered Hong Kong, while 2,987,772 left it in the same period. That is to say, a number of persons totaling roughly three times the whole population of Hong Kong left the port during the year and an equal number entered it, the daily average of arrivals being 8,134 and of departures 8,163. While it is not unlikely that a considerable percentage of these persons left the colony to attend festivals, etc., in the villages on the mainland and then returned to it, and many others perhaps were simply commuters, these figures do reflect what is unquestionably a

fact—that the Chinese population of Hong Kong was an extraordinarily mobile one.

Nothing approximating a control of this flow was attempted by the British colonial government until 1941, and then under regulations so lax that the government could have only a very inaccurate knowledge of the allegiances, the composition, or even the number of the urban mass over which it ruled.

This situation was not so much the fault of the Hong Kong government as might at first appear. The colony had traditionally been, as we have suggested, a place of refuge for those against whom the fortunes of Chinese political life had turned, and almost complete freedom both of entry and of exit had long been customary. When it finally became clear that, for the sake of the safety of the island, these usages would have to be set aside, the whole position in Asia had already become a very delicate one, and it is said that Whitehall refused to entertain proposals for rigid control of exclusion for fear of repercussions in China.

But because the government knew nothing of the newcomers and could not trust them, and since it could not distinguish between a Chinese who had been in Hong Kong for a few months and one whose family had lived on "the rock" for three generations, the permanent base of the population, loyal to Hong Kong and reconciled to British rule, was immobilized, even had the government sought to exploit its unquestioned potentialities for the defense of the colony. As we shall see, prejudice heightened this mistrust, and the resentment which it caused was only regarded as a further justification for it, so that the gulf of misunderstanding between the ruler and the ruled widened of itself, and in war a hapless government was quickly doomed.

Another of the situations which were perhaps to account in part for the things that were to come was that of Hong Kong's labor. The natural and spontaneous development of a movement toward the organization of labor in the colony has always been handicapped by the circumstance that it could find no firm base in the constantly changing laboring population of the colony. And not only was there a constant replacement of individuals through continual migration; there had always been at any given time a large labor surplus, depressing the labor market and making the establishment of fair wage standards very difficult.

In addition to these inherent problems, efforts to organize Hong Kong's labor were further handicapped by legislative enactments and attitudes surviving from the early history of the movement in Hong Kong. Swept forward in the wave of a strong campaign to organize labor in South China in the early 1920's, the workers of the colony had brought into existence the Hong Kong General Labor Union and the Chinese Seamen's Union. In the reaction against the general strike in the colony in 1925, both of these organizations were declared unlawful. The passage in 1927 of the Illegal Strikes and Lockouts Ordinance, based on the even broader Trade Unions Act of the same year, made any strike illegal which was adjudged to have an object in addition to a trade dispute and forbade the control of any Hong Kong union by any union outside the colony. These restrictions, combined with the inherent limitations already noted, and with the fact that the movement in China proper had meanwhile also suffered a sharp recession, brought labor organization in the colony to a virtual standstill. In 1939 the existence of eighty-four labor unions, with a total membership of forty-four thousand, was recorded, but the labor officer's report of that year accurately noted of them that they had become "little more than friendly societies concerned more with the provision of funeral expenses for the dead than the improvement of the conditions of the living."

There remained, however, a very real labor problem. For Hong Kong's capital to show a profit, the wage standard had to be kept almost as low as it was in the hinterland of China—with which the colony's products were in competition or to which they were to be sold—even though the cost of living for the common worker might be higher in Hong Kong and his housing more wretched and unhealthful because of the overcrowded conditions in the city. The lack of unions did not remove the laborer's grievances; it simply deprived him of a place to go to talk about them and left him without any feeling that he had had a stake in the continuance of the government's rule.

Neither these nor any of the other social fissures which marred the face of "the rock" and threatened even to split it against itself should there come a heavy storm were as easily to be seen or as clearly traced as they seem to us now: in the mind of the average foreign resident they perhaps did not even exist. There was too much else to think

about, and especially was this true in 1940 and the first eleven months of 1941.

To begin with, there was the progress of the war in Europe, which engaged a large share of the attention of most foreigners. There was also the apparently endless fighting on the mainland of Asia of which one was always conscious, but which seemed somewhat remote, as if glimpsed out of the corner of one's eye. Of perhaps more immediate interest were the things that were happening right in Hong Kong. The *South China Morning Post* devoted many columns of excellent reporting, for instance, to the battle being put up by a committee representing British husbands in Hong Kong whose wives the government had shipped to Australia for reasons of safety; the husbands wanted their wives back immediately and protested that by undue use of influence some individuals had been successful in keeping their wives with them the whole time. When the government had first undertaken the evacuation of wives, the protests had been on the opposite score: it had then been alleged that not all wives were given the opportunity of repatriating to safety. There had also been some criticism of the fact that, while there were many more Chinese women in Hong Kong who were British subjects than European women, only the latter were included. These circumstances had now been forgotten; the fulminations of the irate husbands stopped only on December 8.

The matter of the air-raid tunnels was something else again. An able and energetic Englishman was made the director of air-raid precautions. Evidently of the alarmist type, for some unaccountable reason he became possessed of the idea that Hong Kong—of all places!—was really in danger of being attacked, and in consequence he was forever rushing about organizing air-raid precaution squads and building immense air-raid tunnels right through the rock of the island and in general attracting rather too much attention to himself. Expenses were also a good deal heavier when things were done in such frantic haste, and it was said that there was a little Chinese girl in the pay of one of the contracting companies, which, it appeared, also had English friends. In the end there had to be elaborate public hearings that continued for weeks and amounted to a trial, no one knew of whom or what. Assured that, no matter how much his rashness might be deplored, his integrity was absolutely unquestioned, the Englishman went off to India, confident even at that late date that

the turn of events would prove that it was not he who was unbalanced. It was subsequently whispered that the Japanese consul-general had scrutinized the full press reports of these proceedings with great care, but perhaps that was only to practice his English.

A sure sense of propriety kept certain other more personal scandals, too startling and intimate to be detailed, out of the public press, but they proved very diverting subjects of conversation between cocktails in the lounge of the Hong Kong Hotel.

Fortunately, Caldbeck, MacGregor and Company had an excellent stock of wines and whiskies; the hotel dance orchestra was a good one; there was swimming upriver and boating in the bay. Withal life was pleasant enough, though one somehow felt that, as one grew older, one grew less attractive. There were mornings that were rather hard to get through, but if one needed bucking up it was always possible to think of the little Scots' army band going through its forenoon bagpipe drill on the parade ground. Precisely it cut the traditional figures while it piped away with complete aplomb; the sight of it, even in the mind's eye, gave one at least the illusion of permanence, the faith that—for all the world's inconstancy—there were yet things that had always been and would always be.

CONQUEST OF THE COLONY



MASTER! Have got war! You look see!" So shouted many a frightened Chinese servant, rushing to awaken his drowsy foreign employer or interrupting the ritual of his breakfast to lead him out to the veranda to look down on what was happening in Kowloon on the mainland across the harbor. The bombing of the Kai Tak airfield on the Kowloon foreshore was the first warning that Hong Kong as a whole had received that the colony was being attacked. The air-raid alarm had sounded at 8:00 A.M., when Japanese planes were already in full view, bombing and strafing the airport. Not a few foreigners were even then unconvinced, thinking that this was just one of those extra-realistic air-raid drills with which the colony had been threatened. Practically everyone was having to find out about it in the same hard way, by visual means; but, as it continued, even the most skeptical were brought to accept the witness of their eyes.

The "China Clipper," the great seacraft which flew the Pacific and which a few minutes before had been riding gracefully at anchor on the bright blue waters of the harbor, awaiting the moment of its scheduled departure at eight o'clock to rise on its way and be gone, was now in flames, burning to the water's edge. Probably as many as seven other planes were destroyed on the field. Five planes were saved, and it was subsequently reported that one of the attacking planes had been shot down, presumably while it was on its way back to its base.

The first official communiqué after the Japanese attack had begun, issued on the morning of December 8 by the Battle Headquarters of the British forces defending Hong Kong, stated that the general alarm to the garrison had been given at five o'clock that morning and that

battle positions had been manned at dawn. It went on to say that demolition parties were in position at 5:30 A.M. and had blown up the demolitions in the forward area beyond Kowloon in the New Territories at that time. In this they were immediately successful except in the case of one railway bridge, which gave trouble, but which the Volunteers managed to blow up at 9:30 A.M. At 7:30 A.M. the road demolitions on the Castle Peak Road, running west along the northern bank of the Pearl River from Kowloon, were successively set off.

In the New Territories the frontier companies had taken up their forward defensive positions, and the Japanese were field-bridging at two places. Several parties of between three hundred and four hundred men had been seen on the enemy's side and were expected to attempt to cross shortly. The police from the frontier posts had been successfully withdrawn.

The communiqué continued that, at 8:00 A.M., the Kai Tak airfield was bombed and dive-bombed and that the Japanese aircraft were greeted with hot fire from the light automatic weapons of the R.A.F. and the Volunteers; it was regretted that two British planes on the ground were hit. The raid on Kowloon caused slight damage and casualties.

All Japanese in the colony had been rounded up, and, the communiqué asserted, "the garrison is fully confident and everything that has happened so far has happened exactly as we foresaw it; there has been no surprise of any kind."

A second air raid occurred at about one-thirty in the afternoon, when twelve Japanese planes attacked North Point.

At two-thirty in the afternoon a combined assembly of the Executive and Legislative councils, the advisory bodies which we have described as assisting the appointed executive in the government of Hong Kong, heard a formal announcement by the governor, Sir Mark Young, that a state of war existed between the British Empire and Japan. In reply to the governor's brief statement, Mr. M. K. Lo, one of the three Chinese unofficial members of the Legislative Council, speaking as the representative of the Chinese in Hong Kong, pledged their wholehearted support and loyalty.

Thus opened the siege of Hong Kong. Its course falls naturally into three periods, as noted before: the resistance on the mainland; the bombing and shelling of Hong Kong which followed the withdrawal

from Kowloon; and the fighting consequent on Japanese landings on the island itself.

In some government quarters, at least, it had been the confident expectation that, should war break out, it would be possible to defend the New Territories from an overland Japanese attack for from two to five months, or until it might be possible to receive relief and reinforcements. All other preparations had evidently been predicated on this assumption, and there were no developments during the first two days of the fighting giving the residents of Hong Kong any indication of the fact that events in other parts of the Pacific and of the world had already rendered it untenable.

The positions from which the defense of the New Territories was being undertaken were maintained intact during Monday, and in the sharp skirmishing with advanced Japanese patrols which were reported to have occurred on Tuesday, the communiqués pictured all attacks as having been repulsed.

On the nights of Monday and Tuesday there was carried out an operation which, although it was unconnected with the colony's defense, was yet one of the bravest feats of the siege. Using the five planes that had been salvaged from the Japanese raid on Kai Tak on Monday morning, the pilots of the Chinese National Aviation Corporation instituted a shuttle from Hong Kong to Nam Yung, landing on and taking off from the damaged Kai Tak airport in almost total darkness and without any cover or protection of any sort against Japanese air or ground attack. In that way many key Chinese and foreigners who otherwise would have been caught in the colony were taken out of it.

The official communiqué issued at 10:00 A.M. on Wednesday stated that the Japanese had at one o'clock that morning launched a heavy attack on the British positions in the New Territories; some penetration of the forward defenses had occurred, but the attack had for the moment been halted. Fighting was continuing, and, in spite of extremely poor visibility, the defenders' artillery had put in some very effective shooting.

That afternoon a further communiqué said that two attacks from the direction of Shing Mun (a valley in the New Territories) had been beaten off and that the situation had been stabilized at approximately the position of the morning; there had been no substantial change. Two boatloads of the enemy attempted to cross Tide Cove

and land on East Shore. Both boats were sunk by machine-gun fire, and the remnant of the landing party was wiped out on the beach. Reports reaching headquarters testified to the effectiveness of the British artillery fire of the night before.

A third communiqué, issued at five o'clock that same afternoon, stated that positions on the mainland continued to be maintained. The enemy had brought up artillery support on the Castle Peak Road and engaged Stonecutter's Island, lying in Hong Kong Harbor between Lai Chi Kok on the mainland west of Kowloon and the west end of Hong Kong Island. One of the largest artillery emplacements of the defenders was on Stonecutter's, and the Japanese appeared intent on knocking it out. The fire which they directed at it was replied to by small naval units, later supported by the Stonecutter's and the Hong Kong Island defense guns. The British field artillery on the mainland was said to have hotly engaged enemy troop concentrations during the afternoon with good results; the casualties of the defense during these engagements were described as very light.

The artillery fire was particularly heavy, lasting throughout the day and well into the night. There were four fairly heavy air raids in the course of the day, although no one of them engaged more than six planes. There were no raids during the night.

Meanwhile a message of confidence and encouragement in their ordeal had been addressed by His Majesty the King to his government and people in Hong Kong. "I have every trust in your leadership and in the spirit of fearless devotion which will uphold the garrison and people of Hong Kong. . . . Under God's providence all the efforts of the enemy will be brought to nought." His Excellency the Governor replied, "We are indeed cheered by the words which the King has addressed to his people in Hong Kong and every one of us will do his utmost to be worthy of His Majesty's confidence."

On the same day steps were taken to meet the food scarcity created in the colony by the action of the rice and other food shops in closing their doors at the outbreak of war. The government gazetted an order compelling every undertaking for the sale of food to keep open from 8:00 A.M. until sunset, and an official of the Food Control Department broadcast an assurance that there was plenty of food in the colony for everyone, Chinese and foreigners alike. As a further earnest of this fact, and to quiet public fears, the opening of free food kitchens was begun.

Although during the early hours of Thursday morning enemy shelling appeared to be appreciably closer and was very heavy, it evidently did relatively little damage to the morale of the defenders, and the communiqué issued during the forenoon said that it had been a moderately quiet night with nothing to report. Some shelling of the island took place, but it had only a nuisance value; damage and casualties had been insignificant.

Newspapers and other organs in contact with the public were at the same time informed that the military authorities wanted it generally known that from that time forward the north side of Hong Kong Island was under observation from enemy artillery posts and would be subjected to intermittent and probably accurate enemy shelling.

There were the usual series of air alerts throughout Thursday, and the only notable development other than the more intense shelling was the issuance of an order by the Auxiliary Quartering Corps to all those persons on the Peak or mid-levels, who had previously been informed that in an emergency their houses would be taken over for billeting purposes, that they should pack up and be ready to move at 5:00 P.M. That evening they were given billeting cards stating the accommodations allotted to them.

In the official communiqué of the Battle Headquarters issued on Friday morning there was no reference to the progress of operations on the mainland. It said merely that the island had been subjected to a certain amount of sporadic bombardment by aircraft and artillery during the day and for a short period during the night but that the casualties had been very low and the damage negligible. The communiqué also predicted that during the next week or so the island would be subjected to some bombing and shellfire, but that, if the public would profit by its experience of taking cover and of dispersal, casualties could be kept very low. In closing, the general officer commanding congratulated the civil population on their calm confidence and steadiness and assured them that, if they would continue in this gallant manner, they would have nothing to fear.

But it was soon to become apparent that the *sang-froid* of the communiqués from Wednesday on only put a brave face on a development fatal to the defense of the colony: the forced abandonment of Kowloon. In some military quarters at least it had been the confident hope that a line across the New Territories north of Kowloon could

be held "until Easter"; it was correctly considered that the only real chance for the island lay in a successfully prolonged and bitter last-man stand on the mainland.

In the *South China Morning Post* of Saturday there appeared the following communiqué, issued as of Friday at 2:30 P.M.:

"We have successfully evacuated our troops, supplies, and essential services from Kowloon. Yesterday the enemy pressed his attack with vigor and in the face of superior numbers we had to fall back. It will be appreciated that the bulk of our garrison has, from the beginning, had to be retained on the Island to safeguard our main base.

"The position we have now reached is as follows: We have retired within our Fortress and from the shelter of our main defenses we will hold off the enemy until the strategic situation permits of relief.

"Emphasis is placed on the word 'Fortress'—every man and woman must contribute a war effort to this end. There is every reason for confidence. Both military and civil authorities have for a long time been working to a situation where reserves of food, guns, and ammunition are ample for a protracted defense on a siege scale. There is every reason for confidence. The garrison is in good spirits and the staunchness of the civil population is marked. The simple task before every one of us now is to hold firm.

"Our losses during all engagements on the mainland have been comparatively light, and the troops gained a valuable time lag for civil defense measures to swing into action.

"A remarkable rearguard action was fought by about 100 men of an Indian battalion through the streets of Kowloon. They were successfully evacuated this morning in broad daylight on a Star Ferry from the stern of which they continued the action by machine-gun fire in the face of heavy enemy fire.

"Great praise is due to members of the Government Medical Department and the Auxiliary Medical Corps who voluntarily remained at their posts in Kowloon and are rendering assistance where necessary to the Chinese population.

"For their own safety the population is warned to keep away from all waterfronts."

The withdrawal from Kowloon which this statement reported had been executed under the impulsion of the most stringent military

necessity, and that it could have been carried out not only without the Japanese suspecting that it was in progress but without the Chinese having any inkling of it until it was completed is truly remarkable. The Japanese attack that had begun at 1:00 A.M. Wednesday had evidently continued until, probably sometime Wednesday afternoon, the defending lines broke on the left flank when the hard-beset Royal Scots were forced to fall back. The Japanese, smeared with the mud of the dirt and clay banks over which they crawled, had managed to infiltrate through the lines and to take one of the Royal Scots' strategic forward positions by surprise. According to an authentic British account of this crucial action, the defenders displayed the greatest individual courage but found themselves with the Japanese both in front and in back of them in the very first hours of the battle. The Indians fought valiantly, and many an almost untrained Chinese volunteer held his ground and died where he stood; but, with one flank turned, the subsequent withdrawal became inevitable.

This movement had presumably been begun late Wednesday afternoon and proceeded through the night. Some refugees from Kowloon stated that they believed that police and other communal services had ceased in Kowloon by Wednesday night, and it is certainly true that they had been withdrawn on Thursday. Ferry services stopped at about noon on Thursday, and no transportation of any kind across the harbor was available on Friday. Kowloon's hoodlums and gangsters were evidently the first to discover what had happened, and for almost two days they were in complete control of the territory, looting as they pleased and forcing the financially better-off among the residents to make large "contributions" to purchase the protection of various "unions" and "societies to maintain public safety."

The Japanese themselves did not cross the New Territories into Kowloon proper until the evening of Friday. Mrs. C. R. Lee, wife of the governor's private secretary, who was serving as an air-raid precaution warden in Kowloon, is quoted as saying (when she was brought over as hostage by the Japanese "peace mission" shortly to be described): "Like so many people on the Kowloon side, I was unaware of the evacuation of Kowloon until it was virtually completed. It was Thursday afternoon.... a bomb fell near.... I saw several bodies lying in the street.... I went to the station to inform the police. I found nobody there. We could not tell what to do....

We were making shift with whatever light we could arrange on Friday night when the Japanese made their first appearance."

It is obvious that anything less than complete secrecy would have endangered the withdrawal: the numerous members, Chinese and foreign, of the air-raid precaution squads and other civilian corps could not all have been informed in advance. The fact that they had to be abandoned along with Kowloon was nevertheless one of the tragedies of the defense and one of the circumstances most often cited by critics of its course, especially after the fall of Hong Kong.

The event proved, however, that this sudden disappearance of their protectors did not take Kowloon completely unawares. In the words of a Chinese resident there at the time, Kowloon "became a land of Japanese flags as soon as the Japanese entered; almost every house hoisted a Jap flag, and big posters were pasted prominently in some places welcoming the Imperial Japanese Army." Some of this was the work of bona fide fifth columnists in the pay of the Japanese, and one of the favorite rackets of the hoodlums was the sale—at exorbitant prices—of Japanese flags; but there were enough such flags instantaneously uncovered to suggest that perhaps more than one thrifty householder had early laid one away in advance, "just in case."

In these circumstances it was not unnatural that the Japanese should offer to negotiate with the British defenders for the surrender of the island. They did this on Saturday morning, a mission headed by a lieutenant colonel accompanied by two junior officers crossing the harbor to Queen's Pier with two British women (one of whom has been mentioned) as hostages. A subsequent communiqué—issued at 5:30 P.M., Monday, December 15—revealed that the Japanese delegation brought a letter inquiring if His Excellency the Governor was willing to negotiate for the surrender of Hong Kong. The communiqué continued:

"His Excellency rejected this proposal, and replied that he was not prepared in any circumstance to hold any meeting or parley on such a subject.

"Not only is this Colony strong enough to resist all attempts at invasion but it has the loyal backing of the resources and peoples of the British Empire, of the United States of America, and of the Republic of China. British subjects, and those who have sought the

protection of the British Empire, can rest assured that there will never be any surrender to the Japanese."

Remembered some ten days later by the people of Hong Kong, the brave words of this reply had a sour and ironic sound (as, indeed, even at the time they were spoken they already had for the Chinese in Kowloon), but, as in the case of the evacuation of the mainland, there were the very best reasons for the way in which the thing was done. The positive wording of this rejection and the defiance of its tone were doubtless deliberately adopted by the British defenders of the colony in order to reassure the Chinese population, to whom any suggestion of equivocation in language would have meant that the high command regarded the situation as hopeless.

Hong Kong had already entered the second phase of its struggle when this first peace offer was rejected. The shelling on Thursday had been noticeably more intense and continued to increase thereafter both in intensity and in accuracy. The first air raid of Friday morning was the twenty-first which the colony had undergone since the opening of hostilities, and there were five more on the same day, the air-raid alert being "on" most of the morning and early afternoon.

Keynoting the more desperate situation in which the colony now found itself, the governor on Saturday issued a statement addressed to the Civil Defense Services, in which he thanked them, and stated: "There is before you a task that can and will be done if you will go to it with all your courage and all your might. The defense of Hong Kong against the aggressor is going to be the finest page in the Colony's history. See that your name is written on that page. Good fortune to you all."

The Bund was now regarded as the "front line," and it had overnight flowered in sandbags and barbed-wire entanglements and was deserted by pedestrians, since it was widely feared that the rejection of the peace offer would be followed by a crossing directly over the harbor. Saturday passed relatively quietly, however; there were only two air raids, no new developments in the shelling, and no attempt at a landing on the island.

On Sunday there were markedly sharper artillery exchanges, but only one air raid with six planes taking part in it. Five of these, following a practice which was now becoming more and more frequent, maneuvered over the more heavily populated areas of the island,

dropping thousands of handbills in Chinese telling the populace of the pride and cruelty of their British rulers, who were, these documents alleged, sacrificing the Chinese community to maintain a futile defense. As was usual when enemy planes were overhead, the anti-aircraft fire was continuous and was credited with driving the raiders away.

Monday (the fifteenth of December) saw both bombing and shelling again intensified, with eight air alerts and continual artillery exchanges. A lone Japanese plane was shot down in Stanley Bay, and another was believed to have been winged. Two vessels could be seen burning in Kowloon Bay, set afire by British batteries. All the steam launches, ferries, and other steam or motor craft that had been moored on the Hong Kong side were scuttled.

A communiqué issued at ten o'clock Tuesday morning stated that the night had been quiet, with no change in the position; one at two-thirty in the afternoon repeated the assertion that there had been no change; while that issued in the evening reported: "There has been a sharp artillery duel with the enemy throughout the day, with our guns maintaining their ascendancy. We succeeded in silencing two of the enemy's gun positions this morning, and another one this afternoon. Our batteries suffered no damage."

There had been four air raids in the morning and three in the afternoon, in the course of which the city had been bombed and pamphlets had again been dropped. Of the artillery action it was said, with literal truth, that there was a continual stream of shells overhead.

Wednesday morning it was even worse. Hong Kong was experiencing perhaps the worst bombing and shelling that it had received, or was to receive, throughout the war. The objectives appeared to lie, for the first time, in the congested business districts in the center of the town. A simultaneous bombardment was carried out. The Hong Kong Hotel, the Gloucester Hotel, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Building were all struck, although the damage done was relatively slight and the casualties were reported to have been light. The clock on the Gloucester Tower, which had kept accurate time through all previous bombardments, was evidently strafed by a dive-bomber and stopped dead.

At the beginning of the second week of the war, the controller of land transport issued a notice (in the "Gazette Extraordinary") stopping all private motoring and limiting the sale of gasoline to certain

designated pumps, where officers of the Transport Service checked on all persons desiring to buy it. Nearly all the privately owned cars and trucks in the colony had been requisitioned much earlier in the conflict; but this order stopped what remained of private traffic. The buses had been requisitioned, and the streetcar service, which for days had run only from dawn to dusk, was now indefinitely suspended.

Shop fronts throughout the business district were boarded over by their proprietors, such business as was done being, with a few exceptions, carried on through little peepholes or half-sized doors in the boarding. Everywhere glass store fronts and window panes were criss-crossed with pasted slips of paper to prevent them from shattering with the constant reverberations of shellfire and the continual thudding of exploding bombs or shells.

The streets were sprayed with a rubble of plaster and bricks and were in some places piled so high with debris as to be impassable. Many houses and buildings, particularly those of the older type of construction, were pulverized. The unremitting shelling made whole blocks uninhabitable even in areas where the actual damage was relatively lighter. As the hostilities progressed, more and more of the mid-level and Peak dwellings were literally blown off the side of the hill—among them the residence of the American consul-general, whose home was totally wrecked.

The effects of the bombing and shelling greatly increased the congestion which the presence of a large refugee population had caused. As we have seen, their influx in the years between 1937 and 1941 had more than doubled the number of people living in the colony, and many of them even before the war had slept on the streets. Now the problems of public sanitation, as well as those involved in the maintenance of order, were many times multiplied. The regular collection of garbage had to be suspended, and the public was being urged to burn or bury their own refuse. The system of night-soil collection was breaking down, and on Tuesday, December 16, running water was turned off all over the city except between the hours of six and nine in the morning and three-thirty and six-thirty in the afternoon. Later on in the week the supply to large areas was cut off altogether, and some shift had to be made with what water could be got from long-unused wells which were now reopened.

Well over a hundred thousand people were being fed daily at the communal kitchens opened and run by the Office of the Food Con-

troller. They would begin each day to queue up at dawn and wait patiently for their turns. There were queues also at such of the rice shops as had been prevailed upon to open and at most of the other stores that sold essential provisions. At the better-class stores it was the practice to admit only a few customers at a time, allowing the line to wait outside. The medical and sanitary controller stated on Monday that he was making every effort to procure the reopening of at least a minimum number of drug stores to permit the public to obtain essential drugs.

Because handbills dropped from Japanese planes had said that, when the city was captured, Hong Kong notes in denominations higher than ten dollars would not be accepted, the poorer Chinese began hoarding small paper notes and coins until both had almost disappeared from circulation, the consequent shortage being partially supplied by a large issuance of five-dollar Chinese National Currency notes, overprinted as Hong Kong dollar bills.

The arcades of the Gloucester and Hong Kong hotels and of other large buildings in the business area were crowded with families of Chinese refugees living and sleeping in them for such protection as they were believed to afford against the bombing and shelling. There were unnumbered thousands living day and night in the many air-raid tunnels throughout the city.

To this situation of siege, as grim as it was, the populace as a whole adjusted itself rapidly, and the Civil Defense Services, covering air-raid precautions, first aid, food, transport, fire control, etc., seemed capable of continuing their functions indefinitely. Many of the most active in these were Chinese or Eurasians, and the Chinese community seemed unified behind the government's effort to maintain resistance. To these people a message from Prime Minister Churchill, published on Tuesday, December 16, and telling them that "we are all watching day by day and hour by hour your stubborn defense of Hong Kong. All our hearts are with you in your ordeal. Every day of your resistance brings near our certain victory," did not come amiss.

But there was growing evidence throughout this period that an attitude of disaffection discernible in a small minority of the Chinese was tending to dissipate the government's own faith in the loyalty of the rank and file of the people whom it was attempting to defend. The authorities had always feared the existence of a strong fifth column in Hong Kong, and after the withdrawal from the mainland they

evidently found themselves confronted with what they apprehended to be widespread defections among the Chinese populace. A sign of this apprehension was the issuance, presumably at the instance of the government, of a statement by Admiral Chan Chak, the leading Chinese citizen in Hong Kong, appealing to the Chinese residents there to assist the government in every way possible and to keep close watch on the treacherous conduct of unruly elements. The admiral also paid tribute to the British defenders and asserted that the Chinese armies were advancing to effect a junction with them. A second such appeal, issued by the representative of Overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, was published in the Chinese press on the following Tuesday, urging them to "put forth their strength to preserve order with the object of defeating the enemy."

Over the week end of the thirteenth and fourteenth numerous arrests were made, and on the afternoon of Monday, the fifteenth, one of the leading Cantonese merchants in Hong Kong, one Chan Lim-pak, renowned as a reactionary and reputed to have extensive underworld connections, was taken into custody, charged with working contrary to the interests of the government. An unsubstantiated rumor ran through the colony at this arrest, giving it a thrill of horror: Chan was the head of an organization of some thirty thousand Wang Ching-wei "fifth columnists"; they had procured further recruits among the disaffected Chinese in Hong Kong and had worked out detailed arrangements for seizing the city while its garrison was engaged by the Japanese. The plot (the rumor ran) had been discovered just in time and had been frustrated by the large Chinese "Blueshirt" organization in Hong Kong which remained loyal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. This story, and many others like it, pictured two different groups of Chinese gangsters as struggling for the police control of Hong Kong. It is perhaps not to be wondered at that the reaction of some among those of the foreign residents in the colony who credited these stories was that they would almost rather see the island surrendered to the Japanese than either to lose control of it to one gang or to continue in control through the support of the other.

Further color was lent to these fears by reports that the protection "racket," which had been faring so well in Kowloon since the previous Thursday and Friday, had begun to flourish in Hong Kong under the very noses of the authorities. Many merchants in the central

district, for instance, were approached with promises of protection on the payment of certain fees; articles in the press printed at the behest of the authorities urged them to turn down all such propositions.

As of Monday a strict curfew was imposed, with the avowed purpose of curbing what was felt to be the growing lawlessness, and only persons bearing valid defense passes were permitted on the streets between 7:30 P.M. and 6:30 A.M. A complete blackout had been imposed since the beginning of the hostilities, and it was hoped that the curfew would simplify police functions during the hours of darkness.

On the following day (Tuesday, the sixteenth of December), a further police measure, calculated to simplify the search for arms on the persons of suspects, was taken: the Chinese were warned not to go about the streets with their hands in their pockets or, when they were wearing Chinese clothes, not to put them in the backs of their gowns; they were to walk with their hands at their sides. It was found necessary also to issue repeated warnings against harmful talk and the spreading of idle rumors, on the threat of serious penalties. The recruiting of Chinese into the essential services virtually stopped, although many continued to volunteer.

Perhaps as a propaganda effort calculated further to weaken that defense, or because the Japanese felt that their "air-blitz" of the morning might have taken effect, a second Japanese peace mission, of the same composition as the first but with the addition of a naval officer, came over to Hong Kong from Kowloon in the forenoon of Wednesday (December 17) to deliver a letter to the governor. It returned again at 2:30 P.M. to receive his answer. A government communiqué described the mission as follows:

"The Governor has today received a letter from the Japanese Military and Naval authorities repeating the suggestion that he should enter into negotiations with them for the surrender of Hong Kong.

"In his reply His Excellency has declined absolutely to enter into any negotiations, and has notified the Japanese authorities that he is not prepared to receive any further communications from them on the subject."

On the following day, Thursday, the governor was informed telegraphically by the British government that "the stirring conduct of all defenders of the fortress is being watched with admiration and

confidence by the whole Empire and by our Allies throughout the world. Hold on!" To which His Excellency replied, "We are going to hold on!"

In the situation in which he found himself the governor could have made no other reply, and there is no doubt but that all his instincts and training committed him to resistance to the end, but this first act of the longer drama was to close differently than he may have hoped. On Thursday evening, taking advantage of a natural smoke screen laid across the tip of North Point (the east end of the residential district on the northern side of Hong Kong Island and the point closest to Kowloon Peninsula) by the burning of an installation there after it had been shelled—and which protected them from observation or fire from the landward artillery to the south—the Japanese began to land in that area. Their operations were almost uninterrupted and continued in broad daylight through Friday morning, it being subsequently explained that none of the island's gun emplacements were so constructed as to permit of artillery being brought to bear on the fairly constant stream of boats with which the Japanese were ferrying over the forces with which they were to take the island. Landings were also made at Taikoo and possibly simultaneously at other points.

Appealing to His Majesty's forces to meet this new threat, the governor told them: "The time has come to advance against the enemy: be strong, be resolute, and do your duty!" But the Japanese forces kept coming on, and by Saturday they had captured and lost, and then captured again, the vitally strategic Wongneichong Gap, the key to the defenses of the island. Landings at other places had evidently made possible a wide infiltration of Japanese sharpshooters and advance squads throughout the whole eastern end of the island.

An officer of the government charged with liaison with the American consulate-general stated on Sunday that there was no hope, with the forces available, of clearing the island, nor could relief from Chinese forces on the mainland possibly arrive before the first week in January. But there still seemed to be a chance, and the defenders had the day previously released an encouraging communiqué:

"Operations have been proceeding satisfactorily today. Parties of the enemy have been mopped up in the Repulse Bay area and our troops have pushed the enemy back across Happy Valley.

"A message has been received from General Yu Hanmou from

which it appears that his forces are now within a very short distance of Hong Kong and the relief of the Garrison can be expected in the near future."

Reference was also made to the appearance of three bombers and six fighter escorts which had been observed dive-bombing the Japanese positions in Kowloon. These were generally believed to be planes of the Chinese armies coming to the colony's relief.

Sunday's communiqué reported that the lines were being held with difficulty and that the enemy was attempting to reinforce his positions on the south of the island. During the bitter and decisive fighting of the next three days communiqués continued laconic.

A relatively successful effort was also being made in the problem of anticipating and forestalling any action by fifth columnists. An officer of the Chinese armies, holding the rank of brigadier general, stated on December 23 that he had been charged with acting as liaison officer with the numerous members of China's largest secret society resident in Hong Kong and that the government was paying him \$50,000 a day for distribution among them. A corps of six hundred of them had been formed to go into the North Point sector with small arms and hand grenades, and negotiations were in progress with the British military authorities to procure the necessary permission to arm them. The communiqué of December 24 read: "There has been no further Japanese advance since the last communiqué. The slight enemy penetration in the direction of Mount Cameron is being firmly held. Our lines remain intact."

Suddenly, and for no perceptible reason, a wave of optimism surged through the city's populace: the Chinese troops, it was said, had already engaged the Japanese rear in the New Territories, and the defenders of the island had surrounded the main part of the Japanese forces on Mount Cameron and were proceeding to destroy them. People went about what little Christmas shopping they had to do in an almost festive spirit.

On the morning of December 25, Christmas Day, the governor issued his last message to his people. He urged them to have faith in the colony's defenders and said that there was no reason why Hong Kong could not be held indefinitely.

Meanwhile the base was again crumbling away from beneath this high wall of courageous intent. The Canadian forces which had been

defending the Mount Cameron sector had been driven from it, and about noon on that same Christmas Day the decision was taken to surrender. It is stated to have been communicated to the Japanese at two-thirty that afternoon, the surrender taking effect at four o'clock. Sir Mark Young was required to proceed across the harbor to the Peninsula Hotel in Kowloon, where formal capitulation of the colony was accepted on December 26. The Japanese Army entered the city at dawn on the following day.

ANARCHY AND LOOTING

FOR the first day and a half following the sudden denouement in the drama of the "Fortress," the whole colony lay in a state of dazed and quiescent expectancy. The city itself was still unoccupied, such Japanese troops as were in evidence having moved in quite gradually. This lull continued until the full force of the conquering army entered the city on the morning of the twenty-seventh.

The phase which then opened was more than anything else a period of looting. The pillaging was inaugurated by the military authorities themselves, and rarely in the annals of warfare has a territory as small as Hong Kong offered such immense loot. As has been indicated, the colony was literally a storehouse of provisions and materials of every sort. Not only had the government forehandedly built up stocks of essential commodities in preparation for resistance to a siege of from four to six months but the shortage of shipping, which had become acute in the summer of 1941, had brought about an accumulation of stock piles in the city's godowns that represented, in some commodities at least, a supply sufficient for the colony for from two to three years. It had been possible to destroy only a small part of these supplies, and the Japanese authorities were employed for days in locating the balance of them, assembling them, and getting them aboard the ships which were brought into Hong Kong Harbor to take them away, presumably to Japan.

All the automobiles in Hong Kong and Kowloon were collected, most of them being placed either on the race course or the cricket field on the island or, in Kowloon, in the compound of the Police Recreation Club. There they stood for weeks before they were finally removed. A few of them were retained intact in the colony; some were stripped down to procure the engines and parts; but by far the

greatest number of them were eventually shipped out. Quantities of metal and scrap were removed, and some of the industrial plants were stripped of their machinery. The major part of these activities was concluded in the first ten days of the occupation, but occasional removals of valuable lots of scrap and other things by the Japanese continued through the period for which information is available, all this booty apparently going directly to Japan.

A second action of the Japanese authorities, which in its effects represented an extension of the looting, was the wholesale sealing of stocks that were not to be immediately removed and of premises which either had not yet been looted or which appeared to the authorities to be desirable localities for their offices or businesses. The sealing consisted simply in pasting big Japanese seals, which it would be an offense against martial law for any unauthorized person to break, over the doors of the godowns or premises affected. In this operation the Army and Navy were vigorous rivals one of the other, and to some Chinese it seemed that the two branches of the Japanese armed services were each rushing about trying to snatch as much of the booty from the other as it could. The result of this competitive spirit was that in a very short time all stocks which had not been moved to Japan and all useful premises in the business sections of Hong Kong, as well as the better-class private residences, were sealed.

Perhaps the most picturesque phase of this period of looting grew out rather of individual initiative than of the collective activities of the Japanese Army and Navy. For weeks following their entry into Hong Kong, every individual Japanese seemed to be trying to outdo every other in looting, the most desired objects evidently being wrist watches and fountain pens. They appeared to be only slightly less interested in wrist watches than they were in rape, and many a stocky, dull-faced Jap private marched proudly about the streets of Hong Kong in the first days of the occupation with his left arm covered from wrist to elbow with one watch after another. The process of collecting these was the simple one of sticking a gun or a bayonet into anyone they could find, in or out of doors, and pointing to their victim's left wrist to indicate what they wanted.

One foreigner, who happened to be Swiss and who therefore was supposed by the Japanese to be necessarily an expert on watches, was approached by various Japanese soldiers, who asked—with their rifles on him—that he evaluate such and such a watch or tell them why it

would not run. More than once the writer has seen two of these mental ten-year-olds meeting on the street, each with his shirt sleeve pulled back to his shoulder to show the other the extent and variety of his collection.

The childishness which marked these relatively minor depredations would have been amusing had there not been so many evidences of other much more vicious activities on the part of the same soldiery.

Of course, these looting activities spread into much wider fields, and for weeks the Chinese found it necessary to make a present of practically anything any Japanese wanted rather than risk the consequences of irritating him by haggling over prices.

The Chinese themselves, however, did not miss the opportunity which this period of anarchy afforded, although from an objective standpoint they perhaps had a far greater justification, the collapse of the ordinary life of the community having left them in many cases without food or fuel or money to buy either. Hundreds of the poorest Chinese swarmed over the higher levels of the hillside facing the harbor, where most of the better residences had been, and onto the Peak itself, looting everything that they could put their hands on. Many of these homes had suffered from the shelling, and the billeting system enforced by the British during the abortive defense of the island had in almost every case removed the original tenants from them, so that they were in many cases fully furnished and vacant, open to anyone who passed on the road. All the most valuable *objets d'art*, the higher-priced radios, and the other objects of easily recognizable value would already have been carted away by the Japanese; but the Chinese looters found plenty in what was left. Toward the end, when all the furniture had been broken up and everything portable removed, the tearing-down of woodwork and fixtures began. In one house on May Road, for instance, after it had been completely stripped of movable property, the looters tore out all the window frames on the second story, took up the floors, tore down all the paneling, and then backed downstairs, step by step, tearing up the stairway after them as they went, taking it out completely. They then proceeded on the first floor as they had on the second.

It was natural that the Japanese should resent this competition, and it was not an uncommon sight to see a Japanese gendarme or guard taking pot shots at Chinese in the acting of looting some house or other on the side of the hill. In other cases the looters were arrested

and executed (after the Japanese had impounded their booty), but, generally speaking, this phase of the looting continued until its resources were exhausted.

Some of the foreigners in Hong Kong—that is to say, the British, American, and other “European” nationals—who themselves were in the main the chief victims of this orgy of looting, did a little looting on their own. The head butcher of the Dairy Farm, a British subject married to a Chinese and long a resident of Hong Kong, is said to have “turned over” to the Japanese and to have become one of the leading spirits in the Japanese Investigation Corps, where his brutality and dishonesty have been described as being remarkable even in the group with which he was working. He is reported, for instance, to have taken over all the property in two of the best apartment houses on May Road. Various and detailed accounts of these depredations on the part of the former “meat man” circulated in the colony; they were brought particularly forcibly to the writer’s attention because the latter’s apartment, where a considerable quantity of his property had been stored, is alleged to have been one of those taken over by the individual in question. He is also rumored to have been interested in diamonds and precious stones and to be by now the possessor of a considerable collection of them. His is perhaps not the only case in which a foreigner took advantage of the collapse of public order in Hong Kong to enrich himself on sheer theft, but most foreigners who took any part in the looting did so from another motive. At least one group of interned American nationals, for instance, were forced, at considerable personal risk, to “scrounge” some of the articles absolutely essential to their well-being. One item which they had, under the noses of their guards, to slip out and search through empty houses for were the water filters that afforded them the only protection they had against the very polluted water supply that was all that was available to them. These and other necessary articles were not supplied them by the Japanese, and they had no alternative but to take them, risking being shot the while.

The Japanese soldiery did not stop at looting. On the night of the assault on the island, when the official assurance of the colonial government had left the whole residential area in western Wanchai unaware of the closeness of its danger, home after home was surprised by squads of the toughest Jap soldiers in the first wave of the landing party, who made no ceremony of shooting the men and raping the

women. In one well-authenticated case a European and his daughters were at dinner together, with no intimation that anything was amiss, when suddenly a squad of Japanese burst into the room. Ordering the father out onto the lawn of the house, they bound him and left him to listen to his daughters' screams. The girls they took down to the basement, and each man of the squad is said to have raped each of them. This was just a starter: it is certainly not the only incident in which, in the days and weeks that followed, white women were brutally raped.

Their officers had evidently cautioned the Japanese soldiery against the bad effects of the wholesale raping of Chinese women, because they had all learned the Cantonese "Fa Ku Niang" ("Flower Girls"), a euphemism for prostitutes. Breaking into Chinese homes in the middle of the night and yelling their savage orders in Japanese, that single expression was usually the only one that was intelligible to the frightened householders; the soldiers themselves quickly reduced its use to a mere formality, on the assumption that every woman they saw and wanted was a "Flower Girl" anyway. Women so used had no agency to which to report the fact, and usually they did their best to hide it. But there were too many detailed and factual stories for all of them to be false; and in one instance which was reported to the writer on good authority and which may be taken as typical, a Chinese woman of good family was raped three times in one night, her last attacker leaving a ten-yen note in her hand. In another, a large number of women were herded into a room and dispatched one by one into another room, where a squad of Japanese soldiers "worked over" them.

Later on, a penalty of three months' imprisonment under military law was laid down by the Japanese for soldiers against whom charges of rape could be proved to the satisfaction of their superiors, and there seems to have been some desire on the part of the authorities to lessen the evil, if not to eliminate it. There were fairly frequent and fairly well-authenticated cases as late as the latter part of August, 1942, and even now, several years later, we here in Chungking occasionally hear from some recent escapee from Hong Kong a circumstantial story of new outrages. It must also be noted, however, that—according to several Chinese who left the colony in the interim—the once-dreaded appellation "Flower Girl" has come to be more commonly used by Japanese soldiers as a somewhat sheepish form of approach to

Chinese girls than as a signal that they are about to rape them. It is said, too, that some of the more attractive of the younger Chinese women still in Hong Kong have since "accepted" the "protection" of particular Japanese men, preferring that form of servitude to the continual risk of rape and consequent disease.

Looking back on all this rape and rapine, it seems obvious to us now that Hong Kong was subjected to the unnecessarily prolonged period of anarchy which followed upon the fall of the colony as what we may call a primary "technique of control" to force the Chinese population to a realization of its position—of the fact that it would have to accept Japanese domination and that its leaders would have to co-operate with the Japanese to maintain even the most basic essentials of livelihood.

The looting and rape were only phases of the situation in which the Chinese then found themselves. The wholesale flight of the more well-to-do left the community without shops or commercial services, and even those who remained could do no business because their stores had been sealed and their stocks confiscated. Doctors, dentists, and other professional men disappeared. Leaders of integrity who had served under the governments of Hong Kong or of China faded into the masses, and many of them managed to slip away. Food was very difficult to procure; only small denominations of the Hong Kong notes were of any known value, and those had largely vanished as the result of hoarding. All these things had come about in a very brief period.

The facts were at first too hard for the public to face. Not three hours after the surrender, the city was alive with the most extraordinary rumors and reports. Typical of these was the widely accepted assertion that a Mr. Gimson, the former British colonial secretary, was to be appointed governor by the Japanese, who were to maintain British authority on the island just as it had been prior to the fall.

A curious reflection of this inability of many Hong Kong people to understand the full implications of their situation appeared in a letter dated December 28, 1941, written by this same Mr. Gimson to one Colonel Okada of the Japanese military headquarters in Hong Kong. In this document Mr. Gimson, who signs himself as the "Colonial Secretary, Governor's Representative," refers to one Mr. Gibson, whom he states is the "Petrol Controller," and says of him that "[he] is in charge of the petrol supplies of the Island, and could

be of considerable assistance to you in arranging for the distribution and arrangement of these supplies when necessary," and adds in a second paragraph: "Any results reached as a result of this discussion will be, as usual, subject to my approval." Even if it represented an effort to comply with the terms of the capitulation, it is still a strangely worded document: written on December 28, 1941, it brings forward into the present tense things which had ceased to be true three days before and ignores events which, however recently they might have transpired, were already as much a part of history as was the death of Nelson.

Other rumors which flew from mouth to mouth throughout the colony on that Christmastide of Hong Kong's humiliation were to the effect that Italy had laid down her arms and was suing Britain for peace; that Finland had negotiated a separate peace; that Marshal Pétain had committed suicide; that there had been a revolution in France against the Nazi regime; and so on, ad infinitum. Many of these things have to one degree or another been realized since, but in that hour they were sheer fantasies, the last projections of faith in a superiority which had never really existed; and when, one by one, the stories were shown to have been untrue, the bubble burst and there was the sharpest reaction.

Among Chinese this reaction was naturally the most sweeping where there had been the most complete reliance upon British protection, but no literate Chinese escaped it. Perhaps the best expression of this feeling appeared in a very bitter editorial published in the Japanese-controlled *Hong Kong News* of January 14 (1942), which said, *inter alia*:

"Today the British and Americans have a much greater respect for the Oriental soldier—for in Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines the outcome has been the same: the vaunted supermen of the white race have melted like butter. . . .

"In eighteen days of conflict it was all over—a horrible muddle of inefficiency and helplessness which has bequeathed a miserable aftermath."

This editorial was almost certainly the work of a very intelligent Eurasian who wrote for one of the leading Hong Kong papers before the war, and, although it was obviously published for propaganda

purposes, it is believed to be an authentic reflection of the thinking of many Hong Kong Chinese after the colony's capture. This widespread feeling of betrayal and disgust lent itself naturally to the clever exploitation of the Japanese in their efforts to enlist Chinese co-operation in the control of Hong Kong; more than that, it was rich soil in which to sow the seeds of a slower and more poisonous growth.

Meanwhile, the special treatment that Hong Kong's populace had been receiving was beginning to work. The first concrete evidence afforded the Japanese that the Chinese community had had enough of anarchy was given them in a long petition drawn up by the Executive Committee of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, comprising nineteen of its members under the chairmanship of Tung Chung-wei. Under the British rule the Chamber had represented the wealthiest and most influential of the Chinese traders in the colony, and Tung, a typical businessman of the older Chinese type, was its treasurer and a member of its executive committee. Perhaps because of a latent hostility to foreigners and their ways, or as a result of some earlier connection with the Japanese, Tung was one of the first, if not the most important, of those residents of Hong Kong who, having grown fat on British favor, turned with unction to the Japanese. But we must not forget that the situation which the Japanese had deliberately created was in literal truth intolerable and that, if Tung had not come forward, someone else would have had to.

The petition, formally presented to the Japanese military on January 10, after fifteen days of lawlessness, covered nine essential services in which the disruption of supplies gravely endangered the community: food, fuel, water, electricity, telephones, public safety, currency, communications, and prostitution. The last of these was regarded by the city fathers as one of the most important: the law of "supply and demand" had been the rule of their lives, and they calculated that as long as the brothels remained closed, and the regular supply was shut off, just so long would Japan's soldiery demand the services of family women as their "Flower Girls."

NETWORK OF CONTROLS

ONLY the things that nothing could stop kept on. There were still people who died of natural causes, and whose death notices appeared in the press much as such notices had in the past; mothers went on having children; and every day the papers carried advertisements of the intention to wed, inserted by couples who could not wait for the reopening of the office of the Registrar of Marriages. But even in these things life was deeply vexed and the habitual courses turned from their ways. The recently deceased could not be paid the respect that was due them; as often as not the mother bore her child without any practiced hand to help her, making the risk both to the new life and the old a much graver one; for the young couple and their families the insertion of a simple notice in the press was a poor substitute, indeed, for all the rich usages of the marriage feast and ceremony. Every aspect of Hong Kong's life was affected by the period of shock and confusion which we have described; the whole social organization of the city was paralyzed by it.

When the Japanese had allowed this situation to continue for long enough so that they were sure they could count upon at least a minimum of Chinese co-operation, they began to attempt the restoration of order, at the same time seeking the revival of the separate phases of the community's existence, imposing upon each the forms of control which they felt were most likely to bind it to their purposes.

This process proceeded unevenly, being in some instances undertaken immediately and in others only after weeks or months. Therefore, in examining the development of these controls, we will consider, one by one, the phases of organization to which they were applied, reaching back where necessary to the date of the city's fall.

It was the stated intention of the Japanese military upon their occu-

pation of Hong Kong to govern it as a *captured fortress under military bureaux*, and, although most observers were agreed that they proved much less efficient as administrators than they had been as an army in the field, they never swerved from that simple program.

In line with this purpose the first act of the commander-in-chief of the invading army was to issue on the day of the fall of Hong Kong a proclamation placing the colony under martial law. This proclamation listed any action or rebellion against the Nipponese Imperial Army, any sort of espionage activity, and any action which would endanger the safety of the Nipponese Imperial Army or cause any obstruction to military movements as crimes and listed as the punishments for them, according to the gravity of the offense, death, imprisonment, banishment, fine, and confiscation. This "confiscation" was presumably of all the property of the guilty person; articles of any sort connected with or obtained in the commission of one of the listed crimes were confiscable *per se*.

As it was subsequently interpreted, this proclamation served simply to give some semblance of legality to any action which the Japanese military wanted to take against anyone under their control. It was published regularly in the Japanese-owned English-language newspaper and in the Chinese press for the first two weeks of the occupation, emphasizing by public notice a circumstance of which every resident of Hong Kong was already being made well aware—that is, that the military intended to do exactly as they pleased. Except as it worked to assure the security of the forces of occupation—its primary purpose—and to intimidate to some extent the criminal fringe of the Chinese population, it probably only added to the anarchy which existed.

On January 2, 1942, the establishment was announced of the first regular governmental organization for the administration of the civil population of Hong Kong. It was called the "Civil Department of the Japanese Army" (later called the "Civil Administration Department" to parallel the "Military Administration Department"). Major General Yazaki, a ranking officer of the occupying army, was nominated its chief. Its office was established in the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank; the first press report describing it stated that other officers had been deputed to function on its staff and that it had opened on January 1. Some of the subordinate officers of the department were civilians, and the clerical staff appears to have been largely Chinese. A Hong

Kong bureau of the Department (i.e., for Hong Kong Island) was subsequently opened under a civilian Japanese, one Mr. Sometani.

In the Department's first notice, issued on the day of its establishment, it declared that the Japanese Army had seized Hong Kong with the object of sweeping out British and American influence from the Far East and establishing a New Order in East Asia, freeing the races of the East. The Japanese Army assumed responsibility, it asserted, for the protection of the lives and property of the Chinese people, who should resume their businesses, "fearlessly placing their confidence in the Japanese Army."

A second notice issued at the same time stated that the Hong Kong government was now under the protection of the Japanese Army and that, with the exception of British officials, all those formerly serving in the government ought to resume their functions as soon as possible; that they should neither transgress the law nor act in a disorderly manner; and that, if they were caught doing so, no leniency would be shown them. All labor and shops were instructed to resume business as soon as possible and not to "act contrary to law" or "else they will be dealt with."

A third notice informed the people of Hong Kong that, with a view to restoring conditions in the colony, the Japanese Army was doing its utmost to repair the water, electrical, and gas systems but warned that "any persons found wasting water will be dealt with according to Japanese Army law without any leniency."

In the situation which then existed the creation of the Civil Administration Department went almost altogether unnoticed, and it was weeks before effect was to be given to any of these exhortations and promises. The "softening-up" process had not yet lasted long enough.

Meanwhile, although the Japanese counted to no small extent on the inevitable Chinese reaction against the period of anarchy to procure their co-operation in the government of Hong Kong, they were not limiting themselves to such subtle methods. One of their first steps after their entry into the colony was to corral as quickly as possible all Chinese leaders of the Hong Kong community who could be found, together with any Chinese of national importance who happened to be caught there. These men were usually taken to one or another of the large hotels—although some of them were kept incommunicado in their own homes—and subjected to every sort of pressure and every

kind of appeal to enlist their "voluntary" support for the objectives of Japan in Asia.

Two of them, Dr. W. W. Yen and Eugene Ch'en, both of whom had in the course of their careers been foreign ministers in the Chinese government, were given especial attention. First held in adjoining rooms of the Peninsula Hotel, they were later reported to have been moved across the harbor to the Hong Kong Hotel. They were well fed and quite well treated but were not permitted to communicate with anyone, not even with each other, although they had been in former days political opponents. In their cases the Japanese military were said to have plans beyond the question of Hong Kong's government; it was reported via the "underground" that Yen was being offered the post of foreign minister in the Nanking regime, while another ministerial post was to be given to Ch'en. They were taken in the spring of 1942 to Shanghai, where they were doubtless subjected to further pressure; on March 1, 1943, the Japanese House of Representatives was officially told that both of these men "had agreed to co-operate with the Nanking Government," and reports again circulated of the posts which they had accepted. But again the facts were very different. Eugene Ch'en died on May 20, 1944, at the age of sixty-seven of a heart ailment, without having become a quisling, and W. W. Yen, after once attempting suicide by drinking a well-known disinfectant, continues persistently to refuse active participation in Japanese schemes on the ground that he has "retired from politics."

With Hong Kong residents of lesser stature the Japanese were more successful. On January 10, 1942, 133 of the Chinese who had been the recipients of their attentions, and who were described in the Japanese-controlled press as "former Chinese Justices of the Peace and other distinguished leaders representing all sections of Chinese society," were brought together at a luncheon held in the largest ballroom in the Peninsula Hotel, at which Lieutenant General Takashi Sakai, the commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces in South China, was their host. He had commanded the army which had taken Hong Kong, and there were present with him many of his ranking subordinates.

In his speech to the assembled Chinese, General Sakai stated that (1) the brave troops that he led had seized Hong Kong and Kowloon in "a little over ten days," driving out "the evil forces of the British"; he had not been fighting the Chinese of Hong Kong, for whom he had the deepest sympathy and whom he hoped would understand the

"object of co-prosperity for all the races of Great East Asia"; he had not used "artillery and large bombs in order to avoid hurting the common people and damaging the city"; (2) the British Colonial Administration planned only for its own profit, not caring about the life or death of the Chinese people; his audience should awaken to the fact that, in this battle, the British government "used Chinese Volunteers, Canadians, and Indians in the front line," while the English soldiers "were hiding in the hills"; investigation of the casualty lists "showed mostly colored troops with very few Englishmen among them," from which it could be seen that "English soldiers fear death and covet life"; (3) the Chinese and Japanese are of the same people, have the same literature, and belong to the same Great East Asian race; the many Chinese "in all the islands of South East Asia" also were members of "our race," and he hoped that his words might also be transmitted to them, so that they too might "join in the establishment of a Greater East Asia"; (4) he would spare no effort to make Hong Kong and Kowloon a place "where people may reside in peace." He asked his guests to form a local assistance committee to exert all their strength to help him.

The general then proceeded to a rough outline of his program for the "reconstruction" of Hong Kong. The first item he listed was *order*: this was the responsibility of the military authorities, but, to avoid "inconvenience" to the populace from the use of too many troops, the Chinese police were being re-employed, and the people might organize their own self-protection guards under the direction of the officials.

The second important item which, he indicated, was to receive the attention of the military government was the *currency*. Describing it as the "blood of business," he said that he had "appointed people to deal with the matter"; that there was a reason for the nonacceptance of higher notes; that his guests, as the wealthy and influential element of the population, should "for the time being tell all the people not to think of hurting other people or to spread idle rumors."

Of his third item, *the relief of business*, he expressed the hope that his guests would "get together and help in settling the fuel and rice problems" and that they would "devise methods for this, and apply to the Administration for permission to carry them out."

Return to employment was the fourth problem the general discussed. Of it he said: "Labor and business have stopped now for many days. You should help in advising all classes of people to return to their employment at an early date."

The fifth and last item was *cleaning up the city*. Of this the general told his guests that they should advise the people to start putting in order the places where they lived, thus helping the authorities to deal more easily with the problem of cleanliness.

This speech was actually delivered in Japanese, being translated—for the sake of those who were still shamefully ignorant of the Sun Goddess' language—into Cantonese; for our text of it we have had to rely upon an English translation appearing in the Japanese-controlled English-language *Hong Kong News*. It was the writer's impression at the time that the editors of this paper were very shrewdly "toning down" or completely eliminating some of the more virulent expressions of anti-white propaganda directed at the local inhabitants. The readers of the *News* were a relatively small percentage of the total population and would presumably be less gullible than the mass of the inhabitants, so that they had to be approached on a somewhat more rational plane. There was thus no use in giving them the same raw propaganda line that was being generally used; in fact, it was dangerous to do so, because material printed in English in a controlled organ might easily find its way in the hands of German or other "white" allies or friends of Japan.

It is likely, therefore, that what we have is a restrained version, but even in that form it affords a fairly typical example of the Japanese approach. The British had taken the island from China a hundred years ago, subjecting it to the most corrupt misrule in the interim; the Japanese had now taken it back, ending that tyranny. Since the Chinese and the Japanese were of the same race, the circumstance that the Japanese intended to keep the island from that time forward as a part of their empire was not any more relevant than was the fact that, when the British first took it over, it was a rock at the mouth of the Pearl River. In other words, since all the races in Asia were in reality one and the same race, the arrival of the Japanese was the liberation of the race, and rule by the Japanese was self-rule. With the basic problems thus easily disposed of, everybody could live in peace from then on forever.

The same curious state of mind was reflected in the general's approach to the incidental items which he listed. There was one reason for the lack of order in Hong Kong, which he knew better than his audience. His suggestion that people organize their own "self-protection guards" so that it would not be necessary to "inconvenience" them by the use of too many troops was equally bland: it is

much more probable that the lack of sufficient troops, rather than the desire to avoid their use, was the determining factor in this disposition. He could not have supposed that Chinese street guards would be able effectively to control Japanese soldiery "on the loose." The hopeless confusion in the currency was the direct result of the general's own proclamation on the subject, and there would have been no need to come to the "relief of business" if the general's underlings had not seized or sealed all the stocks in the colony.

The Honorable Sir Robert Kotewall, Kt., C.M.G., LL.D. (to whom we have already made a most respectful bow), replied to the general on behalf of the Chinese community in Hong Kong and more particularly as the spokesman of those Chinese present. They had all been very pleased to receive the invitation of the supreme commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces in South China, and they had listened "with the most complete agreement" to what he had said. "The object of Imperial Japan is to release the races of East Asia," he parroted, desperately anxious to say the right thing. "We know that the Japanese Army has avoided harming the people of Hong Kong or destroying the city. We are very grateful to you for this. . . . Japan and China have the same literature and are of the same people. As regards the maintenance of order and reconstruction, we will put out all our strength in Hong Kong to co-operate with the Japanese Army authorities, and we will ask all the Chinese people to arise and unite that strength, so that they may achieve your objectives of permitting people to dwell in peace and carry on their business so that all may recover prosperity. . . . We thank the Emperor of Japan and may he live forever."

The Honorable Sir Shouson Chow, the aged and attractive Chinese who, as we know, had preceded Sir Robert Kotewall as the leader of the Chinese community, spoke after Sir Robert, agreeing "heartily" with all "Mr. Law Kuk-wo" had said.

On the following day, the twelfth of January (1942), the Executive Committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, comprising nineteen leading members of the Chamber (all of whom had been present at the general's luncheon), held a meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Tung Chung-wei—whom we have also met before—to "discuss ways and means of restarting business in Hong Kong" and to comply with Sakai's request that they form a local "assistance committee" to help him. It is probable that the group to be selected had already been

hand-picked and that the general had assured himself that he would be able to procure compliance with his request before he made it. In any case, the meeting of the twelfth produced a Committee of Nine, which adopted the title of "Rehabilitation Committee" (later changed to "Rehabilitation Advisory Committee") and elected "Mr. Law Kuk-wo" as its chairman and "Mr. Chow Shou-son" as its vice-chairman. Subsequently—on February 5—the membership was raised to twelve.

A second meeting of the committee, stated to have lasted some three hours, was held the following morning (January 13), and on January 14 its members were received by the Japanese military authorities at the Peninsula Hotel, where, according to the *Hong Kong News*, "they submitted their proposals for the immediate settlement of several important problems, such as rice supply, opening of communications and reopening of business." The discussion is stated to have been a long one and to have covered the whole field of Hong Kong's situation.

Indicating the Japanese intention to proceed further with the organization of the Chinese community, there appeared in the same press article which reported the meeting of the committee with the military a notice requesting all former Chinese justices of the peace who were present at General Sakai's luncheon to register their business or profession with the Rehabilitation Committee as soon as possible.

The next step in this direction was announced on January 21. As a result of "discussions"—presumably between the Civil Administration Department and the Rehabilitation Committee—it had been decided to divide the island of Hong Kong into twelve, and Kowloon into six, administrative districts, each of which was to be placed under a district bureau headed by a (Chinese) "Official in Charge." It was stated that these several bureaus would "look after the general welfare of residents in their particular areas, and also handle matters relating to public health, business, repatriation, and other matters of communal interest." They were subsequently to concern themselves with the issuance of certificates to the thousands of Chinese leaving daily for the interior of China; with the employment of the labor force to be used in the removal of garbage from the streets of their respective districts; and with the formation of street guards to augment the available police force in the maintenance of law and order. They also were later to assist in the functioning of the rice-rationing system.

On January 27, 1942, Major General Yazaki, chief of the Civil

Administration Department (and presumably the officer who had superintended the creation of the districts and the appointment of the "officials in charge"), called all the latter together and harangued them. The object of Japan in fighting this war was, he told them, to free the Asiatic races from oppression and to drive out the evil influence of the white people. Victory for Japan was certain, he averred, and at the end of the war Japan and China would co-operate with each other to bring a new era of prosperity for Greater East Asia. Of Hong Kong he said that steps for its rehabilitation were now under consideration, including the question of the reopening of banks, revival of business, resumption of communications, public safety, and education.

One Mr. Wong Ying-yue, a practiced Japanese puppet and the head of the Civil Administration Bureau in Canton, also addressed the assembled "officials in charge." After referring to the "oppressive methods adopted by the British during their rule of Hong Kong," he said that Japan's one desire—to be a "friend" of China's—had been blocked by Chiang Kai-shek, a tool of Britain and America; that both General Yazaki and Mr. Sometani (head of the Hong Kong bureau of the Civil Administration Department) were real friends of China.

Shortly after the establishment of this system of district bureaus, a further subdivision of the governing units was accomplished by the setting-up of *wards*. A little note published inconspicuously in the *Hong Kong News* of February 9 announced that the "Central District Committee" had "elected" 131 ward leaders; it was estimated, according to this statement, that there would be two thousand ward leaders in the twelve districts on Hong Kong Island. Presumably the same ratio per density of population was followed in the delineation of wards in the Kowloon districts, and there, as in Hong Kong, the "ward leaders" were responsible to the bureau of the district in which their ward was situated.

Over this relatively elaborate administrative machinery, calculated to encompass and bind the "Captured Territory" within the network of a petty Chinese officialdom committee to the service of the Japanese, there was set a "District Affairs Bureau," under the chairmanship of Mr. P. H. Sin, who was concurrently the official in charge of the Central District Bureau. Sin, known to foreigners before the fall of Hong Kong by his Christian name Peter—or the diminutive "Pete"—is a somewhat undersized, ill-favored individual with a bumpy face

and a brisk determination to get on in the world. A "joiner," he was a member of Rotary and a director of the active and influential Y's Men's Club of Hong Kong. Apparently not of altogether pure Chinese blood, he was overshadowed at Hong Kong's social functions by his attractive wife, a Eurasian from Australia, who stood over a head taller than he. But he was making up for that discrepancy by the success of his enterprises. A solicitor, he was the principal of P. H. Sin and Company, the vice-president of the Chung Shing Institute of Commerce, a member of the committee of the Diocesan School Old Boy's Association, and a vice-patron of St. John's Ambulance Brigade. In short, it was not inconceivable that he would one day be "Sir Peter," which would impress his wife if anything would.

The unexpected arrival of the Japanese in Hong Kong and their startling string of victories in the rest of Asia, which proved to Sin that they were there to stay, forced him to make certain superficial adjustments in the program, although the basic drives remained unaltered. He could be a "big shot" in the new setup, and certainly his wife would no longer be able to put on such airs about being part Australian.

The District Affairs Bureau, of which he became the chairman, was expected generally to concern itself with all matters affecting the welfare of the people on the island, and it was to it that the various district bureaus were directed to bring their problems and any reports they had to make on the views and wants of the people in their respective districts. It provided the liaison between the districts and the Civil Administration Department. Sin worked under Major General Yazaki and provided an alternate channel, a check and balance, as against the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee under Law Kuk-wo and Chow Shou-son. In Kowloon one Pang Yuk-lan was charged with functions similar to those of Sin in Hong Kong relative to the districts under him, although he is believed to have acted there as Sin's deputy and to have been expected to report rather to Sin than to Yazaki.

Sin came thus to be, after Law and possibly Chow, the most responsible Chinese in Kong Kong, and among the English-speaking Chinese of the "Captured Territory" he was called the "Mayor," a title implying the possession of powers which, as a minion of the Japanese, he did not enjoy.

THE "KINGLY WAY" OF ISOGAI



WE HAVE already recounted with what ceremony it was that on February 25, 1942, Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai became the first (and, by God's grace, the last) Japanese "Governor General of the Conquered Territory of Hong Kong."

We have also described in what manner it was that Sir Robert Kotewall chose to welcome him in the formal inaugural held in his honor. On that occasion the speech by "Mr. Law" was followed by others by Messrs. Chow Shou-son and Lau Tit-shing. Under the British regime both Sir Robert and Sir Shouson had at one time been members of the Legislative Council, and of their performance in this puppet show the sarcastic Eurasian editor of the *Hong Kong News* wisecracked: "When Knights were bold, they were Legislative Councillors. Now, of course, they're not so bold."

In response to fawning words Isogai declaimed, with an almost audible sneer:

"Hong Kong has been for long an important base in the Orient for furthering the decadent materialistic civilizations based on selfish individualism. . . . [Britain] regarded us, the Oriental races, as her subjects, supreme in her arrogant tyranny . . . there are some unscrupulous Oriental people who have often been content to be used as a cat's paw by the British people, thus seeking their own excessive gain and unhealthy pleasure. . . . In the Western section of the interior of China there are still Chinese who will realise that a wonderful opportunity is being offered them . . . they are content to act as the puppets of the British and Americans, having the selfish aim of protecting

their own power and influence. . . . Should there be any person in Hong Kong who still desires the selfish European civilization that has caused so much harm to the Oriental cultures . . . let that person leave here at the earliest opportunity and be a slave of the British or Americans. I will try to eradicate these undesirable elements. . . . As to the future policies for Hong Kong, they were clearly laid down in my Order of the Day issued on February 20. . . ."

So considerable a portion of this statement has been directly quoted because, like General Sakai's speech to his luncheon guests on January 10, it reveals clearly several of the characteristic facets of the Japanese mind and is at the same time a fair instance of the persistent, continuous, and very effective racial and cultural propaganda of the Japanese military. His reference to the "unscrupulous Oriental people" content to act as cats' paws of the British for "their own excessive gain and unhealthful pleasure" was a sharp and contemptuous slap in the face for the very men who had just finished figuratively kissing his feet; they could only grovel the more to express their gratitude for this further kindness. Of greater viciousness and deeper effect was his hammering on the theme of the "decadent materialistic civilization" (of the white man) which had enslaved and was destroying "Oriental culture." This is a myth that Isogai and his brother-generals implicitly believe: it was only just in the nick of time that the Son of Heaven (with their eager support) had intervened.

The order of the day which the general mentioned, and which had been published in the *Hong Kong News* of February 22, 1942, had not, however, "clearly laid down" any blueprint of his plans for Hong Kong. After asserting that "the base from which Britain, public enemy of mankind, plotted to fulfill her unlimited ferocity of heart, has now been extinguished, which is a cause for the heartiest rejoicings amongst the millions in East Asia," it continues:

"The great objective of the war in East Asia is certainly to guarantee the peace of East Asia, through which peace may extend to the whole world for the glorious happiness of all countries. Therefore Hong Kong, under military rule, should hereafter co-operate . . . to reconstruct its position and to help in the attainment of victory in the Greater East Asia War . . . the present strength and culture of the

place must be elevated to the same spiritual stream in order to attain the Kingly Way, which will shine upon the eternal basic prosperity of East Asia."

The residents of Hong Kong were exhorted to "eschew vices and sever themselves from easy practices in the light of the Kingly Way and give all their energies to the service of the community." The order closed with the oft-repeated and by no means empty threat: "As for those who transgress the path of Right. . . . these are the enemies of East Asia's millions and are not members of our Kingly Way. Irrespective of their nationality or race, I will deal with these according to military law, without mercy."

With the arrival of the governor, General Isogai, Major General Yazaki, who had been director of the Civil Administration Department and who had been largely responsible for the establishment of such controls of the civilian populace of Hong Kong as had so far been set up, was transferred to another post. On February 19 he gave a farewell luncheon party to the members of the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee at which he told them that since the governor's arrival that official would naturally look after all civil affairs. In the inevitable reply by Sir Robert Kotewall the general was told that everything that had been accomplished so far had been due to the latter's efforts and that the Chinese community wished to thank him and to wish him every success in his new sphere of activities, especially in his efforts to improve the relationship between Japan and China.

Mr. S. Sometani, the Japanese civilian head of the Hong Kong bureau of the Civil Administration Department, was transferred at the same time. He gave his farewell party to his staff and the officials of the district bureaus on February 21, taking the occasion to introduce his successor, a Mr. Matsuba, and bespeaking for the latter the same assistance which he had himself received. The chairman of the District Affairs Bureau, our friend Mr. Sin, and the ranking Chinese in the Civil Administration Department, Mr. Wan Shiu-ying, made "suitable replies."

Of greater significance were the farewells for Consul-General Yano and his "number two," Consul Kimura. By a notice published on February 23, 1942, the public was informed of the closing of the Japanese consulate-general in Hong Kong. This was, of course, from a Japanese point of view, a logical development. As the press reports

stated, since Hong Kong was now a part of the Japanese Empire, there was no further need for a consulate—but the warmth of regard expressed for its staff by the Japanese military whose arrival had made their further functioning unnecessary was interesting, as was also the evident sincerity of the regard in which Kimura at least, if not Yano, was held by certain of Hong Kong's Chinese residents. The party given to Kimura on February 22 by some of the Chinese who had been associated with him was apparently a real farewell. At another party, on the twenty-eighth of February, Yano gave a history of the office, and, in a response by Lieutenant General Kitajima, was praised by that officer (who spoke on behalf of the occupying army) for the part that the Japanese consulate-general in Hong Kong had played *prior to the fall* in helping to bring to fruition the Japanese plans for the capture of the colony. At still another affair, given on March 2 by the Japanese community of Hong Kong, Yano himself spoke of the "preparations which had been made" (in a context which suggested that he was talking about himself and his staff) for the capture of Hong Kong. He noted, however, that "it had come about earlier than had been anticipated."

For his rank and responsibilities, Yano is quite a young man—the writer knew him when he was the Japanese equivalent of a student interpreter in Canton in 1929—and his rapid rise was attributed by some of his foreign colleagues to his supposed connections with the military clique in Japan. The exact nature of his services in preparing Hong Kong for its conquest are, of course, not known, but it has been surmised that they covered his direction of (1) a very active and complete espionage (in co-operation with the military) and (2) persistent anti-British and anti-white propaganda among the Hong Kong Chinese. While this was going on, the other members of his staff went about making much of their friendship for foreigners and Americans in particular and of their contempt for the Chinese.

With the departure of this group of officials who had carried out the initial measures toward the development of controls in the "Captured Territory," there was soon evidence that a new hand had taken over with the intention of setting up a permanent regime. The first step in this direction was the establishment of a "Civil Court of Justice."

A formal notice, "by order of the Hong Kong Government," announced on March 10 the setting-up of a court of justice for the adjudication of civil cases. Any person wishing to institute a civil action

in the court was asked to apply to it for instructions as to how to proceed. The court was located in the former Supreme Court Building, and several weeks later a "Civil Law Office" was set up there also, the regulations being altered to require that anyone wishing to bring suit should first notify that office.

The system of trial by jury was dispensed with as a senseless and inefficient Anglicism, nor were lawyers admitted to practice before the court. Statements of the allegations in a given case were to be taken from the parties to the action by an officer of the court, and presumably an investigation of the facts was to be undertaken by him, whereafter the court—the presiding judge being, it was said, a judicial officer from Japan—would reach its judgment. Effect would be given to its decisions by the gendarmerie, the costs being 5 per cent of the amount involved in the action.

Although no definite statement to that effect was made, the civil law to be followed was presumably that enforced in Japan except where modified because of the special situation of Hong Kong, by the fact that it was under a form of martial law, or by local custom, it being the declared intention of the Japanese not to violate the customs and usages of the Chinese. All criminal offenses, and all alleged breaches of military laws and regulations, or any act regarded as contrary to the numerous orders and proclamations issued under martial law, continued to be tried by military courts or courts-martial. Press and other reports indicate that, for the first six or eight months at least, the civil court had little to do.

Perhaps because of that circumstance, or possibly in tribute to the influence of the legal profession, something less than a year later Chinese, Japanese, and Manchukuoan lawyers were given permission by the Government General of Hong Kong to resume their practice there. On April 16, 1943, fourteen Chinese lawyers were admitted to the Hong Kong bar in a formal ceremony held in the presence of Governor General Isogai. The press report of the affair stated that they were forming a Chinese bar association.

In the fall of the same year an ordinance of the Government General, promulgated on October 15, 1943, and taking effect on that day, undertook to revise the whole judicial system of the "Conquered Territory." Before this change, civil cases had been handled—as we have seen—by the civil court (the "Civil Affairs Court of Justice"), while a body called the "Military Discipline Council" had in general

handled all criminal cases. Under the reorganization a judicial court was established, its functions being divided between the two subordinate organs of which it was constituted, the Criminal Affairs Department and the Civil Affairs Department.

The Criminal Affairs Department subsequently judged all offenses except certain specified ones against the military forces (and those committed by members of the armed forces themselves); it also took charge of all examination and investigation of alleged offenses. The Civil Affairs Department took over the entire organization of the earlier Civil Court of Justice and judged all civil cases.

In spite of these changes, and the apparent effort to create a judicial department that would really function, it seemed to be the impression of some at least of the Chinese more recently in Hong Kong that the dispensing of "justice" was still largely controlled by the military and was still characterized by bribery and favoritism. The reaction of most Chinese still in the colony was to stay as far away as possible from the whole institution.

Turning back once more to the spring of 1942, we note that Isogai's next step was the issuance of specific "laws" for the governance of the people of Hong Kong. On March 28, 1942, the Office of the Governor—or Government General, as it was later to be called—promulgated an ordinance effective from that date regulating the entry into or residence in the "Territory" of all persons and controlling transportation and commercial transactions.

Although described in their preamble as "Laws for Rule of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong," they amounted in essence to a set of closely restrictive regulations calculated to force every resident of Hong Kong to register his arrival, his presence, or his intention to depart, as well as the details of his situation and of any business in which he might be engaged. The ordinance was divided into nine numbered chapters and covered forty-one items. The first item of the four comprising "Chapter One" stated the subjects which the law was to cover and exempted military persons, army and navy employees and their families, and military supplies. "Item Two," which set forth the actual intent of the law, stated:

"All those persons entering and leaving, residing in, transporting goods in and out of, and establishing businesses, carrying on businesses, with commercial activities, in the areas ruled by the Governor

of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong must obtain permission from the Governor of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong."

The third item stated that permission to enter or leave, reside in, transport goods in and out of, to establish businesses, to carry on businesses or commercial activities, would be refused by the governor of Hong Kong to nine listed categories of people, including "enemy nationals," "foreign nationals with enemy leanings," and "persons who are unsuitable as residents with respect to their attitude towards military affairs, public safety, and local customs," etc., the terminology being purposely so vague as to be applicable to anyone. The fourth item placed the enforcement of this ordinance in the hands of the gendarmerie. The other eight chapters gave in detail the requirements for registration, the information desired, etc., and stated that breaches of the regulation would be dealt with under military law.

A press conference was held on March 30 to instruct the reporters on the part they were expected to play in convincing the Chinese populace that it would be to their advantage to support these laws. A Captain Kimura, chief of the Police Affairs Section of the Gendarmerie Headquarters, addressed the pressmen. He described the statements which the law required as being divisible into two categories, "applications for permission" and "reports." The "applications" (presumably for permission to carry on business, etc.) had to be submitted in quadruplicate to the divisional headquarters; the "reports" were to be submitted to the gendarme police stations in duplicate. Kimura emphasized that persons already in business had to apply again for permission; that the law required the submission of "applications" and "reports" by Japanese and "third nationals" by the end of April, while Chinese were given until the end of June. Failure to comply with the laws would be punished, he warned; serious offenses would be tried by court-martial; minor ones would be dealt with by the gendarme police.

But in this instance at least the docile Chinese population had a better understanding than did the Japanese of the problems which confronted a conquerer. By the end of May there had been less than seven thousand registrations (i.e., "reports") of residence for the whole colony, which at that time was estimated by the Japanese to have a Chinese population of over a million persons; on June 15, with only two weeks left, a semiofficial statement admitted that the ordinance

was being generally disregarded by the Chinese. It was obviously impossible to visit upon all these potential delinquents the threatened penalties for "failure to comply with the laws," and, since the governor himself stated publicly that he would not consent to the extension of the time limit beyond the end of June, the Japanese took the only course open to them: they changed the law—very considerably simplifying and reducing its requirements. Even then there were few who could be got to register, although Sir Robert Kotewall, Chan Lim-pak, and "Mayor" Peter Sin all appealed to the populace to comply, and special forms were printed to make compliance simpler still.

At the same time that Hong Kong's "laws" were promulgated, the governor undertook another considerable modification of the administrative machinery set up prior to his arrival by Generals Sakai and Yazaki. He decreed the establishment of two councils, called the "Chinese Representative Council" and the "Chinese Co-operative Council," to act in place of the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee, which he dissolved. The Representative Council was composed of three men—Sir Robert Kotewall, Lau Tit-shing, and Li Tse-fong—to whom a fourth—Chan Lim-pak—was later to be added. Its function was to afford the governor a liaison with the people of Hong Kong, and to assist it in this duty it was empowered to "elect" from the Chinese residing in the "Captured Territory" the membership—numbering twenty-two—of the Co-operative Council, which was to act under its direction. Sir Robert was appointed chairman of the Representative Council. The Co-operative Council, allowed to elect its own chairman, selected—almost certainly by prearrangement—Sir Shouson Chow. Li Koon-chung was elected its vice-chairman. The Representative Council was to hold daily meetings; at its first meeting on April 2, the Co-operative Council decided to meet every Monday and Thursday.

At the final meeting of the Rehabilitation Advisory Council, Sir Robert said that it had held fifty-nine meetings since its inception but that it had accomplished little, the "phenomenal progress" which had been made being due almost entirely to the efforts of the governor. It may be that the committee had in fact proved a relatively ineffective instrument, and it is probable that the machinery by which it was superseded was fashioned as it was to give the greatest amount of influence and responsibility to a small group of men amenable to the

governor and acceptable to the Japanese generally—while the Co-operative Council, representative of the various occupational groups within the community, would afford a wider popular base. It is also conceivable that there were personalities involved: Sir Shouson Chow had during the days of British rule never willingly admitted the precedence of Sir Robert Kotewall in the Chinese community, and it is possible that the presence of the two of them on the same committee did not make for harmony. With two councils they could both be chairmen as long as neither disobeyed their Japanese masters.

Press statements on the subject indicated that the Representative Council, "charged with informing the Governor of the people's desires, and the people of the Governor's aims," was expected to receive directly from individuals or groups such suggestions or petitions as they desired to present. These were then supposed to be referred to the Co-operative Council for discussion, whereafter they were to be returned to the Representative Council with appropriate recommendations. The matter might then be presented to the governor.

With the chairman of the four-man Representative Council, Sir Robert Kotewall, we are already almost too familiar. Let us spend a few moments with the other three. Of these, the most completely in his element as a member of this board of the élite in shame and degradation was Chan Lim-pak, the last to be elected to it. The reader will remember that in the midst of the siege of Hong Kong the British authorities arrested Chan on the suspicion of leadership in fifth-columnist activities; however unfair such suspicions might have been to the generality of Hong Kong Chinese, they were certainly more than justified in Chan's case. Born in 1884 in Namhoi, Kwangtung Province, he became very wealthy as a Canton merchant and the comprador for various foreign firms. By 1920 he was chairman of the General Chamber of Commerce of Canton, president of the Canton Chinese Silk Merchants Association, of the Canton Mining Association, and of the Kwangtung Export Association; he was also the Canton comprador of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the manager of numerous Chinese firms, as well as a director of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company.

He used this position of power and influence—which should have been one of great honor and usefulness as well—in such a way as to acquire in a few short years what was unquestionably the worst repu-

tation in South China. A dangerous and altogether unscrupulous reactionary, he organized in 1923 the notorious Merchant's Volunteers of Kwangtung with which he was actually successful in carrying out a bloody *Putsch* in 1924, seizing the city of Canton in an effort to crush the adherents of the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. After a brief period of riot and disorder, he was driven from Canton, taking refuge in Hong Kong, and the paid levies of professional gangsters whom he had so lavishly financed were scattered. This was only the high point in his career. A further indication of its course is the fact that on a subsequent departure from Hong Kong he was leaving the colony to skip bail rather than answer charges before the court for embezzling the funds of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company.

Lau Tit-shing was a successful but relatively obscure Chinese merchant of the older type under British rule in Hong Kong. Educated in Japan, he had kept up his connections with Japanese friends and was president of the Chinese-Japanese Returned Students' Association. Otherwise little was heard of him until after the fall of Hong Kong, when he began writing to the *Hong Kong News*. In one of these communications prior to the fall of Singapore, he said: "The fall of Singapore will be of great benefit to overseas Chinese. . . . Britain has encouraged Japan and China to slaughter each other, hoping that she could profit by their wounds to swallow them both up at once. . . . We must fight there [in Burma] with the ferocity of animals. . . . Our method must be to add the totality of our Chinese forces to the Japanese Army and fight together." That he apparently sincerely held beliefs so completely in accord with those that the Japanese were working to propagate made him a natural selection for the position.

The third, Li Tse-fong, was another of the men who under the British regime were on their way to knighthood. His background had been typical: the manager of the Bank of East Asia, Ltd., director of the Hong Kong and Macao Steamboat Company, Ltd., of the Green Island Cement Company, Ltd., of the China Underwriters, Ltd., etc., he was deputy chairman of the Macao Jockey Club and honorary treasurer of St. Paul's Girls' College. He was also an acting unofficial member of the Legislative Council. He had thus much in common with Sir Robert Kotewall.

The two councils continued to function on into 1945 and have evidently served the Japanese purposes well. Some time ago, however,

their members began to feel less completely certain of Japanese victory, as is suggested in the slightly tremulous tone on which ends the declaration issued on the second anniversary of Isogai's appointment to the governorship (February 21, 1944):

"In the past two years, the living conditions of Hong Kong inhabitants have been rather strained, but compared to other places, Hong Kong stands out as faring very well. On entering the third year of the war, the hardships will perhaps be even greater than in the past two years, but we hope that our brothers and fellow-countrymen will respect this period of trials, withstanding tribulations and hardships, to surge forward in the spirit of ever greater effort, in order to harvest the greater benefit, not only for the inhabitants of Hong Kong, but for China and Japan."

Two weeks after the establishment of these twin councils, the governor took a further initiative in the elaboration of the already complicated governmental machines administering Hong Kong. By an order issued on April 16, 1942, he divided the "Conquered Territory" into three "areas" over each of which he set an "Area Bureau." One bureau was to deal with "all the island of Hong Kong and the small islands around Hong Kong, including Cheung Chau Island and Ping Chau Island." Another was the Kowloon Bureau, to deal with Kowloon, Kai Tak, and Tsun Wan; and the third, the New Territory Bureau, with all of the New Territories, except those under the Kowloon bureau.

Each of these bureaus was to be staffed with a chief, a deputy chief, three subordinate chiefs, and forty-two minor personnel. The chief was charged with supervising, "under orders from the Chief of the Governor's Office," the carrying-out of the governor's laws, attending to the business of the bureau, and the direction of subordinates. In his absence the deputy chief was to take over his duties. In the absence of both the chief and his deputy, the chief of the Governor's Office would depute one of the subordinate chiefs in the bureau to act for him. The order instructed each bureau to set up three subordinate offices: a general office, an economic office, and a health office. The general office was to handle general business, financial plans, educational matters, and others. The economic office was to deal with industrial economy, communications and transportation, and with

"necessities from raw materials" (*sic*). The health office was charged with the promotion of health, measures against disease, and medical supplies.

Although the fact was nowhere stated in the press accounts of their establishment, these bureaus were at least partially staffed by Japanese, and it is probable that it was intended that all but the lowest-ranking officials should be Japanese. The strongest indication of this is the fact that the names of the chiefs of these bureaus were never directly reported as such in the press, nor were the other personnel ever listed, and such notice as the bureau officials received was incidental. This corresponds to the treatment accorded other Japanese officials, military or civilian, serving in the government of Hong Kong; whereas whenever a Chinese, even one previously totally unknown, could be got to accept a position under the Japanese, the press would unfailingly publicize that fact as another proof of growing Chinese adherence to the Japanese regime.

These bureaus were not meant to supersede or displace the Chinese-staffed district bureaus and their ward leaders but represented an organization parallel to them with much greater actual authority. In practice the district bureaus came to be only supplementary in their functions to the area bureaus, although the former always enjoyed a channel of approach to the higher Japanese which was independent of the bureau in whose area they happened to be. The existence of the two tended to create a certain amount of confusion as to the ultimate responsibility, but here again there was the check and countercheck which the evidently suspicious nature of the ruling Japanese required.

With the transfer of Major General Yazaki and the assumption by Lieutenant General Isogai of the governorship of Hong Kong, the Civil Administration Department was dissolved and its functions taken over by the office known to Hong Kong by their reading of the Chinese characters in its Japanese designation: Tsung Tu Pu, a name rendered into English as the "Governor's Office" or the "Government General."

There are no press or other reports describing the division of labor within this office, and Chinese who dealt with it were often—perhaps deliberately—given a confused and inaccurate idea as to its workings; but a careful examination of existing data makes possible a fairly accurate picture of its organization.

Presided over by a chief of the Governor's Office, a ranking military

official directly under the governor, its most important suboffice appears to have been the Civil Affairs Bureau, under a Japanese civilian. The Control and Supervision, Foreign Affairs, Education, Economic, Financial, and Land and Houses sections are believed to have been administrative divisions of this bureau, although in practice each evidently enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy and authority within its particular sphere. The Control and Supervision Section, for instance, appears to have wielded wide if ill-defined powers in such matters as the distribution of commodities, the sale of rationed articles, etc. The size of, and the number of personnel employed by, certain of these sections was also misleading: an intelligent Chinese informant who had dealings with the Governor's Office believed that it was composed of three departments—Economic, Financial, and Land and Houses, these three being evidently the most active.

Three other bureaus evidently functioned directly under the chief of the office: Communications, Information, and Repatriation. The Press Section, which, with the induction of Governor Isogai, took over control of Hong Kong's press from the Japanese Army Press Bureau, was under the Information Bureau, which apparently also managed the local censorship and directed propaganda.

There also appear to have been some four departments set up in the Governor's Office: the Public Works Department; the Water Department (the latter seems not to have been a part of the former); the Health (or Medical) Department; and the Electrical Department. The Anti-Epidemic Bureau was under the direction of the Health Department, while the Telephone Bureau was evidently a part of the Electrical Department.

With the establishment of the Governor's Office and of the bureaus and departments among which its responsibilities and duties were divided, the administrative machinery with which the Japanese were to undertake the exploitation of Hong Kong's potentialities was to all intents and purposes complete; subsequent reports do not suggest that any important changes were later made in it.

Let us contrast this government with that which it superseded. We have attempted in an earlier chapter to describe the position of the British governor and the functioning of the selected group of officials comprising the Executive and Legislative councils, into whose deliberations only a relatively small number of Chinese were admitted. In the Japanese model the actual control, as we have seen, is exercised

by (1) the governor and his office, the latter comprising the administrative departments, directed by a group of Japanese experts and administrators which—by the purest conjecture—this writer would estimate to number not less than eight hundred, and probably well over a thousand; (2) the “area” bureaus, officered, it is believed, by a total of some two hundred Japanese officials; and (3) the gendarmerie. No one who reads the full text of this book will doubt that the British government was incomparably the better one; the rule provided by the Japanese organs which we have just listed is completely ruthless, interested in the lives of the governed only inasmuch as they are lived to further the aggrandizement and power of the rulers. No concepts of freedom or justice or popular representation could possibly arise to embarrass their single-minded pursuit of the aims of the Japanese Empire.

But consider the number of Chinese whom the Japanese have associated with them: the effective leaders of the Chinese community form the four-man Representative Council; the major trades and activities of the colony are represented on the twenty-two-man Co-operative Council; the eighteen district bureaus, each with a chief, a deputy chief, and Chinese staffs, employ several hundred Chinese in responsible advisory positions; and there are probably as many as three thousand “ward leaders.”

The ends which the establishment of this relatively much wider “popular” base serve are, from the conqueror’s standpoint, many and sound, but for the Japanese the most compelling motive was almost certainly the fact that it appealed to them as a patent and obvious technique of control. Every one of the Chinese whom the Japanese associated with their administrative machinery was answerable to his superiors, and his defection could be the more readily detected and punished because of the responsibilities which he had assumed. The Japanese by this means increased greatly the strength of their hold on many of the most prominent Chinese; for many of the latter it could not have been long before the adequate performance of the tasks which had put upon them became a matter of personal “face,” and thereafter their self-respect, their own view of themselves, could not but be inextricably engaged in their being good servants of the Emperor of Japan.

KEEPERS OF PUBLIC ORDER

FOR the first three weeks after the surrender of Hong Kong the maintenance of public order was intrusted almost completely to the Japanese Army and gendarmerie, with results—planned or otherwise—that have already been noted. Aside from its participation in the looting and its action in decreeing martial law, the principal contribution of the Army to the stabilization of the situation appeared to be the characteristically haphazard movement of small squads—numbering usually not more than four or five men, comprising a non-com or officer and three or four privates—that went about, apparently without specific orders, searching private houses and rummaging through the accumulations of loot. Many of the indignities to which the population at large was subjected were the acts of such squads.

The vacuum thus created sucked upward the lowest elements of Hong Kong's underworld, and the actual police power of the community fell into the hands of gangs of Chinese toughs and criminals, members of the age-old secret societies and thieves' guilds. They did no rioting, and it is not recorded of them that they were given to rape or even to murder on a large scale. But they levied a tremendous fiscal toll while they had the opportunity. They took control, for instance, of the crossroads leading down from the Peak to the lower levels; they would stand around in small groups, and although they did not bother foreigners and would disappear at the approach of one of the wandering squads of Japanese soldiery, they charged a price to every Chinese passer-by. Chinese coolie women trudging down from the Peak with loads of loot that it had taken them the whole day to gather, and that as often as not would amount to nothing more precious than some old clothing or a pile of furniture broken up for firewood, would have to surrender a part of it for the privilege of continuing safely on.

During the time when the old wells, now reopened, were the only source of water for a large percentage of the people, they collected around the stone well platforms, asking a price for the use of the well; when later the Japanese opened a number of public fountains to afford free water for people who could not pay the exorbitant rates which were assessed for the piped supply, the gangs took them over, selling the water. They preyed on the public latrines, both those for women and those for men; anyone using either was very likely to be robbed. Frequently they were able, either by bribery or by fraud, to represent themselves as agents of the Japanese military, and as such they forced their way into private homes, restaurants, or shops, using every conceivable pretext for extortion. There was no one to stop them; they were the rulers of the city.

In his speech on January 10 to the 133 prominent Chinese whom he had collected for luncheon at the Peninsula Hotel, General Sakai had suggested that the people might organize their own self-protection guards "under the direction of the officials." This was probably already being done when he spoke of it: the innate desire of the Chinese for order had already begun to reassert itself, and the wealthier of Hong Kong's residents had found a solution in regularizing the extortion to which they were being subjected. They had realized that for a lump sum they could hire the members of one particular gang to protect them against the others, and gradually the hired thugs took on the character of "Volunteer Guards" who took their duties seriously.

The relationship of the Japanese gendarmerie to the maintenance of order in the "Conquered Territory" had, up to this time, been very obscure. There were many evidences that its interest in the colony considerably antedated the war; British and American internees were surprised to discover, for instance, that the gendarmerie officer placed in charge of the internment camp, and to whom Japanese consular and other officials appeared to show a certain amount of deference, was none other than Yamashita, for years one of the most popular barbers in the Japanese barber shop in the Hong Kong Hotel, patronized by many of the "Taipans" in the community.

Members of the gendarmerie had been active in Hong Kong from the hour of its surrender; it was they who had undertaken the roundup of leading Chinese which had begun after the close of hostilities. The largest share of these labors was believed to have fallen on the gendarmerie "Investigation Corps," widely reported to have

been brought in from Japan, and the effects of whose works were everywhere felt. Besides its list of those Chinese who might be useful to the Japanese, the corps was also supposed to have a roster of "dangerous radicals" and of persons who had been critical of the Emperor or of Japan whom it was charged with apprehending. There were persistent grapevine rumors of wholesale searches and arrests, and it was whispered that numbers of people were being executed. From the Stanley Prison Yard, where the executions took place, the reports of rifle fire were audible to the foreign internees nearly every morning: there would be one, two, or sometimes three shots, and then silence.

One of the first acts of Isogai's regime was addressed to the gendarmerie, but it was in the direction of increasing rather than checking their power: he placed the Imperial Gendarmerie in direct charge of the Hong Kong police, the fire brigade, and the water police. In discussing this change, Captain Kimura, chief of the Police Affairs Section of the Gendarmerie Headquarters, said that, although under ordinary circumstances the preservation of peace and order was handled by both the gendarmerie and the police, the former for military and the latter for civil affairs, since Hong Kong was under a military administration the preservation of peace and order was now to be undertaken solely by the gendarmerie, which also controlled the police and fire brigade, the former being known as the gendarme police and the latter as the gendarme fire brigade. The gendarmerie had, he continued, five divisions: East Hong Kong, West Hong Kong, Kowloon, the New Territories, and the Harbor or Water Gendarmes. All former police stations had been taken over by them and should now be called gendarme police stations. Referring to the discipline of the gendarme police, he recalled that under the former British government there had been many scandals about the police force, but, he asserted, the gendarmerie was determined that there should be no more such scandals; "the public should give up the idea that they could gain the favor of the gendarmes by giving bribes or presents."

This aspersion was worse than gratuitous. As any unprejudiced person who lived under both regimes would doubtless be glad to testify, there was literally many times more corruption in the Imperial Gendarmerie than among either British or Chinese police. And a circumstance that epitomized with even greater succinctness the contrast between the Anglo-Roman concept of law and order and that of the Japanese was the fact that on January 25, 1942, the Imperial Gendar-

merie took over as its headquarters the imposing stone and marble structure that had once housed the Hong Kong Supreme Court.

The difference in the degree of control exercised by the police as they had been at first reorganized and the new gendarme police was very marked. The latter had the widest powers and evidently received the full support of the Army. When, for instance, a large downtown restaurant was robbed in broad daylight, the whole area was cordoned off and gone over with the greatest thoroughness. Although in this particular case their labors were in vain—the robbers were never caught, perhaps because the Chinese instinctively resented all this “big-time” efficiency and would not voluntarily co-operate with the pursuers—this technique was later applied generally. Gendarmerie squads, supplemented by fully armed troop contingents, would rope off blocks of certain streets, or particular areas, believed to harbor dangerous persons, and search all houses and every passer-by, arresting anyone who could not satisfactorily explain his presence there. When the combing of one street had been completed, they would move up to the next. While these intensive searches were proceeding in particular areas, the rest of the colony was not neglected. Day and night “emergency squads” were reported to patrol Hong Kong around the clock.

A practice which particularly outraged Chinese sensibilities, and which probably grew out of motives a little different from the desire to perform their duties with all zealously, was the searching of women by gendarmes at the Hong Kong Ferry. It was said that women who by reason of their youth and charm were subject to suspicion were not infrequently taken into the ferry station latrines and stripped, whereafter we may well suppose that the all-seeing and utterly benevolent eyes of the God-Emperor were turned slightly aside.

The administrative advantages of uniting the civil and military police functions in the “Captured Territory” are obvious. It permitted the gendarmerie to extend its operations through an already trained corps of Indian and Chinese police, which served it not only as an immediate instrument but as the nucleus around which it could build up a considerably larger body of freshly instructed and indoctrinated native police directly under Japanese control. From the standpoint of the police themselves, it placed behind them the weight of the fearful authority and prestige of the Japanese gendarmerie.

A more profound if less obvious effect of the change was to alter the direction of normal police activity and to assimilate it to that of the gendarmes. Henceforth in Hong Kong such acts as robbery, rape, or murder, committed for the age-old motives, were to be regarded as relatively simple and uncomplicated—almost “natural”—crimes. It was a different category of evil against which the best energies of the gendarme police were to be spent; the real criminals were the “political terrorists,” the insidious spreaders of “dangerous thoughts,” the unregenerate who wilfully misunderstood the “Imperial Way.” For them there was literally, as many a government order proclaimed, no mercy.

Coincident with the transfer of police power in Hong Kong to the Imperial Gendarmerie an examination of the status of the now highly organized and flourishing “Street Guards” was undertaken. The “officials” of the latter organizations in the Western Gendarmerie District were reported in the *Hong Kong News* of February 20 to have been called into conference with the gendarme police, where they were asked to report the exact amount being charged shops and residences for protection. The immediate reason for this inquiry was stated to have been the receipt of numerous complaints of inequality in the assessments being made, but, as the gendarmerie worked into their task, it became evident that their object was the liquidation of these semi-independent, private organizations exercising the functions of public police. At the first meeting, however, they evidently were simply instructed to canvass the shopowners in their areas, to warn them that if they did not resume business immediately their premises would be sealed and their subsequent applications to be permitted to reopen would be refused. At a second meeting, on February 22, the Guards were ordered to submit a full statement of their income and expenditures within three days.

The results of these inquiries were not revealed immediately, but on April 29 the Governor's Office issued an announcement to the effect that, “peace and order now having been restored,” the authorities had decided to disband “Street Guards, Self-protection Corps, and District Watchmen” as of April 30. Reviewing the history of their organization, the chief of the Press Bureau stated that a number of residents had volunteered to undertake the formation of such groups and that some of them had been recruited under the guidance of the Army or civil authorities; they had “obeyed every order issued by the authorities” and had “played their part in the preservation of peace and

order"; their duties had included fire prevention, suppression of crime, and searching for arms. Among the Guards there were, however, undesirable elements who had given rise to complaints against them, and since the training of the gendarme police was now making good progress, the Guards were regarded as no longer necessary. Residents who felt that they still required their services might petition the authorities individually, and it was the intention of the latter to draft as many of the Guards as possible into the new gendarme police. But meanwhile the Guards as they were then constituted would cease to exist, as from the effective date of the order. The "Street Guards" in Kowloon were disbanded at the same time, being given a gratuity of thirty yen apiece. It is not known whether a similar payment was made to such of the Hong Kong "guards" as were not re-employed (in the gendarme police), but it is assumed that they received some money settlement, probably at the expense of the citizenry. Residents were warned to make no more payments to any organization for the maintenance of such guards.

Although it is unlikely that the protection "racket" has even yet been completely stamped out, the formal organization of guard units was effectively destroyed by the action described, and thenceforth the gendarmerie had no rivals save the gangsters themselves.

With the dissolution of the "Self-protection Corps" *et al.*, one of the striking phenomena characteristic of Hong Kong after its fall had been liquidated, but another—the widespread gambling, in which all elements of the Chinese population seemed to be equally engaged—was not so easily disposed of. In the period of enforced idleness which followed the collapse of the defense, the whole Chinese population apparently turned to gambling. In the narrow streets back of Queen's Road so many small tables were set up, one right after the other, along both sides of the roadway, and there were so many people moving among the tables, that the streets themselves became impassable for any other traffic. This phenomenon was expressive of the near-hysteria which grips whole masses of people who have lost the feeling of security: they seek instinctively to find it again by losing themselves in the mob and by engaging with it in some acceptable diversion that does not involve the issue from which they are fleeing. The same thing could be seen any night in the crowds that milled around Times Square in New York's dim-out.

The games—"Pawn the Jewel," a kind of roulette without the

wheel, and others played with dice, or by the numbers on small dominoes—started early in the morning and continued until dusk, when the darkness made it unsafe to continue. Chinese “of the better classes,” who would not join the street games for fear of being robbed, gathered together in their private homes and played mah-jongg. In one known instance the play continued frequently for eighteen hours a stretch; in others it is said to have been continuous, the players stopping only to sleep and eat. They had no more safety than their numbers and a locked gate could give them, and there was nothing else to do. For foreigners who could collect four of their number and find the cards and a table, the game was bridge.

The spread of this mania among people who should have been enthusiastically engaged in pressing forward the aims of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere appeared to disgust and anger the Japanese military, who may well also have feared the effects which it might have on the maintenance of order. It was obvious, for instance, that street gambling on that scale afforded the protection racket one of its most lucrative sources of revenue, since the ease with which they made their money would dispose the owners of the tables to hand over very readily any “reasonable” cut to the gang as the price of being permitted to continue.

On January 25 the military authorities issued a strict injunction forbidding all gambling and ordering the closing of gambling establishments, whether on the streets or in houses. Every effort was made to enforce this edict, and although some of the streets continued for several months to be not much more than open-air gambling casinos, the drive against them, coupled with gradual subsidence of the first feeling of panic, was successful to a considerable extent in clearing them up.

Indoor gambling continued almost unaffected by the decree or by any of the ones which followed it and was undiscouraged by police action. In one case in Kowloon four women who had been playing mah-jongg were made to kneel in Nathan Road for several days, holding the mah-jongg set and placarded with a statement of their offense. In other cases groups of as many as twenty men were arrested and imprisoned for participating in a mah-jongg game. By the “Regulations for Police Punishments” issued on May 31—of which more anon—“practicing gambling and similar conduct” was listed as one of the offenses for which a fine not exceeding 500 yen or imprisonment

for not more than three months was the penalty. None of these things made any appreciable difference; the gambling went on in spite of them.

Many other problems confronted the Imperial Gendarmerie in Hong Kong. Perhaps we can gain the clearest insight into them by reviewing the regulations through which the gendarmerie attempted to solve them.

As has been indicated earlier, the gendarmerie's first task was to stamp out all activities hostile to the Japanese Army or that would in any way hamper its operations. This was the intent of the proclamation of martial law issued on the day the city fell, and it was kept well to the fore in nearly all published orders and exhortations. A further indication that this problem, too, continued to be a very live one was given in the "preliminary orders" drawn up on March 10 in the name of "the Governor of the Captured Territory" "so that the people may understand what conduct or action is treated as an offense under military law" and warning the people to refrain from such actions. The offenses listed were (1) conduct of a seditious character or directed against the Imperial Japanese Army; (2) conduct involving espionage; (3) any conduct endangering the Army or "injuring military operations." Persons who had committed one of these offenses "but who help to clear up the plotting" were promised that they might have their punishment mitigated or remitted; "those who confess before official discovery" might have their punishment mitigated. This notice appeared consecutively for a number of days and was later from time to time reprinted.

However, Chinese reaching Chungking from Hong Kong as late as the fall of 1944 corroborated earlier reports from the "Conquered Territory" to the effect that there had been and was then very little underground activity directed at hampering Japanese control; the situation in Hong Kong is, these Chinese believe, different from that in Europe. In the Crown Colony under British rule the Chinese had only "colonial" status; they had been submerged by the white man and are now being "rescued" by the Japanese. These informants agree that the Chinese in Hong Kong may hate the Japanese military but that they tend to regard the Japanese civilian as being, after all, of the same race as themselves, an attitude which makes for an easier camaraderie between them. The Chinese in Hong Kong after the Japanese came could also talk quite freely among themselves and were not

ordinarily overborne by any feeling of very strict supervision; they suffered more from the confusion of the government than from its harshness. There are thus no deep loyalties, no sound historic or political basis, from which the desperate underground activities which have characterized Yugoslav or Greek resistance could spring in Hong Kong.

For our immediate purposes it is immaterial whether this Chinese attitude toward the Japanese in Hong Kong represented a predisposition which the Japanese exploited or was gradually created by persistent Japanese propaganda, but it should be noted that the particular Chinese who gave expression to it in this case were persons who had been for long periods in Hong Kong after the fall, subject to all the efforts which the Japanese were making to "reorient" them, and were without exception deeply affected, as were all Hong Kong Chinese, by the swift collapse of British resistance.

Another of the problems with which the gendarmerie was much concerned was that of what were called "third nationals." By a notice issued on January 16, 1942, over the signature of Lieutenant Colonel Noma, commander of the Imperial Gendarmerie, "all alien nationals of neutral countries or countries allied with Japan, and people corresponding to the aforementioned nationalities (except Oriental races)" were instructed to present themselves at the Foreign Affairs Section of the Civil Administration Department before January 19 to obtain passage certificates for movement in Hong Kong. Persons without such passes after that date would be regarded as enemy nationals.

The Japanese were not uniformly strict in the issuance of these passes: to escape internment, one G. S. Kennedy-Skipton, in 1940 assistant financial secretary in the Colonial Secretariat and in 1941 controller of food in the Government Food Control, asserted his Irish citizenship and assumed neutral status. He did this for the sake of his wife and children; the youngsters were for months the pets of a squad of Japanese soldiery, who—from no evil motive—made special efforts to see that they had enough food and sometimes even brought them candy. In another case an American woman was reported to have assumed Chinese nationality.

The liberality of the Japanese in instances of this sort was not quixotic: they welcomed the initiative of any white man who would voluntarily divest himself of his national character and meekly take his place as just another human being in the New Order of East Asia;

from the Japanese point of view, that was where he should have been all along, and his acceptance of the role made him a walking advertisement of the fact that "white supremacy" was a myth.

Third nationals were later required to report in writing any change in their address, and a set of rules which they were obliged to obey was published in a notice issued on February 1, 1942, by the chief of the General Department of the Military Administration Office. They were instructed by these rules to keep within the Hong Kong and Kowloon City districts as far as possible and to avoid "any unnecessary going out at night," that is, from 6:00 P.M. to 8:00 A.M. They were forbidden to interview or communicate with enemy nationals without permission or to indulge in activities of any sort which would benefit enemies. Trips beyond the Kowloon border were to be avoided, but if it were absolutely necessary, an application with a full explanation of the circumstances could be made to the General Department of the Military Administration Office for permission to cross the border. At the end of March, 1942, third nationals were told that their passes expired on March 31 but would be extended until April 15; on April 1 the regulations covering the issuance of the new passes were published, and severe punishment was promised for any misrepresentation. On April 17 the neutral status of Norwegians was revoked.

In its issue of February 22, 1944, the Japanese version of the *Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury* published in Shanghai carried an item on conditions in the colony which alleged, *inter alia*, that "third nationals in Hong Kong will be the first to admit that they are today enjoying virtually all the privileges enjoyed by Chinese and Japanese nationals." There was, according to the article, a "growing amity between various nationalities, in striking contrast to the racial prejudices and distinctions which were encouraged among all communities there during the British regime." This statement is propaganda in a very subtle form, suggesting as it does that the once privileged foreigner—i.e., white European or American—would now be happy to affirm that he had not been placed in any really very inferior position but was being accorded "virtually all" the privileges which would be his if he were Chinese or Japanese: a contrast, indeed, with former days!

It does not provide us, however, with a very accurate objective picture. In fact, foreigners generally—other than enemy nationals and without distinction between Axis and neutral—were treated less con-

siderately than the higher-class Chinese, but somewhat better than Chinese of the coolie class. They were nonetheless continually subjected to onerous examinations and questionings, and the gendarmerie were less liable even than the troops of the regular army to miss any opportunity to make clear to as large an audience of Chinese as could be gathered at the moment the dependent and inferior position of any particular foreigner or group of foreigners. The big hulking foreigner whom the Chinese had always respected and feared could only look sheepish when some little Japanese sentry slapped his face until it bled.

Special steps were taken to make compliance with third-national regulations simple for the Indians: they were permitted to register with the India Independence League, and the latter body undertook to handle all the details. Exceptional arrangements were also made for the Portuguese, whose status in the social order was naturally somewhat higher than that of other Europeans by reason of the liberal admixture of Chinese blood in their veins. They were permitted to register with one Dr. Atienza, president of the Japanese-controlled Filipino Association of Hong Kong. These and similar associations will be described in more detail later; here we need only note that this arrangement greatly facilitated their extension of control over the communities that they were supposed to represent.

An element of the confusion reigning in Hong Kong for the first months of Japanese rule which seemed to exercise the Japanese authorities almost as much as it did its victims was the practice among the extortionist gangs of impersonating officers in Japanese employ, either by wearing the uniform of one of the auxiliary services or by wearing a Japanese armband, or by passing themselves off as being employed by one of the departments. An order dated March 10, 1942, was aimed at that practice, as well as at direct extortion, and warnings were published in both the Chinese- and the English-language press. On one occasion these were directed against a gang of hooligans who were representing themselves as collectors of telephone fees; on another against persons claiming connection with the Army, Navy, or government, and who asked for contributions for their good will; on yet another against water and electricity "rate collectors"—no such collectors had been dispatched—and the public were asked to admit no one to their homes who was not adequately identified.

The question of what to do about the firecrackers that the Chinese

so loved to shoot off also must have occasioned the gendarmerie many hours of anxious thought. Finally, evidently afraid that the crackle of bursting firecrackers might be used as a cover for the actual use of firearms or might lead to false alarms and public disturbances, the authorities issued an order—on February 11, 1942—forbidding their further use and leaving the populace without any means of scaring the devils away at the traditional times of rejoicing. Perhaps the Japanese expected the Chinese to realize that the light of the Emperor's countenance had frightened all the devils enough as it was, but the Sons of Han were not happy about the ruling, and in spite of months and months of propaganda planned to demonstrate to their subjects how foolish these childish superstitions were, the ruling Japanese ended by lifting the ban for Chinese New Year's evening and day in 1944.

Curfew was another problem. The Japanese military at first attempted to keep everyone off the streets after dark; then the hour was set at 8:00 P.M. By an order published on March 9, 1942, it was extended until 11:00, the ferry service across the harbor still terminating at 10:00, as it had for the period when the hour had been informally extended from 8:00 to 10:00. The press praised the later curfew as an evidence that the Japanese Imperial Army looked benevolently on the revival of Hong Kong's "night life."

The most interesting and revealing, and at the same time the most concrete, regulations issued by the gendarmerie in Hong Kong were those published on May 31, 1942, to be effective as of that date. A supplement to an earlier and evidently more general order on police fines, this was applicable to "all persons living in the areas ruled by the Governor of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong." Even Japanese were controlled by it: "In the case of Nipponese nationals the regulations are applicable to those cases in which there is no other Nipponese law to be applied." It then established a fine of not more than 500 yen or imprisonment for not more than three months for seventy-four listed offenses, of which only the last—"disobeying any other order issued by the police"—is general. The other seventy-three were evidently purely and simply a list of acts which had been committed by the populace—Chinese or Japanese—with sufficient regularity to make specific regulations against them desirable. At the same time the fine was high enough, the term of imprisonment long enough, and the offenses sufficiently numerous and detailed to make it possible

to arrest, with a show of legality, anyone whom the gendarme police wanted for any reason to intimidate or take into custody.

One of the first offenses listed was "making a false statement to officials, or refusing to make a statement which is called for." Several other clauses were directed at the giving of false information or the making of false reports under various circumstances. Another covered the familiar offense of "falsely assuming an official rank or title or a scholastic title, or falsely wearing medals or orders, or similar matters, with the object of deceiving a third party."

The eighth item, "interfering with the working or planning of any public body organized or to be organized for the public benefit, or interfering with the establishment of such a body," was aimed at brushing off such obstruction as was encountered by the Japanese in their organization of the "spontaneous" groupings through which they effected their control of nearly all phases of Hong Kong life.

A number of the strictures were against simple nuisances: "making any unnecessary noise, lying down or getting drunk in place of free traffic"; "failing to chain up a fierce dog"; "practicing singing, dancing, music or making any other noise in the late hours of the night"; "wearing strange clothing, or talking and behaving in a queer manner, and loitering and refusing an official order"; "making water in a street, park and other publicly visible place, or compelling another person to do so"; "spitting in a street, park and other public places"; "being naked or acting in a disgraceful manner in a public place."

Of this class of offenses, it may be noted that—with the exception of "making water" and "spitting" in the plainest view of all the world around, practices in which the "lower-class" Japanese and Chinese are equally unrestrained—the offenders were nearly always Japanese and almost never Chinese. Exuberant Japanese men, prematurely celebrating the God-given total victory of the Imperial Way, were not infrequently to be seen stumbling drunk about the streets, shouting and singing; occasionally such a one would get tired and lie down in the road to sleep, everyone around being too frightened to interfere with him.

Other items ranged from unethical business practices—"intending to obtain an unjust profit by inserting a boastful or false advertisement in a newspaper or magazine"—to such acts as "deceiving the public with false statements foretelling good or evil fortune, or supplying

the public with charms, or giving people charms to carry on their persons" and "practicing hypnotism on a person."

Some of the offenses reflect even more directly the unsettled and unhappy circumstances in which they were being committed: "harboring on one's premises some young or old disabled, sick persons in need of some help without reporting them" or "having dead corpses [*sic*] without reporting them to the authorities"; "camouflaging a human dead body, or holding an autopsy, or burying or cremating without permission"; "burying or cremating outside of a public graveyard or cremating place."

It is unlikely that any of the offenses listed were invented by the drafters for their own amusement, and perhaps only one of the regulations was not directly intended to be prohibitive in effect but rather to permit of official extortion: "committing prostitution, or acting as intermediary in committing prostitution." It is possible that the geishas imported by the authorities in large numbers were finding native competition too severe; it is certain that there was never any intention on the part of the Japanese to destroy the island's most persistent commerce, and this particular ruling must thus have been for some purpose other than its suppression.

TRANSPLANTING THE POPULATION

EVERYWHERE that the Japanese have gone in Asia they have been confronted by what were basically the same problems, and the solutions which they have brought forward for them have everywhere been basically the same, whether it be Manchuria or Sumatra, Hong Kong or Singapore. But one situation which they met in Hong Kong was unique: the swollen state of the city's population.

We have described in an earlier chapter how a city which could without too much discomfort accommodate a population of around 850,000 had grown in the five years after 1936 from less than 990,000 to close to 2,000,000, and we have also noted how extraordinarily fluid and unstable that population was.

The Japanese understood even better than the British how difficult this situation had made it for the latter to protect the colony, and as conquerors they learned well the lesson that the rapid collapse of their enemies had to teach them: the first essential of an effective defense of Hong Kong was a drastic reduction in the size of its population.

Such a reduction would go far to solve other problems incidental to an overlarge population and which had further aggravated the difficulties of the defense, but which would exist even if the island were not attacked. It would simplify the feeding of a colony that had never been self-sufficient in food. It would eliminate a good part of the demand for nonessential consumers' goods, of which wartime stocks were low. Housing problems would become less acute (and the existing air-raid shelters would be rendered more nearly adequate); the maintenance of order would be infinitely easier.

It is therefore not surprising that upon their occupation of Hong

Kong the Japanese military authorities took immediate steps calculated to reduce its population as rapidly as possible to pre-war levels.

Shortly after the surrender of Hong Kong, and perhaps even prior to the establishment of the Civil Administration Department of which it was to become a part, a Repatriation Bureau was set up by the Japanese military to organize the evacuation from the colony of a considerable part of its population. Early in January this bureau was successful in bringing about the organization of a Chinese "Repatriation Committee" composed of representatives of the various district and provincial guilds which had long functioned in Hong Kong as social and mutual benefit societies for the Chinese residents of the colony born in their respective districts or provinces. The meetings of this committee were held in the presence of Japanese military officers from the Bureau.

Sometime during the first week of January the military authorities issued, through the Repatriation Bureau, a notice warning that persons in Hong Kong who had "no employment or place of residence," or who had to "beg for their food," should be repatriated to the cities or villages in China whence they had come.

The agents both of the Bureau and of its tool, the Repatriation Committee, worked through the district and provincial guilds. These organizations had in most instances already well-established club rooms or offices which were familiarly known to most of the villagers or provincials whom they represented, and they afforded a quick and natural means of contact with the majority of those Chinese who still had attachments with their home villages and who therefore had somewhere to go. Many of them were, as has been indicated, mutual benefit societies, and not a few of them were wealthy in their own right. In ordinary times a native of Toishan who wanted assistance in returning to his village would be likely to turn to the powerful Toishan Guild without prompting; now the existence of such an organization not only greatly facilitated the exercise by the Japanese of pressure aimed at forcing the individual to leave but afforded as well a ready-made means of making the project self-supporting. The money and property and other vested interests of the guilds were now all virtually in Japanese hands and made the guilds peculiarly accessible to Japanese control. Nor were the authorities slow to exploit their position; by statements in the press, as well as directly through

the agents of the Bureau, the guilds were informed they were expected to "hasten to prepare the way for their members to return [to their native districts] either by land or by sea."

When the outward flow had gotten well started, the district bureaux, especially for the central district in Hong Kong and the more centrally situated ones in Kowloon, became in practice suboffices of the Repatriation Bureau, and from the second half of January on they were engaged in issuing literally thousands of the "repatriation certificates" without which the repatriates were not permitted to leave. Later the gendarme police stations also issued these permits; besides such a document, the repatriate had to have inoculation and vaccination certificates and, for some destinations, to have been medically examined by one of the staff doctors within forty-eight hours of his departure. Two photographs had to be presented with the application for the repatriation certificate.

All this gives the impression of a carefully planned and well-ordered evacuation of a part of the population, carried out with due regard to the interests of those who sought to leave. Here again what really happened was something very different. In every situation which they had met since they had entered the colony, and even in their capture of it, the acts of the Japanese all seemed to reflect the effort which they were making in their minds to weave together the two strands of their policy—to make the necessities which conquest placed upon them somehow accord with the mystic mission in Asia which they had proclaimed as their own. Nowhere was the fundamental conflict between these two aims more clear, nor was there any other circumstance in which the second suffered more palpably in the interests of the first, than in the manner in which the surplus population of Hong Kong was repatriated.

An editorial in the *Hong Kong News* of January 19, 1942, speaking of repatriation, said:

"Hong Kong has for long been overcrowded with people not normally resident here, who were duped by the Chungking Government into believing that the Japanese were not what they professed to be; but now that they have seen with their own eyes the good intentions of Japan, they fully realise that they have been listening to nothing but lies from the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Therefore they are anxious to return to their villages to resume whatever trade or business they had

before they fled, and in this direction the Japanese authorities are giving them every assistance by providing escorts and means of transportation."

This statement, obviously inserted by the Japanese authorities, is correct so far as the overcrowding was concerned, but it was certainly not because "they had seen with their own eyes the good intentions of Japan" that hundreds and thousands of Chinese were "anxious to return to their villages." Rather it was because they were caught in a gigantic squeeze that left them with no alternative than to leave in Hong Kong whatever possessions they might have—except just what they could carry—and get out as best they could.

They were trapped in the disorder created by the wholesale looting, gang rule, and rape; for such public utilities as were gradually restored the Japanese authorities were demanding an exorbitant price; the cost of everything had increased many fold; there was not enough rice to eat at any price. Those who owned property had in most instances seen it sealed; they knew that if they left, it would be expropriated by the Japanese because they would not be in Hong Kong to comply with one regulation or another governing its registration or its management. As an instance of this, persons whose residences or other properties had been sealed were ordered to apply to the Land Office for their restitution; if they had not done so by the end of February (1942), the premises were confiscated as "enemy property." On the other hand, an individual who obeyed the instructions laid himself open to various exactions which might even exceed in amount the value of the properties affected. So the repatriates were forced to sacrifice their property, and since it was not until January 30 that bank funds were unfrozen far enough to permit the withdrawal by a "non-hostile" Chinese of H.K. \$50 (on March 17 it became possible for him to draw up to H.K. \$150), they were in many cases forced to leave before any of the funds that they had on deposit were available to them. Theoretically they could take unlimited quantities of either Hong Kong or Chinese currency out with them (it was forbidden to take military yen), but the restrictions referred to and other financial regulations made it practically impossible for them to get any to take. They were thus, more likely than not, penniless as well; they were abandoning whatever they had for a trip that they might well not survive, in the hope of reaching a destination where there would per-

haps be no place for them—but a planned anarchy and the cunning application of pressure left no choice.

When this mass evacuation was first begun, the techniques were evidently less developed. There are numerous reports of how, in the first week or so in January, the Japanese military rounded up numbers of those—especially the men—left homeless by the hostilities and herded them through Kowloon and the New Territories and across the border into the no-man's land beyond; if they were seen trying to come back again, they were shot. Chinese troops further north, made suspicious by the circumstances, sometimes shot those who did not turn back.

Ramon Lavalle, who, as consul in Hong Kong of the neutral Argentine, was able to visit points in the New Territories which served as stations for evacuees being sent out through Kowloon, says that they were promised a catty of rice each at the border but rarely received it; and, when they got beyond the borders, they were almost invariably set upon and robbed by gangsters who lay in wait for them.

On January 11 the first regular evacuation route was opened: two small river vessels sailed on that day carrying two thousand repatriates destined for Pok On District and a thousand for Shikioo; the *Hong Kong News* account stated that at Pok On there would be ferry boats waiting to which those who wished to go to Shikioo or Chungshan might transfer. The Canton puppet authorities were also supposed to be dispatching officials to meet the travelers. A third group left three days later by the same route for Shikioo and Tamshui.

On January 16 the steamer traffic to Canton was resumed, the "Shirogane Maru" leaving at 9:00 A.M. from the Osaka-Shosen-Kaisha Wharf. It was followed a few minutes later by the "Kaiju Maru," the two ships carrying two thousand persons between them. Word had gotten around the day previous, possibly spread by the Japanese, that tickets would be on sale at the P. & O. Building for 9 yen for first class, 5 for the second, and 3 yen for the third. The crush at the ticket office was terrific, and on the morning of the sailing, long before the ships were due to up-anchor, those who had been successful in getting tickets were lined up in a queue stretching for well over a quarter of a mile, waiting to go aboard. Later a third ship, the "Giyo Maru," was added to this run, and at least one of the three left every morning at the same hour for weeks thereafter, and always packed with repatriates.

Meanwhile a thriving junk traffic, also for the benefit of Chinese fleeing Hong Kong, had sprung up between the island and Macao. It had been forbidden by the authorities—presumably because it permitted the clandestine escape of persons who might be wanted by the gendarmerie—but not until January 19, when regular Hong Kong-Macao steamer sailings were resumed, did it drop off markedly. The “Shirogane Maru” and the “Tempo Maru” made the opening trip, tickets which were purchasable at the dock costing 5 yen for the first class, 3 yen for the second, and 2 yen for the third. This sailing was, of course, very crowded too, but the Canton trip evidently continued the most popular, there having been, for instance, ten thousand persons lined up along Connaught Road on Saturday to buy passage, of whom more than six thousand were there all day Sunday—hundreds and hundreds of persons standing in line, or lying on the pavements, for forty-eight hours at a stretch just for the chance to get away. The same long lines were forming late in June, 1942, as in the first part of January. There seemed to be no end either to the numbers of these people or to their patience. And those who had tickets would go to the docks the night before the sailing to sleep there, to be sure that they got a place on the boat, the Japanese often selling more tickets than there was space.

Later on, in the first part of February, routes by sea were also opened to Swatow and Chiuchow. On February 20 communications with Kongmoon were for the first time resumed to permit persons from the populous Sze Yap district to return by ship to their villages. By the middle of March many more people were leaving by ship than overland through Kowloon and the New Territories, and the Kowloon district bureaus' figures for repatriates showed a sharp drop for the month of March.

By the end of the same month, however, a reversal of this trend had set in. Probably reflecting a growing shortage of shipping, departures by sea began to decline markedly, and, in spite of the uninterrupted depredations of Japanese troops and Chinese gangsters, the Kowloon route—because of its proximity to Chinese territory—again became the most important.

Since the Japanese desired the over-all totals for departures to be maintained in spite of the shipping shortage, the Repatriation Bureau decided to “activate” the Chekiang and Kiangsu guilds, influencing the organization of a Chekiang-Kiangsu Residents' Association,

which shortly began the organization of the first group of repatriates to make their whole trip by land. The size of the groups handled by the Japanese through this association was surprisingly large: on about April 19 a group of five hundred left under its auspices to return to Shanghai by land; a second group, of three hundred, left on May 27; and a third, of five hundred, on June 3 (1942). A Swatow and Chaochow Natives' Association was also formed, and it sponsored the evacuation by land of a number of groups of its members. The Fukien Provincial Guild served in effecting the repatriation of some fourteen large groups of Fukienese who traveled on foot and by chair back to their native province before the end of June.

One of the writer's personal employees, Li Shang-i, who after a long hegira has just reached Chungking as this is being written, was one of these repatriates. After my internment he was living in the apartment which I had been occupying, but he was finally driven from it by a renegade Chinese named Ts'ao, a graduate of West Point and from a good family, who had become a panderer, a dope-smuggler, and, lastly and most ignominiously, a collaborator with the Japanese. This individual informed Li that the house that had once been mine was mine no more, and ran Li out of it. Under the system of rationing by households, the latter could get no rice unless he could show where he lived, and since he was now without a roof over his head, he was also without rice.

Fortunately Li had two friends, who had been employees in the Foochow Club when Li had been working for me in Foochow, and they told him about the organization by the Fukien Provincial Guild of parties of natives of that province who wished to return to it. They were going to go, and they invited Li to join them.

Together they went to the Foochow Fellow Villagers' Association. Li's friends introduced him as a native of Foochow who wanted to go back home. It happens that Li was born in Peking, in North China, and spoke a very broad Peking colloquial, almost incomprehensible to a Fukienese. He explained to me that he got over this inconvenient detail by alleging that he had been born in Foochow of Fukienese parents who had taken him to Peking at the age of six, so that naturally he had forgotten his Fukienese. His two friends, understanding the situation perfectly, swore that this was true, supplied a wealth of the most convincing details, and became his guarantors. Thereupon the Foochow Fellow Villagers' Association gave him a certificate,

which he still has, evidencing the fact that he was Fukienese. He feels that that little document is very precious: with it, he had to walk back only to Foochow; if he had not had it, he feels certain that the Japanese would have forced him to walk all the way back to Peking, over a thousand miles farther north as the crow flies!

The three then went to the Fukien Provincial Guild, where they were all registered as persons desiring to return to Foochow. Later they were informed that they were in the fifth group, which would leave Hong Kong at 7:00 A.M. on April 5.

The letter which conveyed this information to him also instructed him to complete the public health requirements himself. A Japanese health unit gave him a cholera shot and a stool examination and a little slip of paper evidencing those facts. He wrapped two pairs of Chinese shoes, one old and one new, six pair of socks, four cloth jackets, five pairs of cotton trousers, some underwear, and a cotton blanket in a cloth bundle, and at seven o'clock on the morning appointed he met his group at the Fukien Guild.

There were thirty-four men and three women accompanying their husbands in the party. In age the group ranged from fifteen to sixty. They were all small businessmen, shopkeepers, and the like. They walked from the Guild to one of the westernmost wharves on the Hong Kong waterfront, where every item of their belongings was carefully checked over. A boat then took them across to Kowloon, and they were walked some five or ten miles to the second station on the Canton-Kowloon Railway, where a second inspection by Japanese gendarmerie took place. This consumed so much time that, when it was through, darkness had set in, and they were taken to an old, broken-down temple to spend the night. It was at this station that they were each supposed to receive a catty of rice, but they were told that, as it was so late, the Japanese in charge of the rice had gone to bed, and they had to do without. None of them had had anything to eat the whole day. The Japanese had also promised them each a small sum of money, but they did not receive that either.

At five o'clock the next morning they started out again. After walking for two hours, they came to the final barrier under Japanese control, where their poor belongings were inspected once more.

Six or seven gendarmes did the inspecting. These gendarmes took something from everybody. From Li they took four undershirts and the new pair of Chinese shoes. In this latter action they lived up so

completely to his expectations that he was almost grateful to them: he had calculated that they would steal his extra pair of shoes (footgear being relatively more expensive than other articles of clothing) and that if he carried two extra pair, one old and one new, they would steal the new ones. He had seven hundred dollars in Chinese currency sewed into the soles of the old pair, and eight hundred dollars in the soles of each of the shoes he was wearing. The gendarmes, for all the thoroughness of their searching, discovered none of this.

Other members of the party lost shoes, blankets, shirts, watches, pens, and money. For some reason these enlightened followers of Bushido would not take alarm clocks, and it was noticed also that they would not take shoes that were white, possibly because that is the color of mourning. Several of the evacuees in the group had heard of these "inspections" ahead of time and had come forearmed with watches or other relatively rare objects as gifts for the gendarmes. These gifts the Japanese gendarmes accepted with many thanks, and, to show their appreciation of this delicate compliance with the proprieties, they waved the donors on without any inspection at all.

Because of this inspection, the evacuees were able to walk in all only about 22 Chinese li (seven miles) that day, coming in the evening to a small place called Shih Ma. There they overtook another party that had started a day earlier, some fifteen in number, and made up of runners, guards, and other employees of the Central Bank, some of whom had their families with them. As they were preparing the next morning to set out, they were met by a Chinese who described himself as a representative of the "Association for Safe Passage of the Road from Shih Ma to Waichow." This "Association," the stranger asserted, was a kind of insurance company which for a small premium undertook to insure that the members of the party, now numbering more than fifty, would arrive safely at Waichow without being robbed or killed on the road. The representative made it clear that his company operated so efficiently that, whereas people who failed to take advantage of its protection were practically certain to suffer the most grievous misadventures, travelers who wisely accepted its protection, and paid the very small sum of \$85 Chinese currency each to himself, always got through unharmed.

Eighty-five dollars apiece was a large sum of money to raise for a practically penniless refugee whose possessions had already been "in-

spected" by the Japanese, but by proportionate contributions from the few more fortunate ones, like Li himself, the fund was at last scraped together and paid over, and the representative went on ahead of the party.

Moving in a generally northward direction along the old roadbed of the Canton-Kowloon Railway (before the way turns west toward Canton), they had tramped for another 60 li (twenty miles) by the late afternoon, without seeing a sign either of Japanese or of Chinese soldiers or of bandits and before anything untoward happened. Then, just at a point where the roadbed entered a defile in the mountains, with sharp slopes on either side, a single armed man with his rifle on them appeared from nowhere and ordered them to halt. As Li raised his hands, he realized that spaced at intervals all the way up the slopes to the ridges on either side were other men armed also with rifles, all of them covering their group.

One of these men was the "representative" of the "insurance company." He identified the group and ordered them to proceed through the pass in single file, counting them as they went by. Their belongings were untouched, no one spoke, and after awhile the armed men, who did not try to follow them, were lost to sight behind them, and they heard no more of the "insurance company." "That was what we paid our eighty-five dollars for," Li observed afterward; "just to see a band of robbers standing on the hillsides pointing their rifles at us."

They were not again molested, except that toward the end of the last third of their journey (it is thirty-odd miles from Shih Ma to Waichow) they had to pass through one group after another of "road guards." These were tattered collections of nondescripts who would lay a cloth across the road, or draw a line in chalk, and stand on either side of it. One of their number would have a square piece of white cloth tied to a stick as a banner with the characters "Road Guard Brigade" written on it. They would carry sticks instead of rifles, or perhaps one or two of them would have a real rifle but with the bolt gone, or for some other reason obviously useless. These beggars would demand ten or twenty cents from each traveler who crossed their "barrier." Anyone who stepped across it without making a contribution would be roundly cursed out as a worthless cheapskate. So strong is the Chinese aversion to listening to "talk not good to hear" that they all paid their ten or twenty cents at each of these numerous points.

That was a small sum to pay to save their face; after all, had they not each of them paid much more, out of sheer fear, to a bunch of brigands much worse than these beggars, and lost a lot of face as well?

When the party reached Waichow, they discovered that the Japanese had burned it to the ground but that the Kwangtung Provincial Government was attempting to rebuild it. They were guided to the Kwangtung Committee for Emergency Relief of Repatriates, where the passes and certificates issued to them by the Japanese were taken up, they were all vaccinated and given a catty of rice and a dollar bill. From then on Li was assisted by both the Kwangtung Committee and the Fukien guilds through the rest of his trip. The group traveled by boat or bus wherever they could get transportation and afford to pay for it, but most of the time they went on foot. The passage over the mountains on the Kwangtung-Fukien provincial border was the hardest part of the trip: they tramped over high passes through three long days of rain, with nothing but tattered Chinese umbrellas to protect them. Li said that he carried his pack slung over his shoulder, with his clothing in front and his bedding in back. His back got more completely soaked than the front of him, but he reasoned that he was more in need of dry clothing than of dry bedding. And Li told, too, how because they were drenched with rain and tired and their feet were sore and they were not a little afraid, they all began to sing, chanting out the rhythm of unnumbered Chinese operas, in which the hero is always very brave, even though the forces of evil may win out in the end.

These overland movements, and those by water to Canton and Macao, as well as less frequent ones to Kwangchow, have been continuous to date, although the total numbers of those leaving in any given period have dropped considerably below the earlier peaks.

Because no complete census of the population of Hong Kong as of December, 1941, exists, it is not possible to state accurately the numbers of those whom the Japanese military controlling Hong Kong were able to evacuate from its territories. But even the lowest of available estimates reflects the success with which their efforts were crowned, and if we accept the semiofficial British estimate of something less than two million souls in the colony at the time of Pearl Harbor, that success appears phenomenal. According to an official Japanese statement published on February 4, 1942, in the *Hong Kong News*, 250,000 persons had left Hong Kong under "the repatriation scheme instituted

shortly after the first week of January." If the wording of this report is precise, the departures during the last three weeks in January must have averaged something more than 10,000 a day. According to figures published in the early summer of 1942, there were, as of May 20, 1942, 601,778 persons resident on the island and 472,398 in Kowloon, making a total population of 1,074,176.

A broadcast from Tokyo in English, of January 20, 1943, quoted a Domei dispatch of that date from Hong Kong, giving the population of the colony at the close of December, 1942, as 983,512, of whom 972,146 were Chinese, 4,002 Japanese, and 7,364 nationals of third countries.

But the Japanese were still not satisfied. A Transocean broadcast from Berlin, also on January 20, 1943, quoted Lieutenant General Isogai, governor-general of Hong Kong, as having announced that "the Japanese Administration of Hong Kong plans to reduce the population by another three hundred thousand . . . at present the population of Hong Kong is one million, while the city affords work and shelter for only seven hundred thousand."

And although another one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand persons probably fled the colony in 1943, the year 1944 began on the same refrain. Again a six-month repatriation scheme was put into effect, and glowing accounts were published of the new lives which repatriates would start in their native homes. This drive ended in June, 1944, but the movement continued even after its close; and it is more than likely that, when Hong Kong is freed from its "liberators," its population will be found to number not much above five hundred thousand.

FOOD FOR THE STARVING

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**H**ONG KONG had always depended almost completely on imports from beyond the borders of the colony for its food supply, including the all-important staple of the Chinese population—rice. In anticipation of the gravest difficulties should the island be cut off from its sources of imported rice, the Hong Kong government had begun requiring rice dealers to stock up as early as the spring of 1941, and itself made large rice purchases. The accumulated supply on hand at the time the colony was attacked was many times authoritatively described as being sufficient for the then population (of almost two million) for a period of at least six months. Nor was rice the only food of which there were ample stores: an official statement, published during the siege to reassure the population, asserted that food stocks of all kinds were adequate for even the most protracted resistance and, moreover, that provision had been made to assure that Europeans could continue eating the food that they were used to and that Chinese would have all they needed of Chinese food. It was said that there was even a supply of condiments available.

In the situation which existed in Hong Kong on that Christmas afternoon in 1941 when the colony suddenly capitulated, it occurred to no one to attempt to destroy these stores. The attempt would almost certainly have infuriated the population and increased the feeling of bitterness and betrayal which defeat had brought them. Thus these relatively very large stores fell unimpaired into Japanese hands.

The rice stocks were especially precious, and almost immediately after the capture of the island the Japanese undertook to locate as much of those stocks as they could, brought them together, and shipped them to Japan. Such supplies as were subsequently discovered were sealed or taken directly over. Thereafter only such rice as the

Japanese military were themselves willing to sell, or which they could be persuaded to unseal so that it might be sold by Chinese dealers, was available to the population of Hong Kong. For perhaps as much as ten days after the city's surrender it was impossible to buy rice anywhere, and the suffering of the masses of the people was terrible.

Hungry children snatched from passers-by on the street bundles that looked as if they might contain food and disappeared with them down the first convenient alley; men lurked in the shadows of the porticoes to assault women who had come from marketing, not in the manner that lust would dictate, but to rob them of something which in the Hong Kong of those days seemed infinitely more important: food, any kind of food, and in any amount. Something to eat, to cram into your mouth as fast as you could and as much as you could get, and to swallow as quickly as you could, to stop that terrible, numb, softly sick feeling in your stomach and to make you strong again. Food!

When this frenzy had spread further and further and seemed to have taken hold of the whole people of Hong Kong, much more serious disturbances began. Group assaults grew more frequent; mobs of starving people gathered outside places where they believed that grain was stored, and wholesale robberies of such places began to be reported. When it seemed only a matter of days or even hours before rice rioting would begin, the Japanese authorities opened several grain depots, which were at once literally swamped with hungry people.

At these depots each person was allowed to buy forty Hong Kong cents' worth of rice, and three or four people were admitted at a time, according to the size of the premises. At a typical depot on January 13, 1942—an average day—there was a line standing three abreast that stretched for ten city blocks. With more people than could be waited on in the course of the day, a person who would already have been waiting for hours would not want to drop out of line to eat or sleep and thus lose his place; in some instances the lines stood all night, although the Japanese attempted to disperse them as soon as the shops had closed. To some of the waiters their wives or other members of their families brought rice gruel, but more often than not there was probably no food to be brought, and it was not uncommon to see people literally fall out of these food lines from hunger and exhaustion. To hold the priceless rice that was finally to be purchased every conceivable form of container was used, including hats and even shoes;

some, who had nothing else, carried it away in dirty kerchiefs or their cupped hands.

The first constructive reaction to this situation came from the rice merchants, who held a meeting about the middle of January to discuss means of replenishing the supply by importations from Thailand and Annam. Through the good offices of the Rehabilitation Committee they presented two proposals to the Japanese authorities, one of which contemplated buying rice with the money that overseas Chinese in those areas would normally have remitted to villages in Kwangtung, shipping the rice to Hong Kong and selling it, and remitting the money thus realized to the villages. The second involved an exchange of manufactured products for rice. For over a month these efforts bore no fruit, but in April (1942) it was reported among the Chinese that the Japanese had dispatched several of the rice dealers to Annam to undertake the purchase of rice, and they presumably went also to Thailand.

The first recorded shipment of the precious grain came in on April 15 in a freighter from Thailand; the story was headlined in the *Hong Kong News*:

"Tangible evidence of the authorities' concern for the welfare of the population in Hong Kong was provided by the arrival here on Wednesday evening of a large consignment of rice from Thailand. . . . This news will be hailed with delight by the public. . . . This is the first shipment of rice to arrive here since the occupation of Hong Kong by Nippon. . . . The ship was filled to capacity with rice. . . . It was also noticed that at the godown in Kowloon large stocks of old rice were still available. . . ."

What was described as the second consignment of rice to reach Hong Kong from Thailand "since the end of hostilities" arrived on May 1; asserted to be a much larger consignment than the first one had been, it was said to have consisted of "several tens of thousands of bags." The *News* report, spread in black type over the front page and complete with pictures showing laborers unloading the bags, was exultant: "With the arrival of this second rice consignment, it is expected that the food problem is now definitely solved, as far as rice is concerned."

Optimistic statements of this kind, obviously inspired by the Jap-

anese and intended for public consumption, were a poor substitute for actual food; with only two shipments in almost five months to feed a population of between a million and a million and a half people who depended on rice as the mainstay of their diet, the demand became so strong that a heavy smuggling trade grew up over the borders of the New Territories from areas of Kwangtung Province not under Japanese occupation.

However, because of the exactions and depredations to which this trade was subjected, and the difficulty of transport, the amounts which dribbled in were altogether insufficient in quantity, and the quality was very poor. The rice purchased in Thailand was evidently also of an inferior grade. Writing to a friend, a Chinese who had left Hong Kong in the fall of 1942 says, "Eating too much glutinous rice has produced a form of malnutrition characterized by swelling of the feet [beri-beri]. Eighty per cent of the people suffer from this."

Meanwhile an ugly and persistent rumor seeped through Hong Kong like a kind of poisonous gas: it was said that the poor in the colony had in several localities been reduced to eating human flesh.

It was thus becoming clear that, partly as the result of the shortage of shipping and of other natural elements inherent in Hong Kong's position, and partly through the deliberate acts of the Japanese military, a situation had been created in which strict control had now become imperatively necessary. It is probably not an accident that the form which this control took—the rationing of rice—was such as to give the military a strangle hold on the population of Hong Kong that they could not have acquired in any other way.

With hundreds of persons dying every day of starvation, and the rice merchants themselves anxious to reopen their shops, the Japanese did not find it difficult to set up a controlled sales organization. Under the direction of Colonel Ikemoto, the head of the Economic Section of the Japanese Army in Hong Kong, sixty rice shops on the island and forty on the mainland were licensed to sell rice; each family was to be limited to two catties (a catty being the equivalent of 1.33 pounds) a day, and the price was to be sixty Hong Kong cents a catty, or about twice as much as the same amount had cost before Pearl Harbor. Relatively, however, this was very cheap: black-market prices already ranged anywhere from five to ten times the price set by the Japanese.

On February 5 Colonel Ikemoto called the managers of the selected

shops to a session in the Economic Section of the Civil Administration Office and gave them a lecture on their functions. They were told that the authorities would supply them with the rice to sell; that they were to sell fixed quantities for a fixed price; and that they would be punished "if they abused their instructions for purposes of gain."

There were many abuses. The people were short-weighted, overcharged, and cheated in every other conceivable way. Many shops remained closed to the public and sold their stocks only to the favored few who could pay five times the price set. But even if the system had been given an honest trial, it would almost certainly have failed: there was no sure way to prevent the same people from making purchases at several shops on the same day, nor could an individual who had not been able to make any purchases at all protest against that fact with any hope of redress or remedy.

It is probable that the Japanese themselves did not intend that this arrangement should serve as anything more than a stopgap; the Civil Administration Department had earlier carried out a house-to-house investigation of the central district on Hong Kong Island to discover the number of persons living at each address, and on the basis of those figures ration cards were issued by the Department to persons resident in the area who applied for them. The experiment was begun on February 20; each person was allowed half a catty of rice a day on a card which showed the number of persons covered by it, the total daily allowance, and the period of its validity. After he had received his card from the Department, the applicant had then to proceed to a designated "main depot," where he paid for the quantity of rice to which he would be entitled for the next five days. Then, on the basis of his receipt for the money, he could go to one of the six authorized rice shops in the district and receive one day's supply—one-fifth of the amount for which he had paid. The arrangement contemplated his returning each day for the remaining four to receive the rest of the supply which he had purchased. This system involved standing in long lines at the office issuing the card, at the depot to which payment was made, and every day at the rice depot to get the actual rice.

The Central District Bureau received complaint after complaint alleging that the rice depots were refusing to honor the receipts after the money had been paid; that they were giving short weight; that they would issue one day's ration but deny the next day that they had ever seen the applicant, refusing him the remainder that was due

him, etc. In response to this outburst, P. H. Sin, the head of the bureau, issued a pointed statement in the press emphasizing that neither he nor the bureau had any connection with rationing.

Perhaps as an answer to the criticism of Japanese management implicit in that statement, Sin was shortly thereafter placed in charge of rationing, and the suggestion that a number of rice-rationing depots be established, each to take care of a certain number of people, was officially attributed to him, although it seems more likely that the plan had already been worked out in detail by the Japanese and was publicized as an inspiration of Sin's to make it more palatable to the Chinese and to provide a non-Japanese scapegoat if it aroused too much opposition.

In any event, the scheme was eventually adopted, and a complete census of the population was made, on the basis of which it was decided to establish 57 depots in Hong Kong and 41 in Kowloon, each depot to take care of the needs of 1,100 houses containing an average of 10 people a house. Each person was allotted 0.4 catty of rice a day, this quantity having been stated by the (Japanese) director of the Civil Administration Department to be the equivalent of the ration per person in Japan. In the face of that statement, the Hong Kong ration was subsequently increased to 0.64 catty. Three days' ration were issued at a time, and the price was set at H.K. 40 cents a catty. This was subsequently raised to H.K. 60 cents a catty, and then to H.K. \$1.20 a catty. As has been indicated, black-market prices varied but were consistently much higher than the prices charged at the controlled sales.

The issuance of rice-ration cards was made the responsibility of the various district bureaus. Each card was divided into ten tickets, and each ticket had stamped on it the due date beyond which it was invalid, the number of people covered by it, and the amount of rice which was to be issued against it, and the personal seal of the individual who had drawn the card. About 5 inches wide and 7 inches long, the card was perforated down the middle, each side being divided by perforations into five tickets, making ten in all, and each ticket having a separate due date; every thirty days it was necessary to draw a new card.

Of these cards a Chinese who lived in Hong Kong under the Japanese for eight months says, "They were the most precious possession that anyone had, next to life itself. The ration their holders could

receive was not enough to live on, but their withdrawal meant certain starvation for the persons from whom they were taken up."

To maintain a rice supply to the depots, ten wholesale rice shops were nominated; each had to cover a certain number of the depots, and the latter could not purchase rice from any other source.

A Rice Supply Committee was also formed, comprised of a chairman, five executive officers, and from twelve to fifteen members; the terms of reference were four: supply, investigation, examination, and the issue of ration cards. Its members being leading Chinese rice merchants, and the committee being under Japanese auspices, its functions in these fields were largely advisory, although it was through this committee that the dispatch of rice merchants to Annam and Thailand was arranged.

Restaurants were also rationed: from six to seven hundred were registered with the Civil Administration Department to receive daily allotments of rice directly from it; they were broadly divided into "large" and "small" restaurants, the larger ones being given one-half bag of rice a day, and the smaller ones from twenty to thirty catties a day. These amounts were later changed to permit the larger eating houses to purchase ninety catties a day and the smaller ones forty catties. Both were charged the set price prevailing at the time.

Although other third nationals were obliged to take out ration cards if they desired rice, an interesting side light on the political use by the Japanese of their control of rice is afforded by the fact that both the Indian and the Portuguese communities in Hong Kong were given separate and more favorable treatment through the pro-Japanese groups within each community which the Japanese authorities were supporting. Dr. Atienza, the leader of the pro-Japanese Portuguese, distributed rice rations every morning at the Club Lusitano to 1,100 Portuguese; the India Independence League once a week issued rations sufficient for the week to Indians, and only those able to pay were asked to do so. In a later chapter these organizations and their objectives, and the men who led them will be described more fully; here it will suffice to note in passing how powerful a weapon was the control of the supply of rice.

The political use of this control was not limited to groups; it was frequently employed as a means of rewarding both Chinese and Europeans who were faithful in assisting fulfilment of Japanese aims. The erstwhile butcher in the Dairy Farm to whom reference has

already been made, and who constituted himself the provisional landlord of a block of apartment houses on May Road, was reported never to lack ready access to any quantity of rice; the renegade Ts'ao, to whom the butcher is reported to have "sublet" the writer's own apartment in Hong Kong, was also always amply supplied. The difference between the situation of such a person and that of the ordinary Chinese resident of Hong Kong was so marked that the possession of a sufficiency of rice came to be regarded as a sure sign that the possessor had offered the Japanese some acceptable form of complete submission to their will.

The insufficiency of the diet which rationing permitted gave rise to widespread evasion of the rationing controls on rice by smugglers from the mainland, who brought in the cheapest quality of the grain for sale in the black market in Hong Kong. Many of the rice merchants in the colony also diverted considerable amounts of the commodity to the black market because of the much larger profits. But the existence of this market was no solution: the currency situation was confused, there were no goods available for exchange even had the black market been regularized, and the prices were so high that the vast majority of the population would not have benefited in any case.

With the mechanics of rice-rationing fairly completely worked out, the Japanese military turned their attention to other staple commodities in which famine conditions—real or artificial—obtained. One of these was sugar. With the capture of Hong Kong the Japanese had taken over the 50,000 tons of sugar in the colony's godowns; on April 2, 1942, Tokyo broadcast that 1,000 tons of this amount had already been shipped to Japan and that the remaining 49,000 would follow it as soon as shipping was available. This enlightening statement the Japanese authorities in Hong Kong did not permit to be disseminated there, probably because white sugar had disappeared completely from such sidewalk markets as were open in the colony in the early months of 1942, and brown sugar, which had been substituted for it, had also grown scarce.

In June, 1942—by which time we may presume that the other 49,000 tons had safely reached the main islands—the Economic Section of the Governor's Office undertook "a careful investigation of sugar stocks and consumption requirements" both in Hong Kong and in Kowloon, and on June 13 some forty-seven of the leading sugar

merchants were called to a meeting of the Representative Council, where they were told that they would be issued sugar from sealed stocks (belonging to themselves and other merchants) for distribution to the public. Shortly after that meeting the selected dealers elected an executive committee from among themselves to serve as a control board for their commodity under the direction of the Economic Section.

On June 29, 1942, twenty-four distributing stations were opened, sixteen located in Hong Kong and eight in Kowloon; each person was allowed 4.8 taels in weight of sugar per month, the regulation prices being 55 sen (at the then current rate, H.K. \$1.10) per catty for granulated sugar and 50 sen (H.K. \$1.00) for brown sugar. These allotments were issued against the regular rice-ration cards.

Another item the scarcity of which was sharply felt in Hong Kong was cooking oil, essential to the preparation by Chinese of their food. Only infrequent shipments of peanut oil were received from Shuitung in Kwangtung via Macao, and it and other oils used for cooking purposes were placed on the rationed list at about the time that sugar was, the individual monthly allotment being 9.6 taels, and the nominal price set at H.K. \$3.20 a catty, although, with the further devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar, this price was doubled and continued to rise thereafter. Flour—which had originally been distributed at the rice-ration depots, each person being permitted to purchase one catty every three days—was regularly rationed in the fall of 1942.

For foods which were not directly rationed, the Japanese attempted to put into effect a type of controlled marketing. In the period of confusion which followed the entrance into Hong Kong of the Mikado's soldiery, all markets and provision stores closed down. Such trade as was gradually resumed was done at the street stalls that crowded every thoroughfare or by hucksters who carried what goods they had to sell around with them. The first efforts of the Japanese military to reopen the channels of food distribution were directed at the re-establishment of the numerous markets from which in peacetime Hong Kong had purchased most of its produce. Toward this end the Economic Section of the Civil Administration Department opened a Public Markets Bureau under one Yoshio Nakamura as chief. The bureau ruled that no stall rent in markets would be required for a month and forbade the sale of fish and meat except in markets; the hawkers might continue to sell vegetables, but only in

certain areas. By the end of February the bureau was successful in reopening most of the important markets in both Hong Kong and Kowloon, although considerable street hawking continued in defiance of the order.

In a further initiative the Public Markets Bureau was less fortunate: it undertook to set ceilings on prices of all goods sold in the markets thus reopened, whether those goods had been supplied to the dealers through the bureau or not. The basis on which the prices were established allowed the produce man a straight 25 per cent profit, and during the period when these ceilings were enforced they effected a considerable reduction in the prices of several commodities. This was promptly circumvented by Chinese who bought large quantities of the articles which were available at less than the black-market prices and resold them at the higher rate. The bureau forbade this practice but was unable to stamp it out, or in fact to control the original prices of the commodities, and the attempt to fix the prices of all provisions was abandoned.

A method which permitted a more effective control of the food-distribution machinery than through the control of markets was the establishment of selling areas. In the case of cooking oil, for instance, the Japanese authorities, having control of imports of the raw article (peanut oil) as well as of its manufacture in Kong Kong, obliged merchants who wished to take part in its sale to establish their shops on a designated street, one such street being named for the central section and another for Wanchai, in the poorer districts. This idea was a natural extension of the Chinese tendency for all merchants selling any particular commodity to locate their shops close to each other and was applied by the Japanese to the sale of most of the important food staples which were not rationed. Those which were rationed were already being sold through controlled depots.

Yet another approach to control was through the formation of officially supported importing syndicates for various foods. Since no imports of any kind were permitted except on the basis of approved import applications, it was easy for the Japanese authorities to force all Chinese merchants who had applied for permission to import a given commodity to form an importing group with Japanese participation and under Japanese official direction. An instance of this type of organization was the Japanese-sponsored meat-importing syndicate which was formed in May, 1942, under one Li Chi-kong, who left for

Kwangchowan in the first part of that month to make arrangements for the importation into Hong Kong of pigs, poultry, sheep, and eggs. Similar syndicates were created for other foods as market demands made profitable or desirable the exploitation of a particular field of food distribution.

The prices of all foods shot up very rapidly after the Japanese occupation, the increases ranging generally from 300 per cent in the items least affected to well over 1,000 per cent in those in which the rise was more marked. The basic increase occurred with the establishment of the exchange rate between the Hong Kong dollar and the Japanese military yen—it was at first two to one—and dealers were required to state their prices in yen. Uncertain as to whether the Hong Kong dollar had in fact been devalued, most dealers simply stated the Hong Kong price in yen; when this was reconverted back into Hong Kong dollars, an automatic increase of 100 per cent had been effected. Scarcity, demand, difficulty in distribution, and the risks involved quickly doubled and redoubled the rates of increase.

Eggs have sold in Hong Kong for half a cent (Hong Kong currency, or about one mill in United States money) apiece. For a long time after the occupation "the hens quit laying," and when eggs finally reappeared the smallest sold at 50 cents apiece, and the established price later came to be 80 cents apiece. Meat of any kind—some of it reputedly human flesh—sold for from \$6.00 to \$10.00 a catty, and edible pork and beef at \$12.00 a catty. Chicken was \$14.00 a catty; duck, \$8.00; potatoes, onions, and sweet potatoes (all very difficult to obtain) around \$1.00 a catty; dried fish from \$3.00 to \$5.00 a catty; and salted fish from \$8.00 to \$9.00 a catty. Butter went from \$5.00 a tin (prior to the war it could be bought for 40 cents) to \$20.00 a tin; fresh milk, which was 40 cents a bottle before the occupation, was unobtainable for a long time after it and, when it came on the market, sold first for 60 cents a bottle and then for \$1.20.

These were the levels to which prices had risen in 1942, and a Chinese housewife who maintained a family group in Hong Kong throughout most of that year states that the simplest meal for five people cost at least ten yen (H.K. \$20 until August, 1942; H.K. \$40 thereafter). For perhaps 80 per cent of Hong Kong's population so expensive a meal was even then out of reach, and there tended to be a continual and in some cases a steep rise in food prices which will in all probability be checked only with the close of hostilities.

In the course of a speech on Hong Kong's progress broadcast by the Japanese governor-general in December, 1942, that dignitary undertook to answer complaints at the rising price of food within the "Conquered Territory" with the statement that relatively those prices were not particularly high; that food was cheaper than in many places in Asia not controlled by the Japanese. This statement was at least partially true, and it serves as a fitting footnote to our review of the efforts of the Japanese to assure the food supply of Hong Kong during their first year as its rulers. What they had attempted to do in that year was to control distribution, and if they had failed, the reason was simple: there was not enough food.

At the beginning of 1943 the Government General decided upon a new approach to the problem of feeding Hong Kong: while it did not relax the controls upon the distribution of food, it bent its energies to try by every means it knew to increase the actual amount of food available.

On January 15, 1943, the Hong Kong Fishing Syndicate was established, capitalized by Chinese owners of large fleets of fishing junks and controlled by the Japanese, who had the advice of fishery experts from Japan. It set out to finance and control the exploitation of eight principal fishing centers around Hong Kong, several of which were developed by the syndicate. These efforts evidently met with considerable success: at the end of the year it was stated that the new centers, such as those at Shaokuyuen and the Chaokung Islands, were each capable of producing as much as a million catties of sea food annually, and it was said that in Shasiwan a daily haul of ten thousand catties was not an uncommon occurrence. Early in 1944 a Japanese broadcast described the fishing industry as "the one bright spot in the [Hong Kong] picture today," adding that "there can be no complaint of a shortage of fish, at any rate."

A concentrated attempt was also made to increase the output of agricultural products of the "Captured Territory" through the adoption of modern farming methods, the cultivation of idle lots, the improvement of rice planting, and the more intensive production of vegetables, fruits, etc. The energy with which these things were undertaken had, however, only a very cramped arena in which to be given play. On "the rock" itself there was very little arable land, and it had long been under cultivation. The only hope that Hong Kong had of becoming even partially self-supporting in the production of

food lay in the New Territories beyond Kowloon, where there is an area of cultivatable land on which some rice and a certain amount of garden truck can be grown.

To exploit these possibilities to the limit, the Japanese organized the "New Territories Agricultural Association." Its membership included some of the landowners in the vicinity and the large dealers in vegetables at the Taipo markets in the New Territories. It provided the Japanese military with a direct means of pushing increased plantings. Through it they undertook to provide the farmers with new and improved agricultural instruments as well as with selected seeds.

Later the Taiwan Development Company was charged with drawing up plans for the large-scale production of rice in the New Territories; it sponsored the opening in Kowloon of the Taiwan Agricultural Learning School of Hong Kong, through which the planting of Formosan rice in the colony was begun. It was claimed that the new crops were three times heavier than the old.

Insecticide was also distributed free of charge, and the farmers were supplied with simple formulas for making the powder themselves, to free both the rice and the garden truck from the destruction of insect pests.

An Agricultural Training Institute was opened, giving selected students four hours a day of Japanese and an intensive course in truck farming. The course was free, the students supporting themselves on the chickens and geese, etc., which were bred on the premises as a part of the schooling.

An Animal Husbandry Association was also formed, every resident who owned more than five pigs or other farm animals or fifty head of fowl being obliged to belong to it. The Husbandry Association undertook to select good breeders, to distribute feed, and to teach the rudiments of animal husbandry. It at the same time gave its Japanese managers a considerable degree of control over the breeding and sale of Hong Kong livestock.

In an ordinance which perhaps pushed the use of land for trucking purposes to its ultimate limit, it was set down that whoever saw a piece of land or garden that might be planted with vegetables or rice, and who wished so to plant it, might inform the authorities, who would undertake to "purchase" the land for the would-be gardener, no matter who owned it. This regulation forced every owner of no matter how small a plot of ground to plant it in vegetables or rice.

It would be surprising if all these activities, which were still being vigorously pushed in the spring and summer of 1944, did not result in the increased production of rice and vegetables; but there is striking evidence that the Japanese themselves had realized, even before the end of the year 1943, that they could never by this means hope to make Hong Kong actually self-sufficient in food.

That evidence is the fact that, early in 1944, the Japanese rulers of Hong Kong once more sharply changed their policy on food. In preparation for this change the Hong Kong Civilian Food Assistance Association was set up, of which the very wealthy Singapore Chinese, Hu Wen-hao, the "Tiger Balm King," was elected president. Hu himself put up 500,000 yen as the association's capital. There were twenty-three other Chinese officers of the association, each heading a separate department for the acquisition of some specific food. At the same time a related organization of Sino-Japanese membership, the Tojo Company, Ltd., was reported to have been formed for the single purpose of importing rice from the south.

With this association "voluntarily" taking upon itself the responsibility for the purchase and distribution of food in Hong Kong, the Japanese authorities neatly disengaged themselves from the whole operation by two simple acts: they proclaimed on March 15 the cessation, as of April 15, of the "general distribution of rice"; at the same time, they lifted all import restrictions on grains, wines, meats, eggs, cows, sheep, pigs, domestic fowls, and plant and vegetable oils. There was to be no further control of these basic foods.

These acts, translating into policy the realization of the Japanese Government General that it could not supply sufficient food for its "Conquered Territory," were fervently described by the Japanese themselves as being due to a desire to give greater stimulation to public courage, "thereby seeking to attain an unwavering determination of the people."

## COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY UNDER THE CONQUEROR

AS WAS the case in its effort to force the leading Chinese residents into its service, to drive half of the population out, and to institute control of the food supplies, the Japanese military government was initially favored in its program for Hong Kong's commerce and industry by the situation which obtained in the colony as the result of the hostilities and of the occupation. All trade had been cut off by the war; stocks in godowns were seized by the military; factories that were not dismantled were sealed and their laboring forces dispersed by repatriation. The physical plant itself was unimpaired, and the Japanese military could do what they wanted with it.

Their first step was to make sure that no resumption of commercial or industrial activities could take place without their full knowledge and consent. An order evidently issued early in January (1942) forbade all trading in goods and valuables or their release to other places without permission of the authorities; it was likewise forbidden to move goods or valuables to, or to import goods from, enemy territories.

This order was elaborated in the "Laws for Rule of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong" issued on March 29. These prescribed an application form which had to be filled out and approved by the governor prior to the exportation of the goods; the same form had to be completed within five days after the *importation* of goods; importers who had not made such a petition and had it approved could not sell the imported goods or hand them over to a third party.

In the same laws the carrying-on of domestic trade was similarly hedged about by regulation and control; the application for permission to open and maintain a business had to give the most detailed information, including "a surface plan of the place of business and a

construction plan." More important is Item 23 of the law: "If the carrying-on of a business has been stopped for six months or more, or if the position of a business is not clear for three months or more, then such business shall be deemed to have been given up."

This provision, and a later one which made failure to comply with the regulations touching the carrying-on of trade and mercantile activities punishable under military law, were evidently regarded by the Japanese military as giving them sanction—if, indeed, they felt that they needed any—for the confiscation of the plants of absent or recalcitrant owners.

The heart of the control of Hong Kong's economy was the Economic Section of the Civil Administration Department of the Japanese Army. With General Isogai's assumption of the governorship, this section was transferred to the Government General but with few if any changes in personnel. The activities of the section began with the surrender of the city, and there is evidence that almost immediate contact was effected with the leading industrialists and businessmen who were then in the colony. Such contact was made simpler by the circumstance that these men were, in most instances, members of the group of leaders of the Chinese community in Hong Kong who had been rounded up by the gendarmerie.

On January 21, 1942, the chief of the section, one Colonel Ikemoto, called a meeting of representatives of all the more important Chinese firms in Hong Kong to discuss with them the revival of trade. It is to be noted that among those present the representatives of the Japanese military took their customarily prominent places. Conclusions reached at this meeting were not stated, but it is believed that it was called in connection with other initiatives of the Economic Section which had earlier been taken through the indigenous group of Chinese merchants which was to become the section's principal instrument in Hong Kong: the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce.

Perhaps the first group to contemplate co-operation with the Japanese after their capture of Hong Kong, and certainly the one possessing the greatest material stake in the colony, the Chamber served the Economic Section as what may be called a "control-transmission board" through which the section could reach the merchant guilds whose leaders comprised the Chamber's membership. Every distinct type of trade or commerce in the colony in which the Chinese

were engaged had, as in China, its own guild. The admittedly incomplete figures given in the "Report on Labour and Labour Conditions in Hong Kong" compiled by the Labour Officer and issued on April 11, 1939, show the number of associations in Hong Kong at that time to have been around three hundred, with a membership of 111,400. Of these, twenty-eight were stated to be merchants' guilds and the same number craft guilds. It seems likely that there were actually as many as fifty guilds in the colony classifiable as trade guilds. Each of these guilds had its representative in the Chamber; the latter organ could hardly have been better adapted institutionally to the purposes for which the Japanese employed it.

Typical of the various press references illustrating this function of the Chamber is the report which appeared in the Japanese-controlled *Hong Kong News* on January 14, 1942:

"The Chinese Chamber of Commerce called a meeting of representatives of the various business guilds yesterday for the purpose of discussing proposals to submit to the Japanese authorities for the reopening of business in the Colony.

"There were over fifty persons present, and Mr. Tung Chung-wei, Chairman of the Chamber, spoke to them of the necessity of reopening business and invited them to forward any suggestions in this direction.

"Matters dealt with included public safety, rice, and currency, and suggestions were made to ask the Japanese authorities to release goods which had been sealed and to open more centers for the sale of rice.

"The proposals adopted will be submitted to the Japanese authorities today for consideration, it is understood."

It will be remembered that Tung, here referred to as chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, came forward toward the close of the period of looting as one of the first of Hong Kong's collaborationists, and it seems obvious that at this meeting he was acting on the clear instructions of the Japanese.

On January 24 (1942) the Economic Section requested the Chamber to submit proposals for the revival of business in Hong Kong, asking at the same time six specific questions: (1) How did the members of the Chamber propose to import goods? (2) How did they propose to transmit money to the exporters? (3) How would they go about restarting their businesses? (4) How was the allocation of shipping

space to be arranged? (5) What general suggestions did they have? (6) What arrangements were they prepared to make anent the release of stocks in godowns?

The Chamber submitted its reply on January 27. The first two essentials, it said, for the revival of business in Hong Kong were (1) the reopening of shipping lanes and (2) the immediate release of stocks from the godowns. It added certain observations: (3) Hong Kong's business was usually done with North China, Central China, and South China, as well as with other countries; (4) Tokyo might serve as the financial center of this trade, with yen as the medium of exchange; Hong Kong notes should be accepted at par with the yen until trade could be restored, when a new currency could be issued for the whole area under Japanese control; (5) the import of goods into Hong Kong should be tax free; (6) there should be an increase in the number of ships plying between Hong Kong and Japan, Formosa, Thailand, and Annam; (7) banks should be reopened; (8) the public should be afforded better protection; and (9) the charges for electricity and water should be reduced.

The questions asked were in the first instance not such as, under all the circumstances, it was within the competence of the Chamber to answer, since in each case everything depended on what the Japanese themselves would do; on the other hand, the reply was not an answer to the questions asked but a statement of what the individuals concerned felt it would be in their immediate interest to have the Japanese do. This is perhaps a good example of the type of co-operation the Japanese received in Hong Kong even from those Chinese who sincerely preferred Japanese to British rule; they simply accepted their situation and hoped to make as much out of it as they could.

As the result of the discussions which followed the presentation of this reply, the Chamber was authorized to notify the various Chinese firms in Hong Kong that had goods in the colony's godowns that they should submit to the Chamber detailed lists of those goods, which that body would in turn submit to the Japanese authorities with a view to securing the release of the goods. The merchants concerned were obliged to join the Chamber; a form was supplied; it had to be completed, sealed with the firm's chop, and be in the hands of the Chamber not later than March 24 (1942). The lists completed on the basis of this information and forwarded by the Chamber to the Jap-

anese were stated to have included a great variety of goods: piece goods, glassware, tea, chinaware, electrical equipment, peanuts, chemical products, matches, machinery, tinned goods, building material, gasoline, motorcar parts, paper, wine, stationery articles, woolen goods, gunny bags, rice, flour, precious metals, dyes, leather, rubber goods, silk, foreign medicines, preserved sea food, candles, salt, tobacco, sugar, printing materials, and materials for railway construction. A *Hong Kong News* article of March 30 reported: "The Chamber has received an enormous number of applications for the release of goods. If the authorities agree to release, it is estimated that there will be sufficient material to last a long time."

The services which the Chamber performed for the Japanese in the field of Hong Kong's commerce, the so-called "Chinese Manufacturers' Union" carried out for them in industry. Unlike the Chamber, this "union" was organized at the instance of the Japanese, not having existed in that form prior to the fall of Hong Kong, although its membership was largely drawn from the earlier Chinese Manufacturers' Association, one of the less active of the Chinese groups in the colony before December 8, 1941. The first reference to the Union appeared in the press on March 26, 1942 in an article which reported that that organization was taking an inventory of the stocks of factories in Hong Kong and Kowloon. All factories were asked to submit particulars of their property to the Union. Forms for the purpose had already been sent out to the factories; when the particulars were completed, the information would be forwarded to the authorities. The article estimated that there were approximately four hundred factories, large and small, in the colony, of which over three hundred were already "members" of the Union.

The same article hinted at an even further development of the Union which the Japanese were evidently contemplating: factory owners belonging to it were alleged to be considering the manufacture of goods by it on a co-operative basis, the Union to buy the raw materials and sell the goods manufactured therefrom on behalf of the factories.

By March 30 over two hundred factories, involving a capital of nearly \$20,000,000 and employing approximately thirty thousand workers, had filed the desired particulars with the Union, "with a view to asking the authorities for assistance in the resumption of operations." The factories reportedly covered by these inventories had

been engaged in the manufacture of a wide range of products. In five of the listed categories—electrical supplies, silk-weaving, metal products, perfumeries, and gourmet powder—the total capitalization of the factories producing the particular type of goods was over \$2,000,000; in two others—rubber goods and printing accessories—it was well over \$1,000,000; in three more—confectionery and biscuits, knitting, and canned goods—it was over \$500,000 but under \$1,000,000. Of the numerous remaining categories, cloth-weaving factories and those making paint, batteries, nails, and needles and buttons were the most heavily capitalized.

The official of the Union who gave out this information stated at the same time that there were still a considerable number of factories that had not registered.

On April 2, several days after the release of this information, it was reported that the seven artificial-silk-weaving factories in Hong Kong, which had not up to that time "joined" the Chinese Manufacturers' Union, were forming—probably under some little Japanese prodding—a subcommittee under the Union to "seek the assistance of the Japanese authorities." The factories were said to be capable of producing 250,000 yards of artificial silk a month but were practically out of operation, since they had only 85,000 pounds of raw material on hand and 147,000 pounds in godowns. This stock would last them for some eight months only; they planned that if their petitions for its release were successful, they would ask the authorities to make arrangements to procure further supplies from Japan or Italy. Their markets had previously been in the South Seas, the West Indies, and West Africa; the last two of these areas were now cut off, and they therefore hoped that the authorities would assist them to access to new markets in the south, in China, and in Indo-China.

But things were not to work out quite as facily as the artificial-silk weavers seemed to have hoped. Through their control of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce the Japanese had had laid bare before them all the inner workings of the business life of the colony; through an invention of their own, the "Manufacturers' Union," they had secured the same sure access to Hong Kong's industrial organization. The ways which the Japanese found to exploit the control which they had thus gained were characteristic.

One of the most glaring marks borne by every stage of the process through which the Japanese assimilated the commerce and industry

of the colony into their own imperial system was bribery. His experience in Hong Kong after its capture led many a person, Chinese and foreign alike, to believe that there is nothing a Japanese would not do for a sufficient bribe. A Chinese shop or factory owner or company manager who had complied with the requirements laid down, and submitted detailed statements of his business and the stocks which he had stored, was obliged then to buy the privilege of resuming operations. There was no fixed charge or tax; the amount demanded appeared to depend on the particular Japanese official with whom the Chinese was dealing and on the relative wealth of the firm. In many cases these exactions were so high, and repeated so many times on so many different pretexts, that the Chinese businessman just gave up and got out of the colony as best he could.

The godown stocks of firms which did not comply with the requirements regarding a statement of amounts and values of those stocks, etc., and of those Chinese businessmen who were unable to support the continual demands for bribes, were confiscated by the Japanese authorities, to be disposed of as the latter saw fit. The control of these stocks was, of course, an incomparable tool with which to carve out the new pattern of Hong Kong's commerce and industry, and it is not to be supposed that, for all the irregularities involved, the Japanese military went about the task in any haphazard manner.

A primary objective was to procure a wholesale turnover of the actual ownership and supervision of the firms and factories of the colony from Chinese to Japanese hands. Items 26 and 27 of the "Laws for the Rule of the Captured Territory of Hong Kong" were intended to facilitate the formation of partnerships, a suggestion which was readily received by those Chinese firms which had so large a plant in the colony that they felt that they could not totally abandon their interests; under the pressure of continued exactions and the numerous regulations, many of them turned their companies into partnerships, giving a considerable share of the business to a Japanese.

More frequently, however, the Japanese simply took over the physical plant and ran it themselves, with the assistance in many instances of experts brought in from Japan. Referring to the work of these latter, a Domei broadcast from Tokyo in December, 1942, said: "Hardly had the smoke of fire cleared and the thunder of guns become still when a well-organized army of engineers and technicians went into action in order to hasten the [Japanese military's] work of

reconstruction [in Hong Kong]." The Hong Kong Hotel was taken over by the Navy, and its management was placed in the hands of a former manager of the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo who was brought out of retirement to undertake the task. The Army took over the Peninsula and Gloucester hotels, bringing in Japanese managers for both of them. The Government General (regarded as "Army" as against "Navy" in the rivalry between the two) took possession of the Dairy Farm, restocked it with a new herd of cows, and ran both it and the Dairy Farm Restaurant. In the latter it sold food at prices with which private Chinese restaurant owners could not compete. In the following year the Dairy Farm was turned over to the Japanese Marine Fisheries Corporation for even more intensive exploitation. This corporation was reported in May, 1943, to be manufacturing 300,000 pounds of butter monthly and to have greatly increased the output of milk.

An objective of equal importance to that of forcing direct Japanese participation in the supervision and ownership of Hong Kong firms and factories was that of channelizing the commercial and industrial activities of the "Conquered Territory" in the directions most helpful to the Japanese authorities. In an inspired article in the *Hong Kong News* of May 25, 1942, it was stated to be the policy of those authorities to allow the reopening of (or themselves to reopen) factories making foodstuffs; next in importance they placed textile factories; those using metals would be obliged to wait, they said. From their point of view, and given the situation in which they found themselves, this program was a very logical one; they needed foodstuffs not only for their troops but to supply the minimum requirements of the laboring population employed on their various projects, as well as of the Japanese managers and technicians who were directing them. Textiles were necessary for clothing, and any excess could be disposed of in barter; whatever metal was available in or to the colony had to be used in the repair or building of ships and could not be dissipated in the manufacture of peacetime articles, however useful they might be.

The Japanese therefore pushed the reopening of all types of food-manufacturing shops and plants. Hong Kong's bakeries were among the first of its factories to resume operations; plants processing cooking oils, etc., shortly followed them. This program proceeded hand in hand with the turnover of ownership to Japanese nationals. On May 22 a Mr. Kusumoto was permitted to take over a local bean-curd fac-

tory to produce that commodity for the Japanese Army, for military hospitals, and for general use; one T. Imura, the manager of the Honda Company in Wanchai, was supplied with a stock of wines, foodstuffs, and sundries with which to run a large store (on supplies looted from the old Caldbeck, MacGregor and Company, Ltd.) for the sale of those items; a Japanese enterprise was granted permission to take over the premises of the Cecil Hotel to run there a factory for the manufacture of cakes and biscuits; one U. Hayashi was allowed to open a Japanese bar; the On Lok Aerated Water Manufacturing Company resumed operations under Japanese management, etc. The opening or reopening of factories to produce other necessities for the Japanese Army, like soap and toilet articles, also proceeded at a forced pace.

Another factory whose resumption of operations was unquestionably of more significance than appeared on the surface was the Green Island Cement Company. It was reported on January 1, 1943, to be in production—almost certainly under the Japanese Army—with an indicated annual output of cement of 60,000 tons. Under the original British management which had built it, this factory, with a large, modern plant, had yet been unable to compete with the cement manufactured at less cost by the Japanese and shipped into the colony. In the years prior to Pearl Harbor it had been kept in operation on orders from the Hong Kong government for cement to use in the construction of military roads and of defense works. The paucity of Japanese shipping soon again made the operation of the plant desirable, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the cement produced has been used for the same purpose that the British used it: the fortification of Hong Kong.

Japanese propaganda and news broadcasts describing the "vigor" with which Hong Kong's "light and heavy industries" were successful in regaining "their normal activities of pre-war days" were unquestionably exaggerated, but they are very instructive as revealing the scope and intensity of the Japanese effort in the erstwhile British colony. One such broadcast—of October 17, 1942, from Tokyo, before the shortage of Japanese shipping had become acute—reported a continuous flow of raw materials from the south into Hong Kong and quoted some surprisingly high production totals: approximately 500,000 pounds of manila hemp were being produced, and 250 tons of sugar being refined, daily; a daily production of 18,000,000 cigarettes

would be tripled when more tobacco arrived from Burma; 72,000 bottles of beer were being turned out daily by local breweries, the announcer alleged.

Another typical report, perhaps more immediately credible, was that broadcast from Tokyo on December 3, 1942, claiming that the arrival of rubber deliveries from Malaya had made it possible for "a number of rubber factories in Hong Kong to resume operations." The Japanese had at that time an oversupply of rubber, and it was logical that they should put the otherwise idle rubber factories of the colony to work processing it and turning out some of the numerous and necessary articles of which it is the basic material.

By June, 1943, the Japanese military authorities in Hong Kong were asserting that they had eight hundred industrial plants in the colony in production on a full-time basis; a broadcast of July 24, 1943, alleged that there had been "phenomenal increases" in the production totals of the silk-spinning industry, canning factories, factories making rubber goods—tires and tubes, rubber hose, boots, medical rubber goods, etc.—the electric machine industry, the manufacture of manila rope, of sugar, clothing, bleaching powders, caustic soda, and cold-storage goods. It was stated that 70 per cent of all the products of Hong Kong's industries was exported, the balance being consumed locally.

In the fall of 1943 two large Japanese fishing companies undertook to "rationalize and stabilize" Hong Kong's fishing industry, controlling the sale and distribution of fish through the fishing guilds. On October 2, 1943, it was announced that a Federation of Fishermen's Guilds had been formed under the auspices of the Government General to achieve the following aims: (1) unitary control and guidance of junk fishing; (2) elimination of exploitation by fish brokers; (3) the supply and rationing of necessary materials to members; (4) increase and improvement of storage facilities; (5) experiments in developing and guidance in exploiting various by-products of fish; (6) financial aid to members; and (7) promotion of mutual benefits and aid to members.

As has been suggested, one of the primary mechanisms through which the commerce and industry of the colony were brought under such a high degree of control was the manner in which godown stocks were sealed for subsequent disposal. Through 1942 this disposal was effected as the need arose; for instance, a statement printed in the

*Hong Kong News* of May 14, 1942, invited "applications for supply" from persons and firms engaged in certain trades or dealing in specified goods. The trades listed were, among others, foremen, tailors, building contractors; the lines of trade of the firms were given as paper, metalware, food, electrical equipment, watches, typewriters, and sundries. Applicants were required to furnish a statement of their qualifications and also give details of their capital equipment and the number of workmen available. If their general attitude and antecedents proved acceptable, and if they did not object to a considerable degree of Japanese supervision, they were supplied with the goods with which to work from the sealed stocks.

A need evidently came to be felt for the further systemization of this procedure, and on February 1, 1943, there was set up under the Government General the "Hong Kong Commodity Assemblage Control Organization." This body "went over, assorted, and put in order" the "enormous quantities of goods seized when Hong Kong fell" and, in conjunction with a committee representing the Account and Supplies Department of the Government General and the Office of Commerce and Industry, set evaluations on them. Then, on January 21, 1944, the Control Organization made the first of three instalment payments to some three thousand persons registered as owners of the sealed stocks. It was claimed that these payments were on an equal basis, and all made at the same rate, but they were, of course, made in military yen, the value of which was figured at a high premium against the original Hong Kong currency evaluation of the goods, and the money, inadequate as it was, was regarded by most Chinese as being worthless except for immediate local use. These considerations in no wise abashed the Japanese military, who gave the widest advertisement to their action as another evidence of the magnanimity of the conqueror. Owners who were thus being politely robbed both of their goods and of any claim for adequate compensation for them read somewhat wryly the announcement in the February 4 (1944) issue of the *Hong Kong News*—"Owners of goods in sealed godowns get good news!"—that they were to receive two more instalment payments, each larger than the last. The goods of absent or recalcitrant owners had, of course, been seized outright, so that when these two further payments to their meeker brethren had been completed, the Japanese regarded the job as finished, and on March

15, 1944, the Hong Kong Commodity Assemblage Control Organization wound up its affairs and went out of existence.

Its basic objective had been attained. We have already seen how completely the Japanese had been successful, largely through the control of these sealed stocks, in securing dominance in Hong Kong's industry; if we needed any evidence of the fact that the Control Organization functioned equally efficiently in the field of the colony's trade, the Japanese themselves have given it to us. In the Domei broadcast celebrating the second anniversary of the fall of Hong Kong, a new organization was for the first time mentioned, the Hong Kong Trade Association, comprising the ninety-two Japanese commercial houses, which—as Domei affirmed with pride—"controlled the trade of Hong Kong." Perhaps in the sense in which Domei meant this statement, it was true, but in actual fact the trade was controlled by the people who controlled the Japanese traders: the Japanese military.

Trade across the borders of the colony, both import and export, came under rigid control. As has been stated, the regulations required that both exporter and importer should complete applications for permits to export or import each specific shipment of goods. These regulations left the flow of trade subject at every point to the experts of the Hong Kong Trade Department. When, for instance, in October, 1942, the merchants of the colony had asked the government to clarify the types of goods permitted to be exported and those which were prohibited, the government had answered that the best system for the merchants to follow was to "state full particulars on goods available for export and seek the advice of the Hong Kong Trade Department."

As was doubtless intended, these restrictions very quickly choked off most of what remained of the normal trade of the colony, but it soon became clear that the Japanese military had their own concept of commerce and that they were meeting with what appeared for a time at least to be considerable success in building up a large volume of what may be called "controlled exchange" in lieu of the trade which they had killed.

This altered form of commerce took place under a series of agreements which were concluded between the Japanese economic authorities in Hong Kong and those similarly situated in other Japanese-

controlled territories; they appear to have been essentially exchange arrangements covering a limited number of essential items and operable over a limited period of times. Such agreements were concluded with "Manchuko," North China, Central China (Nanking), Shanghai, Swatow, Canton, Formosa, the Philippine Islands, and Hainan.

The agreement with the last-named island may be taken as typical. First concluded in February, 1943, to expire on March 1, 1944, it was renewed in February, 1944, for another year, or until March 1, 1945. Under the new agreement, Hong Kong was to export to Hainan cotton goods, rubber articles, cloth, food (salt fish, fish liver, and other sea foods), matches, Chinese medicines, and certain miscellaneous items. Hainan was to send Hong Kong salt, raw rubber, unrefined sugar, agricultural products, and medicines. The total value of Hong Kong's exports to Hainan during the year was to amount to Yen 9,000,000; Hainan's exports to Hong Kong were to amount to Yen 3,000,000. These amounts were stated to represent increases over the first year's totals of Yen 400,000 in Hong Kong's shipments to Hainan and of Yen 2,160,000 in Hainan's shipments to Hong Kong. The payments were presumably cleared through Tokyo as the center of this system, and the balances used to pay for imports from other yen-bloc areas.

A further example of these agreements is the one with Canton. In anticipation of the expiration of the then current agreement between Hong Kong and Canton, the chief of the Finance Bureau of the Hong Kong government, accompanied by the heads of the trade and shipping departments, proceeded to Canton in March, 1944, as representatives of the Hong Kong government in the renegotiation of the agreement. Canton was represented by a Mr. Wan, chief of the Canton Trade Office, a Mr. Chang, chief of the Construction Office, and several other officials of the Japanese-controlled government of Canton. They spent two days in their negotiations and emerged with an agreement valid from April 1, 1944, to March 31, 1945, which roughly doubled the then existing totals of exports from each city to the other. Goods to be shipped from Canton to Hong Kong included rice paper, silk and silk goods, native tobacco, meats, fresh and dried vegetables, eggs, fish, fruits, etc. Commodities to be exported from Hong Kong to Canton included electric appliances, motorcar parts, engineering and building materials, textiles, various kinds of paper, sugar, coke, rubber products, salt, and dried fish. The value of


Canton's exports was to be Yen 6,000,000, while those of Hong Kong were to total Yen 18,000,000. Trade accounts were to be settled in terms of yen at Central Reserve Bank rates.

This, then, was Hong Kong's "new economy": its domestic trade completely controlled, its industry owned or supervised by Japanese, and the flow of its commerce regulated from Tokyo to fit the designs of a "Greater East Asia" under the Mikado's sway. The Japanese defense of this structure was as cunning and as carefully calculated as had been the steps by which they had built it. In a typical commentary on the economy of Hong Kong, broadcast in Cantonese from the colony to Chungking on March 28, 1944, the announcer said, *inter alia*:

"'Free trade based on equality' was the pretty slogan which British merchants used a century ago when she tried to make China a British economic colony. Because they wanted to attain this so-called 'free trade based upon equality,' they started the abominable opium war. And from the victorious result of the opium war, Britain attained the 'free trade' she sought, which was to import opium into China, a drug which poisoned China for over a hundred years. . . . Crafty Britain sought to . . . extend a growing power over entire China, and in the meanwhile they could suck the fat of the Chinese people and sacrifice them for the sake of their greed. . . . The British used [Hong Kong] on the one hand as a means to fulfil Britain's ambition of economic exploitation of China, and on the other she employed it to maintain Hong Kong's one special characteristic—that of a free port. From the point of view of Hong Kong alone, her foundation was built mainly on trade; her industries were almost not worth a farthing. . . .

"The outbreak of the Greater East Asia War marked the complete smashing of the old Hong Kong economy and the return of Hong Kong to the hands of the Asiatic peoples. . . ."

FINANCIAL CONTROL FROM TOKYO



READERS will recall that, when the Japanese troops had effected their landing on Hong Kong Island, and it was already clear that the defense was collapsing, Japanese airplanes dropped propaganda handbills over the city, one lot of which informed the populace that, when the Japanese had taken the city, all Hong Kong notes above the value of ten dollars would be worthless. This warning had the effect desired: the Chinese began hoarding the smaller notes, creating so sharp an artificial scarcity of them as to tie up what trade existed; notes above the ten-dollar denomination began to be accepted only at a discount.

When the city fell, the Japanese kept their promise; from December 25, 1941, to January 14, 1942, the circulation of Hong Kong notes of which the face value was more than ten dollars was forbidden. On January 14 a notice was issued in the name of the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Hong Kong, which read:

"The public is hereby notified that, in spite of the previous notification prohibiting circulation of Hong Kong dollar notes, of which face value is more than \$10, as a temporary measure after the occupation of Hong Kong by his Imperial Japanese Majesty's Army, in consideration of the public convenience, Hong Kong dollar notes of the above face value (viz. \$25, \$50, \$100, and \$500) are now permitted circulation for the time being as well as those of not more than \$10."

A suspicious public noted that the larger notes were permitted circulation "for the time being"; the article reporting the new order said also that the larger Hong Kong notes could be exchanged only for smaller ones and not for military yen. The result was that the

larger notes were even less acceptable than before; while the banks and all other agencies that could do so were making payments in the larger notes (to get rid of them), the more well-to-do Chinese who had hoarded considerable quantities of cash in that form against just such a situation as now existed suffered great hardships. A \$100 note, when it could be exchanged at all, would not bring more than \$60-\$75 in small notes; the larger notes could be cashed only at relatively greater discounts and very rarely even then.

Nevertheless, Hong Kong notes continued to be regarded by the Chinese as a relatively secure cache of value: it was reported that they were amply backed in London by the head offices of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, which would honor them there. To destroy this confidence, the Japanese forced the issuing banks in Hong Kong to sign new issues in unknown amounts; these notes could not be readily distinguished from the original and valid Hong Kong notes, and the Chinese felt that the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation might be led, by reason of its inability to tell the good notes from the counterfeits, to refuse to redeem any of them. They therefore sought to exchange this currency for goods, thereby sharply accelerating the rise in prices during this period. This is exemplified in the rise of food prices dealt with in Chapter 9.

In addition, the Japanese twice depreciated the foreign exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar. At the very beginning of their occupation the Japanese military, disregarding the fact that before the war the Hong Kong dollar had had a slightly higher foreign exchange value than the yen, had deliberately devalued the Hong Kong dollar by more than 50 per cent by setting a rate of two Hong Kong dollars for one military yen. In August, 1942, the foreign exchange value of the Hong Kong dollar was further depreciated to a ratio of four to one.

The use of this military yen by the invading Japanese had, in a sense at least, the sanction of history. It is one of the oldest tenets of military science that an invading army must support itself as far as possible on the territories which it occupies. In our time this is accomplished by a very simple device: the issuance of military scrip which is "legal tender" only in the particular territory for which it is issued, and which is not ordinarily exchangeable even for the currency of the home country of the issuing forces. The origin of the system is obscure, but it is known, for instance, that Napoleon attempted to compensate

the people of Moscow for their losses in the great fire, and at the same time to provide his troops with needed supplies, by the issuance of rubles printed at his order. Tolstoy's description of this transaction in his *War and Peace* unquestionably reflects accurately the indignation of the Russian residents of Moscow at what they apparently regarded as a thoroughly dishonest and even despicable ruse.

The practice has been followed in each of the areas of China occupied by the invader and was applied in Hong Kong immediately upon Japanese occupation of the colony. There they issued a form of military yen printed only on one side, and without serial number, on the cheapest paper. The people of Hong Kong upon whom this paper was forced reacted as the good Russian folk of Moscow had a hundred and thirty years before the rubles of Napoleon. They could not be expected to take the conqueror's view and to tell themselves that the Japanese were, temporarily at least, the *de facto* sovereigns and that the issuance of currency is one of the most precious prerogatives of sovereignty. From the standpoint of the occupying forces, for whom the only criterion by which the paper they issued was to be judged was the relative effectiveness with which it gave the necessary access to the goods and services of the area in which it was issued, the printing of military scrip served the purpose better than would the issuance of requisition forms, which as a rule are nontransferrable and nonnegotiable. To the residents of Hong Kong the printing of these military yen merely made the looting of the colony "legal"; those Japanese who disdained outright theft could always "pay" for what they took.

There was another circumstance incident to the issuance of military yen which worried the Hong Kong populace: it seemed to them that the Hong Kong money which the Japanese displaced with this spurious currency constituted an ever present threat to the position of the Hong Kong dollar, particularly in its relation to military yen. Furthermore, the Chinese recognized that any possible postwar redemption of Hong Kong currency would necessarily be complicated by the fact that the Japanese would be among the largest holders.

On March 21, 1943, the Government General of Hong Kong announced the adoption of a system of centralizing exchange between Hong Kong, Thailand, French Indo-China, North China, and Manchukuo, as well as a simplified procedure for handling transactions between Hong Kong, Canton, and Hainan Island. From that time

forward remittances between the three last-named places had to be (1) approved by the Japanese authorities on the spot and (2) made through Japanese banks. A new method for handling exchange between Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippine Islands was put into effect; exchange between Hong Kong, Thailand, Indo-China, North China, and Manchukuo was to be settled in special yen in Tokyo, while the trade between Japan Proper and Hong Kong, and between Hong Kong and Central China, was henceforth to be settled in military yen. The order also specified that trade undertaken from Hong Kong between the places named could be handled only by members of the Hong Kong Trade Association, described in the preceding chapter. Special permission could be granted in individual cases to persons not members of the association.

The foregoing is the regulation which formalized the absorption of Hong Kong into the yen bloc, marking the destruction of the colony as an independent money market. An interesting and significant variation is the existence within the yen bloc of what might be called a military-yen area, in which foreign exchange transactions are obviated by the use of military yen.

For some Hong Kong Chinese, however, the Hong Kong dollar continued to represent a symbol of permanent value in comparison to which the military yen was only a badly printed piece of dirty paper. In an attempt to extinguish this stubborn vestige of British sovereignty, the Japanese Government General of Hong Kong, on May 10, 1943, promulgated an order prohibiting the circulation of Hong Kong dollars from June 1 of that year. The same order stated that Central Reserve Bank of China notes (the currency of the Chinese puppet regime), Hong Kong dollars, or the old "fapi" might be taken out of the Hong Kong area without restriction; that a permit would be required to bring in any currency with the exception of military yen in amounts not exceeding 200 yen or Central Reserve Bank notes of corresponding value; possessors of Hong Kong dollars must exchange them for military yen on or before May 31, 1943; debts in Hong Kong dollars were to be repaid in military yen; Hong Kong dollar deposits had to be converted to military-yen accounts by May 31; and the legal rate for conversion was to be one military yen for four Hong Kong dollars.

It is interesting to note that, whereas in the other areas under Japanese control the military yen issued during the first phase of the

conquest were replaced by a scrip assimilable to the original currency of the country, in Hong Kong military yen continued to be used. This difference probably reflects a difference in political objectives: other regions of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere were to be controlled through pseudo-autonomous regimes, while the colony was to be absorbed directly into the Empire itself.

It is not conceivable that more than a very few Chinese were happy about this final effort of the Japanese to destroy the value of the Hong Kong dollar. To the wealthy or well-to-do who had large holdings it was another serious blow; to the poor who had clung to their little nesteggs hidden away in some old cigarette tin or carried around in an improvised money belt under their clothing, it was ruinous. This new Japanese move was accepted in a silence into which the press announcement issued at the same time injected a sardonic note: "As this development [the devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar] has long been anticipated, financial and economic circles are not only appearing unaffected, but are even expressing signs of welcome"(!).

Before the hostilities Hong Kong had been one of the few places in the world in which an actual movement of treasure was an important item in the balance of payments. Gold and silver moved through the colony to pay in part for China's imports. To regulate the flow of such treasure and control prices, the Japanese on February 19, 1942, "took a further step to stabilize the financial and economic position of Hong Kong" by opening a new Gold and Silver Exchange. The opening ceremony was attended by Colonel Ikemoto, director of the Economic Section. He instructed the representatives of the forty-two money-exchange establishments, the opening of which had been authorized by the Japanese and whose managers formed the membership of the Exchange, in the way they were expected to go. He told them that the main functions of the Exchange would be to stop speculation and to prevent any disparity in the premium demanded by these money-changers for the exchange of money by allowing only cash business and fixing rates daily. The now familiar Tung Chung-wei, appointed chairman of the Exchange, thanked the colonel for his instructions.

Another peculiar characteristic of Hong Kong's position was the extent to which it owed its pre-eminence as a financial center for southeastern Asia and China to the remittances from overseas Chinese, the handling of which was one of the major phases of the island's

foreign exchange activities. These remittances comprised the money sent back through Hong Kong to their villages in China by Chinese living and working in the "Southern Regions" as well as by Hong Kong Chinese to their own family villages. The individual amounts were usually small, but they were so numerous and so constant as to form in mass one of the most important single factors in the economy of southern China and southeastern Asia.

It was because of this almost unique situation that Hong Kong under the British rule had not been included in the sterling area until just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Thus the United States dollars, and other foreign exchange earnings of Hong Kong, were not automatically included in the British Empire's pool of United States dollars and other free foreign exchange; Hong Kong had in consequence been able to remain a comparatively free foreign exchange center until the eve of the Pacific war.

In the immediate aftermath of the fighting in Hong Kong, these remittances had been suspended; but, as the areas from which they were derived also came under Japanese control, a partial revival of the flow appears to have taken place and to have continued in limited volume through 1943. That it still amounted to a considerable item of foreign exchange is evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 1942, in an effort to work out some scheme for the purchase of rice for the residents of the colony, Mr. Tung Chung-wei suggested that all overseas remittances be impounded and used to buy rice; this store of rice would then be sold to the public at fixed prices, and the military yen thus realized, minus service charges, could be remitted to the persons for whom the original remittances were intended. The plan failed of adoption, probably because it was feared that overseas Chinese would suspect that their money was being fraudulently diverted. Other schemes for handling or manipulating these remittances were mooted from time to time but were all for one reason or another abandoned. Finally, on December 30, 1942, the Government General ruled that remittances would be restricted to the sum of 100 yen monthly "for the time being"; they should be made only through Japanese banks, with an exchange rate (fixed at par) between the yen currency and the military scrip in the Japanese-occupied regions.

The assimilation of Hong Kong's banking structure into the larger financial framework of a Japanese-dominated Asia proved a more difficult matter. The nub of this problem lay in the outstanding

importance to the financial life of Hong Kong of the British banks operating there. When, for instance, the United States liquidated the Yokohama Specie Bank in New York, relatively very few people were affected; in Hong Kong, on the other hand, the whole banking system was based on the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and several other British banking institutions. The Japanese were thus faced with the necessity of liquidating, as enemy banks, the principal banking institutions in the colony.

A factor of great importance in the situation with which the Japanese were confronted, and one which at the same time illustrates the importance of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation in the financial life of the colony, is the circumstance that nearly all of Hong Kong's bank notes were issued by that corporation. By destroying this bank, the Japanese were destroying the issuing authority.

The first steps of the Japanese military after their entry into Hong Kong were not, as they related to banking, exceptional. With the occupation of the colony, all banking establishments closed their doors awaiting the instructions of the occupying forces. Thereafter the Japanese Army Economic Bureau took over control of the situation, and the banks could reopen only with its specific permission. The sudden suspension of banking facilities which thus occurred, together with the devaluation of the larger Hong Kong notes and the hoarding of the smaller ones, caused a very tight currency situation during the first month of the occupation. To afford temporary relief to this immediate need, an order was issued on January 27 over the seal and signature of the commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese Army, "in consideration of the livelihood of the people," permitting neutral nationals and "nonhostile" Chinese who had current or savings accounts sufficient to cover the amount in one of two named foreign banks or four named Chinese banks, to withdraw Hong Kong \$50. Such withdrawals were possible only for the three days from January 29 to 31. Very few Chinese took advantage of this first opportunity, probably because they feared that this was just another scheme on the part of the Japanese authorities to discover the whereabouts; or even to apprehend the persons, of more of Hong Kong's well-to-do residents.

On February 6 (1942) a notice was issued, by order of the Japanese

Economic Bureau stating that "the banks hereinafter mentioned are permitted to open and resume business on the dates specified." The notice listed twenty-two banks, twelve of which were instructed to open on February 6, while the other fourteen—including the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, the Bank of Canton, the Manufacturers' Bank of China, the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, and the Kinchong Banking Corporation, all of them important Chinese banking institutions—were told to resume business on February 9.

The same order provided that withdrawals of deposits made in these banks before the war were to be restricted to Hong Kong currency, and each person was to be allowed to withdraw not more than three hundred dollars per month. Withdrawal of fapi deposits were forbidden. Withdrawal of deposits for the purpose of covering office expenses could be made from Hong Kong currency accounts. In order to effect such withdrawals, the firms concerned were required to submit application to the director of the Economic Bureau of the Japanese Army, and no withdrawal could be made without official approval. Withdrawals of deposits to cover salaries or wages of employees were limited to a sum of fifty dollars per employee.

It was further stated in the order that the opening of new accounts in Hong Kong currency and withdrawals therefrom were not restricted, although the opening of new accounts in fapi was not permitted. The notice closed with a paragraph to the effect that, after investigation by the Economic Bureau of the Japanese Army, articles held in safe-deposit boxes would in due course be returned to the owners.

A fairly liberal policy was in fact followed in the opening of these safe-deposit boxes, not only in the banks which had been "permitted" to reopen, but in all others besides. A series of notifications made public the set times when persons having valuables in safe deposit at the various banks might withdraw them; failure to appear at that time forfeited the contents of the box. It had to be opened before inspectors from the gendarmerie and the Financial Section (of the Economic Bureau), but complete withdrawals are reported to have been generally permitted, except of notes and currency of enemy countries; gold bars and coins were also retained.

By a public notice issued April 8, 1942, the Japanese authorities

denominated certain listed banks—among them the National City Bank, the Chase Bank, the American Express Company, and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation—as enemy banks and stated that they were to be liquidated.

Although the preliminary steps looking to this liquidation were taken by the Economic Bureau of the Japanese Army, and a check on outstanding accounts was begun, the actual liquidation was finally turned over to officers of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan, several of whom had evidently been brought to Hong Kong for that purpose.

The foreign staffs of the banks being liquidated were not interned but were kept under guard in a Chinese hotel in downtown Hong Kong, being escorted to and from work every day by armed gendarmes. They undertook much of the work of the various interim payments which were made to depositors. On April 18 all the banks being liquidated opened for a period of two weeks to allow all clients, including enemy nationals, to file with the liquidators a statement of their claims against each bank.

In the casting of accounts both of the American banks were discovered to be highly liquid, whereas the assets of several of the other banks were described as being advances against local shares which were now—at least for the time being—worthless, against merchandise in godowns which was probably now in Japan, and to large concerns which no longer existed. Although the managers of the American banks sought to have the accounts of each bank settled separately, so that they might make as high a payment as possible against their liabilities, the Japanese military authorities decided to create a liquidation pool and to make as high a percentage payment out of that pool as could be realized from the total sum available from all the banks together. This was done, and on June 15 the banks in the process of liquidation paid all accounts up to H.K. \$500, including those of the Americans being repatriated, plus 20 per cent of the remaining amount.

On June 16 it was announced that the four large pro-Chungking banks in Hong Kong were also to be liquidated: the Central Bank of China, the Farmers' Bank, the Bank of Canton, and the Manufacturers' Bank of China. The chief of the Financial Section issued a statement explaining this action, in which he said, *inter alia*:

“Based on the decided policy of Nippon, stern measures should have been taken against these banks, which should not have been permitted to continue to operate here. However, these pro-Chungking banks were permitted to operate after the war because of the serious state of the livelihood of the people then. . . . Now that peaceful conditions have been restored . . . it is thought that appropriate action should also be taken against the pro-Chungking banks which are known for their enemy activities before the war.”

The procedure for the liquidation of these four banks was the same as that for other enemy banks, except that recent depositors were fully protected. The refunding of up to 20 per cent of the outstanding amounts in these banks was reported to have been undertaken on October 22.

According to a Domei broadcast from Tokyo on December 11, 1942, the Governor General of Hong Kong had that day announced the suspension, as of December 31, of further payments on the various deposits in the sixteen enemy banks in Hong Kong. Deposit payments were described as almost completed, and at that time this announcement was taken to mean that the liquidation of the banks concerned had to all intents and purposes been completed. Several subsequent official pronouncements of the Japanese cast some doubt on that assumption, however, and on March 30, 1944, another Domei broadcast stated that the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Taiwan had been designated to complete the liquidation of the enemy banks, to whose number two more had meanwhile been added, making a total of eighteen.

The latter report tended to corroborate the impression current in Chinese banking circles at that time in Chungking, where it was commonly believed that the liquidation of these banks had in fact not yet been completed. This would appear to be true at least in the case of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, which presents in their most developed form all the complex problems involved in settling the accounts of one of the branches of a large modern banking institution.

Before the Pacific war, the larger Chinese banks in Hong Kong had been the center for the foreign exchange activities of the Central Government of China. An illustration of the importance of their

functions was the fact that the Stabilization Board, then a very important body, had its most active office in Hong Kong, although its headquarters were nominally in Chungking, the wartime capital of China.

After the occupation of Hong Kong, it became the avowed policy of the Japanese military authorities to force these Chinese banks, with the exception of the few specifically named for liquidation, to remain open, in contrast to their policy toward foreign banks, which were forced to close their doors and keep them closed.

The familiar organizations through which Japanese direction could be clothed in a similitude of spontaneity began to emerge among Hong Kong's bankers at about the same time that they were appearing in every other phase of the life of the community. A revived Chinese Bankers Association met on April 2 (1942) in the presence of Japanese army officers to elect the Japanophile Lau Tit-shing as their new chairman and Li Tse-fong as vice-chairman, together with a new executive committee of five members.

Another association—one which had no parallel in pre-war Hong Kong—was the Chinese Bank and Money Changers Co-operative Association, the purpose of which was said to be to improve relations between the banks and the money-changers, so that full co-operation could be afforded the government. This body assured the Japanese of access to the small loan “banks” and money-changers’ shops which abounded in Hong Kong but which could not otherwise be reached.

A more complex mechanism for high-level control was the “Hong Kong Financial Deliberative Council” set up on or about March 15, 1943, under the immediate direction of the chief of the Department of Finance of the Government General and the chief of the Finance Section of the Japanese Army. Its membership comprised all the leading Chinese and Japanese bankers in the colony; it met twice a month to “exchange opinions and extend direct co-operation for the construction of a new Hong Kong.” Set up to insure such “co-operation” from the financial community of the “Captured Territory” through an organization immediately under government control, the council might be contrasted with the informal advisory councils established by the United States Treasury Department to take advantage of the experience of American bankers to help the United States government cope with the problems of war finance. These latter

are without organizational form and are, of course, completely voluntary.

Aside from the organizations just described, Chinese banking institutions in Hong Kong were left relatively unimpeded in terms of ordinary controls. No complicated banking regulations or high-reserve requirements were laid down to obstruct their operations.

One of the ways in which the Japanese have successfully exercised control over the Chinese banks in the colony without extensive banking regulations goes deeper than the forms of organizational direction available to them: they have forced the leading officers of those banks to remain in Hong Kong under their surveillance, holding each of them responsible under the penalty of death for the good conduct of all the others. It is authoritatively reported in Chungking that, whenever one of the leading Chinese banking officials in Hong Kong attempts to escape, three of his colleagues are by Japanese military fiat put to death. Under this system there have been few attempts to escape.

The Chinese bankers are thus forced to stay in the colony and to continue in nominal operation. But their large-scale commercial activities have ceased almost entirely. It is said that in comparatively recent months there has begun to be a revival of speculative activity among the small native banks in Hong Kong, but informed banking circles in Chungking believe that such activity still constitutes a very small percentage of Hong Kong's banking business. The larger, modern Chinese banks such as the Shanghai Commercial suffer in the first instance from the loss of all their former business contacts. They are also afraid to engage in any substantial business, because—in view of the gamble on continued Japanese occupation which such activities would involve—they might lose heavily. Even if they desired to handle a share of the business, they are confronted with a virtually impregnable Japanese monopoly. They have therefore become simply banks of deposit, holding the cash reserves of their depositors against the day of liberation.

The large vacuum left in the financial structure of the colony by the closing of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation gave the Japanese a superb opportunity to step into the position which that bank had held and to expand it into a complete dominance of the financial life of the island. Of this opportunity they took prompt

advantage. All the banking for the Japanese military was handled by the Yokohama Specie Bank; no one else could get in on it. And because the Japanese military ruled every part of the activities of the "Conquered Territory," this relationship delivered a firm monopoly of the banking business of Hong Kong into the hands of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which also became the bank of issue.

The assumption of this role in the colony by the Yokohama Specie shifted the center of the island's financial control from Hong Kong and London to Tokyo, the heart of the Greater East Asia Sphere. The Japanese had captured not only the "Territory of Hong Kong" but its money market as well.

A Communications Department was set up in the Civil Administration Department of the Japanese Army early in January to take charge of all matters affecting transport and communications. Assisted by a group of civilian experts and technicians brought in from Japan (who were to prove themselves exceptionally competent), the Communications Department turned its attention before anything else to the problem of intra-urban transport, the first press reference to its activities being in the form of a report appearing in the *Hong Kong News* of January 13, 1942, to the effect that the authorities were understood to be taking steps to resume the street-railway service as soon as possible.

The streetcar line running from Causeway Bay to the Western Market was put back into operation on January 27, with 16 cars operating at two-and-a-half-minute intervals. The fare was 8 Hong Kong cents for first class and 4 cents for second. When necessary repairs to the wires had been made, the Happy Valley Route was opened on February 10; with the resumption of the line from North Point to Shaukiwan Market and later to the terminus, the streetcar

lines in Hong Kong were stated to have been completely restored. The *Hong Kong Press* of February 11 reported that, with 50 cars running, the number of persons using the cars daily was a maximum of 63,710 and a minimum of 59,361; maximum daily receipts were Yen 3,502 and the minimum were Yen 3,129. By March 15, 60 cars were said to be in service (as against 111 prior to the Pacific war). On that day the Japanese authorities raised the streetcar fares to 15 sen (H.K. \$0.30) for first class and 10 sen (H.K. \$0.20) for second class.

The Rehabilitation Advisory Committee presented a petition to the Communications Department asking that these fares be reduced, since at that price many of the poorer classes would no longer be able to use the streetcars. This request was rejected by the committee, which indicated that the fares had been deliberately raised with just that fact in mind: they wanted to cut down on the use of the cars to avoid overcrowding. The subsequent further devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar in terms of yen, of course, again doubled this fare in Hong Kong money.

The only later change in the streetcar service was a typically Japanese one. It was customary in Hong Kong for hucksters of meat and fish, and housewives making family purchases, to go early to the market and to return by streetcar. This meant that the early-morning cars would more likely than not be crowded with people who were carrying little hunks of raw meat tied at the end of strings, or sometimes a whole "catch" of not-too fresh fish, with a resultant odor and general unpleasantness that did not well accord with Japanese concepts of how things should be in the New Order. They therefore instituted special streetcars for goods portage, running every half-hour from 6:30 to 10:30 A.M. Hawkers, cook boys, and housewives carrying fish or other objectionable articles could take those cars or walk; only at the peril of hearing some very bad language or even of being caned would they henceforth attempt to ride with the prim office-goer.

At about the same time that the streetcars were put in operation again, the Communications Department opened four bus routes on Hong Kong Island, eleven of the busses formerly used being placed back into use, while five more were being repaired. The lines and stops were the same as before, but the fares were charged according to sections or districts, the lowest far being 5 sen (H.K. \$0.10). The service was more than well patronized; there were many complaints of congestion on the busses and of crowding at the stops—indicating

that the Japanese were unable to bring in replacements for the busses destroyed during the fighting. It was also reported that the Japanese had taken the engines out of some of the busses to power the wooden vessels being built under their shipbuilding program.

A ferry service of sorts had been in operation since about January 10, when repatriates or persons with essential business in Kowloon were permitted to cross for charges ranging up to H.K. \$1.00 apiece on very crowded ferries. The traffic was then all one way, people who were taken across not being permitted to return. On January 19, perhaps somewhat prematurely, the press announced the resumption of regular service every twenty minutes, the fare being 10 sen for first class and 5 sen for second—twice what it had been under the British regime.

Several of the ferry boats had been scuttled and others badly damaged, so that this early resumption of the service represented a considerable achievement; but more surprising was the successful salvaging of three of the large vehicular ferries, all of which had been scuttled prior to the surrender. The service was resumed in June; the ferry boats to Cheung Chau had begun running again in May. Thus all the basic cross-water transport services were resumed, although at higher rates and on reduced schedules.

If the salvaging of ferry boats was surprising, the repair of the Peak street railway was remarkable. During the fighting the Peak station of the railway—a cable car operating at a steep gradient up the side of the central Peak on Hong Kong Island—was destroyed, the cable broken, and several of the control houses at different levels on the way up badly damaged. The writer himself witnessed, from the relative safety of a ditch about twenty feet away, the destruction by shellfire of the May Road control box. Yet by June 5 the street railway had been completely repaired, and the governor and other high-ranking Japanese officials were taken to the Peak on it. It began regular runs at thirty-minute intervals on June 25; twenty one-way tickets sold for Yen 5.00, which made the Hong Kong price 50 cents (later \$1.00 per trip, as against 10 cents before the war).

During the hostilities prior to Hong Kong's fall, the colonial government took over, for the legitimate purposes of defense, all the privately owned automobiles in the colony. In the widespread looting after the city's capture the Japanese military authorities sent out squads to take possession of all available cars; in some instances they

even undertook small repairs in order to get the machines under way. Most of the automobiles, as we have noted, were shipped out of the colony, presumably to Japan.

In spite of that fact, the *Hong Kong News* of January 21 printed an advice to all those whose cars had been commandeered by the British government to register their names with a view to securing a return of the car. There were few registrations. On March 25 the Hong Kong government published "Notice No. 12" instructing all civilians in possession of motorcars and wishing to use them to apply to the Land Communications Department before April 14; application forms for the purpose were obtainable at the section, and applications made after the set date would not be valid. Again there were few if any registrations, so that from that time forward the Japanese military had a justification in law and regulation for the already obvious fact that they had pre-empted for their own use nearly all the relatively small number of automobiles still in operation in the colony. A few were run by doctors and other "essential civilians"; for them, besides a permit, a license was also necessary, the fee for the latter being Yen 60 a year (H.K. \$120, later \$240), as against the old charge of H.K. \$10.

A public notification dated March 25, 1942, stated that "in order to increase communication facilities, maintain the scenic beauty of the city, keep the roads in good condition, and avoid transport accidents, owners of horse carriages, bicycles, and man-power cars are required to apply for permission to continue to use them." The reason for requiring registration became clear later, when it was announced that they would all require licenses, the charges for which would be Yen 25 for horse-drawn or man-propelled vehicles; Yen 60 for motorcycles; and Yen 9 for bicycles. There were the usual deadlines after which applications would not be accepted.

After the middle of May it was announced specifically that rickshaws and chairs would have to register and be licensed, the fee for a rickshaw being Yen 20 a year (H.K. \$40, later H.K. \$80) and for a chair Yen 5. The Japanese must have known well enough that very few rickshaw-pullers or chairbearers could raise, especially in the short time given them, the sums demanded; these regulations evidently were directed at reducing the number of rickshaws and chairs. Those forced out of work then came within the purview of other regulations which required all those without regular employment to "return to their ancestral home in China." Later, "to avoid useless

quarrels about fares," a regular set rate for rickshaws was established, the prices being much higher than those usually charged or which most Chinese could afford to pay. Also evidently aimed at eliminating the rickshaws, these price ceilings were simply disregarded.

The problem of extra-urban transport was tackled almost simultaneously with that of intra-urban. In the first days of the fighting between the British and Japanese forces in the New Territories, the defenders covered their retreat by discharging the mines which had been set earlier along that part of the Canton-Kowloon Railway which lay within the British lease-hold. Large sections of track and several bridges were destroyed, and two or three tunnels, one of them a long one, were completely blocked. On December 30, 1941, the Railway Corps under the command of Major Kishihara began the task of repairing these damages. By January 30, 1942, the work was finished except for the clearing of the one long tunnel between Koloon-tong and Shatin, and on that day a party of journalists was taken for a tour of the line.

A much more impressive and formal ceremony was held on March 24, when the Governor General officially received Major Ishihara's report of his success in clearing the entire line as far as Lowu, or that part of the railway which now lay within the "Captured Territory." His Excellency addressed the gathering at Kowloon Station, thanking the major. The repair of the railway would, he said, assist the reconstruction of Hong Kong and would bring nearer final victory in the Greater East Asia War; "Hong Kong depends upon the great ocean for its activities, but the completion of the Kowloon-Canton Railway, connecting the continent with the great ocean, will have great importance from now onwards." When the speechmaking was done, the governor traveled up and back on that section of the line which had been reopened.

From March 25 six trains were run on that section daily; the line immediately became an important thoroughfare in the movement of repatriates back to their villages in China. In the week ending May 18, for instance—when the heaviest part of the repatriation movement was already past—8,286 persons left Kowloon Station on the trains and 4,428 persons entered the station on them: some 3,758 persons had evidently gone into China in the course of the week by that one route alone. After June 24 a regular "repatriation train" was scheduled: it left Kowloon Station every afternoon at three o'clock. Considerable

quantities of market produce from the New Territories and the nearby areas of Kwangtung Province were also brought in on the trains.

As the governor had suggested in his speech when the section from Kowloon to Lowu had been reopened, the Japanese authorities had very much in mind the desirability of reopening the whole line from Hong Kong to Canton. The Domei release on December 25, 1943, the second anniversary of Japanese control of the colony, asserted that a noteworthy contribution to Hong Kong's self-sufficiency was the cleaning-up, in November and December of that year, of the "remnants of Chungking and Chinese Communist troops" along the Canton-Kowloon Line, "reopening it for the first time since the fall of Canton to the Japanese."

Another report, of January 10, 1944, alleged that the official reopening of the Canton-Kowloon Railway had taken place on December 28, 1943, in the presence of the Governor General and of the supreme commander of the South China Military Sector. Information from other sources, however, flatly contradicts the Japanese assertion that the whole line had been reopened, although it was reliably stated in September, 1944, that the southern (north-south) section of the railway had been repaired to a point beyond Sheklung (at the approximate elbow of the line, where it turns west to Canton) and that the Sheklung Bridge had been restored. This section of the line was reported to have been in operation from July 1, 1944.

The Japanese have never underestimated the airplane, and we have observed that they were so well aware of the importance of the Kai Tak airdrome in Hong Kong that the first knowledge most residents of the colony had of the outbreak of the Pacific war came when they saw the airdrome being attacked at eight o'clock on the morning of December 8. Almost immediately after the fall of Hong Kong the Japanese repaired the Kai Tak field and put it into operation. There were soon rumors of their plan considerably to enlarge it. The first announcement of the scheme was made on June 6 (1942) in a "canned" release which went on to comment: "Hong Kong has been known for years as an important seaport, and now with the development of air communications it will undoubtedly become a vital link with Nippon and the Southern Regions, both by sea and air."

To anticipate any possible resistance to the enlargement of the field on the part of Chinese landowners in the areas affected, the Japanese authorities secured the formation of an "Association for the Assistance

of the Authorities in the Enlargement of Kai Tak Airport" with a membership comprising the important landowners and residents in the Kai Tak district. The association was charged with determining the number of houses in the zone and other necessary data. This step, and frequent if inconspicuous items in the press, prepared the public for the extent of the project. The Kowloon Bureau was instructed to lend every facility to persons affected. It was estimated that forty factories, twenty small villages, and numerous private residences would have to be removed. Some twenty thousand farmers would, it was calculated, be displaced; they would each be given plots of uncultivated land in Tsun Wan and Tai O. An article in the *Hong Kong News* of June 26 gave some indication of the time the Japanese expected to take in rebuilding the airdrome: persons living to the northwest of the original field were to move by August 10, while those on the west, north, and east of it would be given until December 31 to get out.

A Chinese who left Hong Kong in the summer of 1943 said that the enlarged field had been completed that spring and that British prisoners of war were used as part of the conscripted labor force with which the task was accomplished. They were said to have been paid 80 Hong Kong cents a day. Other reports corroborate the statement that the new field was in service in 1943.

Soon after their occupation of Hong Kong, the Japanese also undertook to restore wireless and other communications. A Cable and Wireless Office was opened at the Marina House, No. 17, Queen's Road Central, on February 1, 1942. A Mr. Ohtsubo, evidently the head of the office, stated in a press account announcing its opening that for the time being it would be possible only to send messages to Japan Proper and to Canton; this restriction was due, he explained, to the serious damage which had been done to the equipment and machines by the British just prior to their surrender. Only two small wireless sets were at that time available for the traffic. The office would be open from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.; messages of greeting or consolation would not be accepted, and the office could take no responsibility for the nondelivery of messages. The rates heavily favored the use of the Japanese language in the messages dispatched. Inward traffic was also handled, and the office undertook to deliver telegrams to the recipients whether they were in Hong Kong or Kowloon.

With the passing months this very limited service was gradually

extended, until it was possible to reach by telegraph from Hong Kong every important city in Greater East Asia.

Hong Kong's telephones presented a somewhat different problem probably because the Japanese military looked askance at a form of communication by which "dangerous thoughts" could go darting about over the city with so much greater chance of escaping detection than by any other convenient means. Action on the matter was therefore considerably slower. The Telephone Bureau of the Civil Administration Department announced on January 31 that the lines connecting more than one half of the 170,000 telephones formerly in use in the colony had been successfully repaired. The Bureau had not yet, however, reached a decision as to the rates to be charged.

The public was later informed that such telephones as were in use would be free until the costs had been determined, but that no new phones were at the time available. A telephone repair office was set up in Windsor House to undertake current repairs on phones being used.

On April 28 "Governor's Order No. 19" was issued, setting forth in detail the "Telephone Regulations for the Captured Territory of Hong Kong." In it the yearly rates—to be payable quarterly—were set according to the remoteness of the place in which the phone was to be installed, the lowest yearly charge being Yen 120 (then H.K. \$240, later \$480). There was also an installation charge of Yen 25, as well as a charge of Yen 5 for "special fixtures" (of which a bell appeared to be one), and of Yen 12 for a table telephone (new model). Moreover—what was perhaps most discouraging of all—"any person applying to the Telephone Bureau for permission to install a telephone must deposit the sum of fifty yen (Yen 50). The deposit of fifty yen will be refunded when the telephone is disconnected if the depositor be not penalized according to Article 25." The article referred to made the subscriber subject to the confiscation of his deposit for any breach of the regulations or misuse of or damage to the installation.

For all but a fraction of the people who had before the war begun to take the telephone for granted, these charges were—as they were intended to be—prohibitive. The regulations also required that the Bureau's operatives must be given access whenever they desired it—provided they identified themselves—to the phones installed. The result was that, in spite of repeated invitations to register their phones,

the Chinese would not respond. By May 20, according to the *Hong Kong News* of that date, there were a hundred subscribers enrolled. On May 30 the Telephone Bureau sent out notices that everyone who had a telephone or wanted one should register. June 17 was set as the deadline for registrations, but this period was subsequently continually extended. The Japanese were getting more than they had asked for: the Bureau had planned to cut down the number of telephone subscribers to perhaps a fifth or a tenth of the number prior to the war, but the Chinese were by an instinctive reflex action paring the number down so much further than was expected or desired as actually to hamper other operations of their military masters.

The resumption of postal services was a simpler matter. The Post Office opened its doors on January 22, 1942, for the first time after the surrender of the island on the preceding Christmas Day. There was a great rush on the first day to purchase the now requisite Japanese stamps—they were sold in 2-, 3-, 4-, 10-, and 30-sen denominations—and to post letters, which were accepted for Japan, Formosa, Macao, Kwangtung Province, China, Manchukuo, French Indo-China, and Thailand. The *Hong Kong News* account of the opening said that “for the present, no registered letters, money orders or parcels will be accepted, but as the postal service develops and as business in Hong Kong resumes more fully, these three branches of the service will be reopened.”

The restitution of the postal service was the work, this article stated, of Japanese postal experts who had been brought to Hong Kong for the purpose and who were now “in charge of this branch of communal and international service.”

At first only the central district in Hong Kong was served by postal deliveries, but as more postmen were engaged and other offices opened, the routes were gradually extended, and efforts were even made to deliver mail that had accumulated during and after the hostilities but which had gone undelivered. Indicating the quantity of mail handled, the Post Office reported on February 1 that between January 24 and 29 (1942), 43,000 letters had been mailed. From February 20, registered mail was accepted. On April 1 the postal rates were increased, to bring them into conformity with those introduced into Japan on that date.

In practice, services abroad were resumed piecemeal and to specified areas. It was not possible to dispatch registered mail to North China

until the first of August, 1943, and it was not until the twenty-first of that month that postal and telegraphic money orders between Hong Kong and Japan were reinaugurated. Registered mail to southern Borneo was resumed only on March 20, 1944. On April 1, 1944, postal rates were again increased.

The reopening of shipping lanes connecting Hong Kong with points on the mainland of China was in the first instance, as we have earlier indicated, a function of the Japanese policy of repatriating a large part of the Hong Kong populace. An organization called the "Inland Transportation Company" was formed under the control of Japanese officials in the Repatriation Bureau. The company employed the setup of one of the former shipping concerns in the colony, but it is believed to have been primarily—if not solely—an instrument for the direction of Hong Kong's shipping by the Japanese authorities.

Steamer traffic to Canton was resumed on January 16, 1942, on a daily scheduled sailing at 9:00 A.M., the "Shirogane Maru" being the first ship employed. Two more ships were shortly put on the run—the "Kainan Maru" and the "Kaiju Maru"—and the "Shirogane" was diverted to the Macao run, which was resumed on January 19 with two vessels, the other being the "Tempo Maru."

Later the steamer "Shirogane" was transferred to the Hong Kong-Kwangchow run, which was recommenced February 9 with a noon sailing. The *Hong Kong News* of February 7 described the Canton run as being served then by three ships: the "Kaiju Maru," the "Nankai Maru," and the "Unyo Maru." The tonnage of these vessels is not known, but it is unlikely that they are any more than small river steamers similar to or identical with those that have been on the Pearl River for years.

There were sailings on the eleventh, twelfth, sixteenth, and twenty-first of February (1942) to Chiuchau and Swatow, but steamers seem to have been taken off this line in March, a circumstance which was strongly indicated by the beginning of the overland treks by Swatow repatriates, as well as by the fact that Chinese informants appear unaware of the existence of such a line.

The *Hong Kong News* of February 18 reported a three-cornered traffic with Macao, ships leaving Hong Kong for that port every alternate day, returning on the next day, while between Macao and Canton a daily service was maintained, a ship leaving each port for the other at ten o'clock every morning.

The Inland Transportation Company also announced in March regular sailings, about six days apart, to the most populous points accessible by water in the Pearl River Delta, at the same time suspending rate-free repatriation and establishing a scale of fares which, under all the circumstances, was reasonable enough.

For years an inconspicuous but not inconsiderable share of Hong Kong's traffic, particularly with the near-by mainland, had been handled by fleets of junks, which also had a virtual monopoly of the fishing industry of the colony. The hostilities drove these junks off the sea, and many of them were sunk by action of the Japanese Navy, which for a time forbade any movement of junks even after the capture of the island. When the degree of Hong Kong's dependence on sea food became clear to the Japanese authorities, the control was slightly relaxed and permission was given for fishing in certain restricted areas. This allowed of the growth of a clandestine traffic with Macao, both to provide transport for repatriates and to supply the growing black markets in Hong Kong with foodstuffs and drugs.

The attempt to reopen shipping lanes, particularly those connecting the "Captured Territory" with the Southern Regions made the demands upon such ships as were available ever heavier, and shipping tending to grow more scarce. By about May 15, owing in part to the increasingly effective work of American submarines and in part to the effort of the Japanese to realize their schemes for linking by sea-borne commerce the areas that they had conquered, this scarcity became very marked.

There was thus the greatest need for exploiting every means at their disposal to procure more adequate shipping. The first step that they took to meet this problem was the salvaging of sunken ships. Before the surrender of Hong Kong, the British authorities had scuttled all the shipping in the harbor, comprising several fair-sized ships and numerous smaller boats.

Shortly after they had taken over the colony, the Japanese military brought in a very efficient salvaging crew from Japan, and they were gradually successful in salvaging nearly all—if not actually all—of the shipping which had been sunk or scuttled in the harbor. Several of the smaller ships and launches they managed to raise immediately; others they worked on for months. Three large ships were reported salvaged in January, 1943, over a year after they had been scuttled; another was broken up for scrap.

However ably these salvage operations were carried out, the means which they afforded of adding to Hong Kong's shipping tonnage were obviously limited and soon exhausted.

On the other hand, the means to build new ships were nonexistent. The large Hong Kong shipyards had formerly depended upon steel imported from outside the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and which was not now available; if the Government General of Hong Kong was to be independent of the mainland Japan, it could not continue to build steel ships. Two freighters of 10,000 tons were in fact launched in Hong Kong in December, 1942, according to Domei broadcasts from Tokyo confirmed by other sources, but these were announced to have been vessels already in the course of construction when the Japanese took over the Hong Kong yards. Later broadcasts make no further mention of other launchings of steel ships, and it seems unlikely that there have been any more.

In this dilemma the Japanese turned to the use of junks. Here, too, the number immediately available was very low: some indication of the number of junks which had been destroyed or had fled to safer haven during the hostilities is given by the fact that, in 1933, when the total population of Hong Kong was 922,643 (comparable to that of the colony after the repatriation ) 100,000 persons were estimated to be living on junks in Hong Kong Harbor (*Annual Report on Social and Economic Progress for 1933*) ; on May 18, 1942, according to the *Hong Kong News* of that date, there were only 2,700 junk dwellers who were receiving rice rations!

But the Japanese had an inexhaustible supply of mahogany in the Philippines and of teak in Thailand and Burma, both excellent for shipbuilding; and in Hong Kong there was no lack of trained shipwrights. They could build a modified junk, a sailing vessel which they could in some cases equip with motors, and which would have two obvious advantages: it could be built quickly and in considerable numbers, and it would afford a smaller and much less remunerative target for enemy submarines.

A shipbuilding company to undertake the construction of such wooden vessels was formed in the late fall of 1942 under the direct control of the Government General. The ceremony for laying the keel of the first ship was held in November. It was announced that the vessels to be built were to be employed in "the transportation of raw materials and commodities for reconstruction in the Southern Re-

gions, such as crude oil, lumber, and rice." An unspecified number of these "transport ships—tonnage not given"—were launched from Hong Kong shipyards on December 8 and 16, 1942. By March, 1943, according to well-corroborated reports, large numbers of these vessels were being launched in from forty to sixty-three days' construction time.

Continual efforts were made both to improve these vessels and to increase the speed of their construction. On February 2, 1944, for instance, Domei proudly reported the christening ceremony of an "undisclosed type of vessel" which had been held in Hong Kong the day before. This "superior vessel," which, the broadcast asserted, was the product of a new shipbuilding technique and had been launched exactly one month after its construction had begun, was unquestionably one of these modified junks.

To exploit this new form of shipping, the Japanese set up on December 10, 1942, a "Sailing Vessel Trading Company" to carry on trade, beginning with that between the island and the neighboring mainland of China. The company was stated to have begun its operations with a fleet of 105 junks, which it planned to use not only on short voyages but in comparatively long coastwise trips. It was planned, according to a press report of the project, to use these wooden vessels in the first instance for food shipments from China to the island in order to release steamships for use as military transports. At the same time it was announced that all wooden vessels, regardless of size, plying out of Hong Kong would henceforward have to be registered. This requirement, taken together with other trade controls and with the powers exercised through the Sailing Vessel Trading Company, placed the remaining privately owned junks and sailing vessels also securely under the Government General's control.

To supply navigators and sailors for its growing fleet of wooden vessels, as well as for replacements on its larger ships, the Government General on March 15, 1943, established the Hong Kong Seamen's Training Institute, which it placed under the direction of its Harbor Section. The school gave two courses, one in navigation and the other in engineering, each course to last for three months. At its first graduation ceremony, on June 15, 1943, fifty-seven persons were given diplomas. Thirty persons were taken into each of the two classes every three months; the board of the students was free, as was tuition, and they were given a small allowance as well. Such reports as were

available indicate that the school was still flourishing well over a year later.

But with the growing intensity of the war, conditions in the whole field of transportation and shipping were becoming no easier: in a radio broadcast by the Hong Kong station to the people of that city on January 18, 1944, they were told that "they should consider themselves lucky that they were still able to get from one place to another with comparatively little inconvenience." Ferries, streetcars, busses, trains, and junks were still functioning smoothly, although service had been slightly restricted: "most of us just grin and bear it, as, after all, things could be much worse."



was completed for the larger part of the downtown area in about two weeks, although for some areas of Hong Kong the job took as long as six months. On January 20 the department had made enough progress so that it felt justified in issuing an order requiring all landlords and property owners to register their water meters by February 1 or have their water supply cut off. Meter deposits were demanded: Yen 25 for family residences, Yen 50 for banks and businesses, Yen 100 (and up) for factories, the charge for the water itself being 15 sen per hundred gallons.

The gravest warnings were issued against failing to comply with the registration requirement laid down, but very few people could be got to register. However desperately they needed the water, the fee was too high for many to pay. Several deadlines were set and disregarded; those who had meters evidently continued to get water and were charged for it if the Water Department could catch up with them. This situation continued indefinitely, because if the Japanese authorities were to act on their threats, they would have had to cut most of the city's water off again and thus would have re-created a situation which they were as anxious to avoid as anyone else. It is also to their credit that, for the benefit both of those who applied for new meters—there were none to be had—and of that much more numerous group (comprising the largest percentage of the population) housed in dwellings without running water, the Japanese open eighty public fountains on the Hong Kong side and forty in Kowloon.

From time to time in the intervening months the Water Department had occasion to urge the people of Hong Kong to be careful in their use of water because the supply was threatened by the absence of rainfall; but, aside from these temporary shortages, the colony was no longer confronted with the basic problem of a lack of water.

Lighting was also given fairly prompt attention. Shortly after the surrender, responsibility for Hong Kong's lights and electricity was turned over by the Civil Administration Department to its Electricity Section, whose members bustled about with characteristic energy and self-importance to serve the Emperor by replacing or repairing the electric wiring that had been torn out or damaged while the island was at war. The service was restored throughout downtown Hong Kong in a matter of weeks, but the task was not regarded as completed until April, when it became possible for Shatin and Taipo in the New Territories beyond Kowloon to have electric lights.

The rates had been published earlier: on January 25 the *Hong Kong News* had carried a story advising everyone who wanted to use electric lights to make application for that privilege; the minimum charge was to be 26 sen per unit for the consumption of electricity, and every shop or business premise had to deposit Yen 5.00 for each bulb it used. Private residences were charged a minimum of Yen 5.00 for from one to five bulbs, and Yen 1.20 for each bulb over five.

These charges were immediately protested by the Chinese, most of whom used a profusion of lights in their stores and houses. On February 5 the Electric Office announced a reduction in the rate of deposit by bulbs and let it be known that the matter was one which could be the subject of discussion in special cases. This was a typical opening for bribery. It was obvious to everyone that the large department stores would have to be given special deductions or they would not be able to open at all, with this charge of Yen 5.00 (H.K. \$10, later H.K. \$20) for each of their thousands of bulbs added to all the other exactions to which they were subject. Hong Kong rumor had it that this matter could be settled in the usual way: if you slipped a fraction of the amount for which you were nominally liable into the right hands, an atmosphere of sweet reasonableness would immediately come to prevail and the problem would shrink to more proper proportions.

Faced with these complications and uncertain of what or how much registration would cost them, the Chinese were characteristically slow to register. In March the Electric Office undertook an investigation to determine why so few people used electric lights: the darkness contributed, it felt, to the difficulty which the gendarme police were encountering in maintaining order. They undertook a canvass of all the larger houses and establishments, and the type of persuasion that they used may have had some effect: on April 18 it was estimated, according to the *Hong Kong News* of that date, that a total of 100,000 bulbs was then in use. That figure would only provide, by rough approximation, one bulb for every ten residents, but Chinese who were there at the time and later believe it to have been much too high; the colony evidently continued under what was, in comparison with its former brilliance, a partial dim-out imposed by the relative poverty of the people, on the one hand, and by the unwillingness of the Japanese to lower the rates, on the other.

Gas for cooking and illumination had not been widely used in Hong Kong even before the hostilities, although gas stoves had been

becoming more and more common in the homes of foreigners and of "foreignized" Chinese. The Japanese authorities reconstituted the Hong Kong Gas Company, made it subordinate to the Public Works Department, and began early in February to accept applications from persons who wished to use the service. Charges were Yen 6.66 per thousand cubic feet, with an initial deposit of Yen 15 for each separate piping point. These rates, like those for water and electricity, were relatively much higher than they had been prior to the war: at the ordinary rate of consumption, the average family in Hong Kong that used a gas stove would pay—according to a Chinese who lived for some months under the occupation—as much as H.K. \$80 a month just for cooking gas alone.

Hong Kong was thus again supplied—for a price—with water, lighting, and cooking gas. A potentially much more dangerous situation, and one harder to meet, was that which existed in the domain of public health. The resumption of these public services helped to lessen the danger of disease, but much more drastic action was necessary as well. The mounting concern which then existing conditions occasioned was expressed by the Japanese chief of the Hong Kong bureau of the Civil Administration Department in an address to the (Chinese) chiefs of the district bureaus on February 4 (1942), when he urged that the primary concern of every resident should be a clean city. Shortly thereafter the Central District Bureau (under Peter Sin) formed a Sanitary Section, and its head, a Chinese, issued an eloquent plea to the people of his area to cease dumping excrement into the streets; but the people had no recourse, and conditions grew worse rather than better.

A real plague was becoming more and more imminent. The first tangible step to head it off was the opening on February 23 of the Anti-epidemic Bureau under the Medical Department of the Civil Administration Bureau. The Medical Department was the particular "military bureau" which had been charged with the maintenance of public health in the "Conquered Territory." It was staffed with Japanese, some of whom were public health experts from Japan, while others were army or civilian Japanese medical men. In the Anti-epidemic Bureau, which was to become the department's principal suboffice, the Japanese had gathered 133 doctors of medicine at the head of a large staff organized into three divisions: investigation, prevention, and examination. Numerous small inspection and inocula-

tion squads were formed, employing a proportion of Chinese doctors and both Chinese and Japanese nurses. The squads were dispatched through assigned areas of Hong Kong and Kowloon to give anti-cholera, typhus, and smallpox injections and inoculations to everyone who could not prove that he or she had had such treatments within the previous three months. For six weeks (from about March 1, 1942) these squads circulated through the city, inoculating people as they got on busses, as they entered the Kowloon Ferry, or when they made any one of the countless applications or reports that were required of them. Every person treated was given a small white slip with a date on it; if you did not keep it on your person at all times, you were liable to be inoculated two or three times in the same day. The press and other propaganda channels urged women not to run from the doctors; they had learned the need for flight the hard way, and it took months to unlearn them. It was made a punishable crime to hire another person to take your inoculations for you; in one such case both the offender and his stooge were made to kneel with placards around their necks for several days on a downtown street corner.

The bureau also attempted to collect the dead bodies found lying in the streets; an appeal was made to the public to telephone at once the location of such bodies.

In this first drive the Japanese claimed to have inoculated 1,030,000 persons; whether this figure is true or not, the best patent of the success of their efforts is the fact that, although there were many deaths of cholera and not a few of bubonic plague, there was no such sweeping epidemic as the conditions of filth and insanitation in which the populace was forced to live might have been expected to produce.

In June (1942) the so-called "Second Stage Anti-cholera Campaign" was begun, the inoculation slips being pink instead of white. Twenty-four centers for free inoculation were set up—fourteen in Hong Kong, eight in Kowloon, one at Tsimshatsui, and one at the Yaumati Typhoon Shelter—to which residents were urged to proceed to be inoculated. Those who did not do so, or who could not produce their white slips, were inoculated on the street by the same squads that had been employed previously. Later in the drive, house-to-house visits were made, although the public was warned not to open their doors to any but fully identified members of the bureau's staff. This drive also lasted for a period of six weeks. Similar drives were carried out each spring and summer of Japanese control.

At the same time five rules for health were announced and widely publicized for the guidance of the populace: (1) eat no cold food or ice cream; (2) eat no food that flies or cockroaches might have touched; (3) summon aid for diarrhea or vomiting; (4) eat regularly and do not catch cold while sleeping; and (5) kill all flies and cockroaches.

Subsequently the Health Department issued instructions to all Hong Kong restaurants containing the following fourteen injunctions: (1) everything must be boiled; (2) raw vegetables and fruits must be sterilized; (3) overnight foodstuffs must be used carefully; (4) ice must not be put in food; (5) iced foodstuffs must be carefully preserved; (6) all utensils must be disinfected before being used; (7) a portion of the foods sold must be reserved for examination by officials of the Health Department; (8) cloths used for wiping the utensils must be made of cotton and regularly disinfected; (9) utensils must be used only for the purpose for which they are intended; (10) a special contraption to catch flies must be provided; (11) the kitchen should be sprayed with Jeyes fluid; (12) the staff of the kitchen must wash their hands with disinfectant and (13) must undergo a physical examination twice a month; and (14) the clothing of the staff must be kept clean.

These instructions were also given the form and the authority of an official public notification of the Hong Kong government. Restaurants were required to post them conspicuously, and patrons who suspected that a particular restaurant was not obeying them were encouraged to report to the Health Department. That department itself attempted to carry out both regular and surprise inspections at frequent intervals to enforce them.

During the period immediately after the collapse, when public services were suspended and there were rot and stench and filth on every hand, Hong Kong was literally covered with a swarm of flies whose number grew as the weather became warmer. A concerted drive was begun against them even before the Anti-epidemic Bureau had entered on its functions, and the days from February 14 to 20 were especially designated as "Fly-Eradication Week." Conducted through the various district bureaus, the campaign was accompanied by a splurge of propaganda and a public offer to give one catty of rice for every 2 taels of dead flies collected. It was said that to one bureau alone 1,500 taels of flies were brought in during the week.

But in the early months of the occupation, flies and other insects continued to breed in conditions of filth that grew worse daily, and it became obvious that a more direct approach to the problem was necessary. On March 11 (1942) the Wanchai District Bureau, acting under the directions of the commander-in-chief of the Naval Expeditionary Force which held that area of the island, issued an order that "all shops and residents of private homes must daily clean all parts of their premises and when shops open they must likewise take every precaution for the purpose of public health. . . . Places which do not give satisfaction will be segregated for one week with barbed wire, preventing all ingress and egress." Squads of inspectors sent out by the bureau were told to see that the following instructions were carried out: (1) ground-floor occupants must clean their doorsteps; (2) upper-floor occupants must clean the staircases; (3) top-floor occupants must clean the roofs; and (4) those who have water closets must see that they are not blocked with filth.

This move was followed several days later by a public health notice issued by the Medical Department in the name of the Hong Kong government designating the ten days from March 16 to 25 (1942) as a period during which all dwelling houses had to be swept clean and washed and all rubbish dumped at the proper places. Failure on the part of dwelling houses or shops "to preserve their cleanliness and exert special efforts to maintain it" would be penalized with a heavy fine. Another order to the same effect stated that, during the period of cleansing, "all residents must thoroughly cleanse their premises as well as all furniture and utensils therein. . . . Authorized officials will make visits to houses . . . and heavy penalties will be inflicted upon the owner or occupier of any premises which are not properly cleaned."

The press of March 16 carried a detailed list by sections of the areas to be cleaned on a given day, and for each day of the period the papers carried notices of the streets and areas which were ordered to be "cleansed" on that particular day.

Fairly rigorous house-to-house inspections were carried out, both during this "clean-up" and afterward, and the city was gradually given some semblance of cleanliness for the first time since the surrender. The inspections of restaurants also continued, but with less assurance—because of the possibility of bribery—of effective control. The interguild difficulties between night-soil coolies were more or less straightened out, and, although disposal was much more expen-

sive than formerly, the service was resumed. Complaints continued, however, against the way in which this very necessary function was performed, most residents finding the practice of carrying the night-soil through the streets in the daytime particularly obnoxious.

Having thus made some progress in securing the most basic rudiments of public health, the Japanese authorities attacked the problem of forcing Hong Kong's doctors and dentists out of hiding and obliging them to make their services available to the Japanese rulers of the "Captured Territory" and to the community which those rulers controlled. On May 14 it was announced that two associations were being formed under the auspices of the Medical Department: the Nipponese-Chinese Medical Association and the Nipponese-Chinese Dental Association. The membership in each was to include all the members of the particular profession resident in Hong Kong, whether Japanese or Chinese, and all doctors and dentists were asked to register with the appropriate organization. The British medical registry was reviewed to secure the names of qualified Chinese doctors and dentists, and the associations were later stated to have been successful in "authorizing the practice of" (i.e., in hunting out, enrolling, and forcing into practice) some six hundred doctors and over three hundred dentists. This number included graduates of medical colleges and institutions in Japan, China, and foreign countries, the degrees of all countries being recognized. A third association was subsequently formed for doctors of Chinese medicine, and the same procedure was applied to them.

In each instance the appropriate association was given the power to issue certificates to permit its members to practice. Any doctor or dentist practicing without such a certificate after June 15, 1942, was liable to a fine of H.K. \$1,000. In this way the Japanese authorities, acting through the Medical Department, which in turn acted through the three associations, were able to gain and exercise control over the medical and dental professions in Hong Kong.

A subsidiary question was that of medical supplies. In March (1942) the Japanese authorities stated that the medical supplies then on hand in Hong Kong—that is to say, that part of the supply which was taken over with the fall of the colony and not moved to Japan—were adequate for the use of the local populace for a year. In May of the same year, however, the representatives of two large Japanese drug firms were called down to Hong Kong to inspect the stocks, and arrange-

ments were made with them for the importation of supplementary supplies.

The handling of Hong Kong's hospitals, however, remained to be settled upon. The large and modern Queen Mary's Hospital was taken over directly by the Army for the treatment of its wounded, some of whom were brought into the colony for that purpose not only from near-by China but from the more remote Southern Regions. The next largest hospital plant on the island was taken over by the Navy, and the two branches of the service divided between them several other hospitals. For the rest the medical authorities attempted to work out a rough division of labor, so that, among the civilian population, mental cases were sent to one hospital and maternity cases to another, for instance. A list of seven such hospitals and clinics "controlled by the Office of the Governor of Hong Kong" was issued in June, 1942, giving their locations and the special services which they were equipped to perform.

Summarizing his reactions to Japanese control in North China and in Peking, a friend of the writer's who left the occupied areas for free China in the early summer of 1944, arriving in Chungking some months later, said that there was one thing that must be said for the Japanese rule in that historic city: Peking had never been freer from smallpox and cholera and the fear of epidemics. He described how, in that city also, the Japanese had done what they had done in Hong Kong and what they do wherever they go: they had "gone crazy for inoculations." "They stick a needle into you on the slightest excuse."

It is certainly unlikely that, as far as Hong Kong is concerned, the effort to maintain public health was ever before so intense. In this instance the Japanese themselves perceived that the best interests of their subject peoples were in fact identical with their own best interests. Although Chinese co-operation with the Japanese health campaign was begrudging at best, and in many instances there was overt resistance, it was still generally recognized that what was being done was actually a good thing for Hong Kong. This recognition brought the Japanese an extra dividend in the form of good will, at least on this one score, and their comparative success in attaining their immediate health objectives placed a telling argument in the hands of those few Hong Kong Chinese who sincerely favored collaboration with the conquerors.

## SWORD AND SHIELD OF THE CONQUEROR



IT WAS in the course of conquest that the Sons of Yamato had swept into Hong Kong; the colony was only a corner in an Asia all of which had to be theirs. And the implacable exigencies of the battle for the mastery of the world which was then beginning left them no choice but to fasten down upon the island, as upon every other spot of their conquered territory, an iron rule—a governance so complete and ubiquitous that with a minimum of lost motion every ounce of energy and treasure could be squeezed out of the subject people in the service of the conqueror's purpose. But did not such ruthless exploitation defeat its own ends? When twenty thousand troops take a city of two million souls, or when an army of a million men subjugates the territories of half a billion people, force alone could never give so small a number of soldiers any security in the midst of such a sea of enemies. Even in the days of their greatest strength they could not have met a united uprising of the people they ruled, and yet in all that time no storm of hatred engulfed them. Why did the people of Hong Kong, like those of the rest of occupied Asia, wear their chains so meekly?

The answer to this question lies in the skill with which the Japanese were able to weave across the hemp of conquest the silken thread of the dream of an Asia that would henceforth be free. They came with all the murderous trappings of war, but the words they spoke were of peace and brotherhood. They manacled the outstretched arms of Asia while they denounced her ancient chains; they led her away to bondage to the rhythm of a song of liberation.

We have seen in detail how in a given case a subject people was bound hand and foot in actuality; how the administrative machinery of Hong Kong was brought completely under Japanese control; how

the police were made the shadow of the notorious gendarmerie; how the flow of population was governed in the interests of the occupied, however disastrous the results may have been for a full half of the colony's residents; how all food was managed; how the trade of the island became a form of controlled exchange; how industry was taken over and finance manipulated, all for the ends of the Empire. We have seen, too, that only in the realm of public health were any of these acts of the conqueror actually for the benefit of the conquered.

Viewed objectively and in retrospect, the accumulated evidence of the conqueror's intent seems too overwhelming to have been misread even by the least acute among the conquered; it hardly appears possible that, with all this proof of what the Japanese were doing, any credit could have been given to what they were saying, however persuasive the words may have sounded. But such a judgment disregards the most important and dangerous mechanism which the Japanese developed in all their apparatus of occupation: their techniques of social and cultural control.

It was through these techniques that the millions who were tied to the wheels of the bloody chariot of Yamato were told that this bondage was the means of their freedom. Through the control, in Hong Kong as elsewhere in occupied Asia, of the social and cultural life of the people, the Japanese could not only justify what they had already done but could carry forward their attack. Through that control they could project upon the minds of their subjects their own picture of themselves, not as the military exploiters of an empire, but as the instruments of a divine mission to deliver Asia from the white man. The techniques by which this was accomplished were more than the shield of the conqueror: they were his sword as well.

One of the most natural and at the same time the most profoundly effective of these techniques was the shift to the Japanese language. A characteristic attitude common to almost every type of Japanese who came into Hong Kong with the island's capture was his fierce insistence that everyone who could speak should, of course, be able to speak the Japanese language and that everyone who could hear should be able to understand it when it was spoken to him. Anyone who failed to obey an order shouted at him in Japanese deserved to be shot as surely for his failure to understand what was being said to him as for a deliberate defiance of the command. The fact that a person had failed to learn the language that the Emperor himself spoke was proof

to begin with of a perverse hostility to the higher purposes that motivated the Japanese people.

This attitude made an immediate and deep impression on the Chinese, who by long tradition are almost too willing to speak the other man's tongue. The study of Japanese became the preoccupation of the hour. Classes sprang up everywhere; the English-language press began running a series of thirty-minute lessons; every intelligent Chinese resident in Hong Kong was making some effort to master the language of "Great Nippon."

The Education and Cultural Department of the Government General had worked hard to encourage the "spontaneous" formation of these classes and allowed them a brief period of free growth. Then, under date of April 16, 1942, there was issued an order over the governor's signature, prescribing regulations for the conduct of "private classes for the Nipponese language" which brought those classes under the close surveillance and control of the department. The regulations, which covered all classes numbering more than ten students, or for which fees were charged, required that the person opening the class first submit descriptive particulars—name, address, teachers, hours, curriculum, the names of students enrolled, etc.—through the local bureau office to the Government General, where officials of the department would pass upon the application. Once the class had been established, it could not be disbanded without permission.

Explaining in a statement to the press the issuance of this order, the chief of the Education and Cultural Department said:

"The enthusiasm shown by the people in Hong Kong in the study of the Nipponese language is a most encouraging sign. . . . The spontaneous desire . . . to learn the Nipponese language is due to the general feeling that in future Nipponese will become the common language in Hong Kong. The adoption of Nipponese as the common language for all people here should go a long way in promoting better and fuller understanding among all classes of people in their new co-operative spirit to assist the Greater East Asia War. . . . Because of this necessity [of using Japanese in applications, etc.], the people should learn to write and speak Nipponese at their earliest opportunity.

"While encouragement would be given to the people to study Nip-

ponese, there would, however, be no restrictions regarding the use of other languages and the people's own dialects in their daily intercourse."

Place names had, of course, to be transliterated into the enlightened language of Nippon. An early order of the occupying army instructed Chinese shopkeepers, almost all of whom had their shop signs and advertisements in both English and Chinese, to remove the English versions: the Japanese wished to do away entirely with this reminder of the island's former ownership. Shopkeepers who did not comply promptly were forced to do so by gendarme squads.

An even more sweeping change was made by the Hong Kong government's "Public Notification No. 12," dated April 20, 1942; it renamed in Japanese all the principal streets in Hong Kong and Kowloon. Queen's Road Central, for instance, became "Nakameiji-dori"; Des Voeux Road Central became "Higashishowa-dori"; Nathan Road (in Kowloon), "Katorido-dori"; etc. Subsequent orders changed the remaining place names; all reference to the former names was obliterated, and anyone unfamiliar with the new ones would be unable to give his own address or to locate anyone else's. The names of the Hong Kong, Gloucester, and Peninsula hotels were also changed to ones as typically Japanese as any in Tokyo. The whole outward garment which was the city's English nomenclature was put aside and replaced with a kimono of Japanese names; the places to which these new names were put seemed themselves somehow altered in the change.

A phase of equal importance in this shift-over in language was that which was demanded of the schools. All schools had to give at least four hours a week in required courses to the study of Japanese. People who wished to study English were not barred from doing so; even the study of Kuo Yu—the Chinese "national language"—was not completely interdicted, although, because that language was one of the instruments by which the Central Government sought to bring about the unification of China into a strong national state, it was discouraged. However, only two languages were any longer to be proper for the purposes of education—Japanese and the individual's own local dialect. In this respect Hong Kong, although now a part of the Japanese Empire, was to follow Occupied China; the infinitely numerous and disparate kinds of village patois were to come back into their own

under a deliberately fostered sectionalism, with the Japanese language the only available bridge across the gulf between the sections.

The interest of the Japanese authorities in promoting the study of Japanese in Hong Kong was by no means temporary. In April, 1943, a "Japanese language ability demonstration" was held, with numerous entrants and appropriate prizes for Chinese who had made the most progress. On March 1, 1944, under the auspices of the Education Department the Association of Principals of Japanese Language Schools was formed; a Japanese Language Teachers' Training Course, opened on August 1, 1943, had already graduated its first class of fifty specially trained teachers and had enrolled its second class. In the spring of 1944 it was asserted that there were some sixty large and comparatively well-organized schools in Hong Kong devoted solely to teaching the language; it was claimed for these schools that they had already formally graduated over thirty thousand students.

The smug satisfaction which the Japanese felt in this temporary ascendancy of their language was perhaps never better expressed than by the Japanese radio commentator who reported in September, 1943, that "everywhere in formerly foreignized Hong Kong one can hear Japanese conversation." Chinese, Indians, Portuguese, and third nationals were all, he claimed, "enthusiastically learning the Japanese language" and were even using it to communicate with one another.

The basic requirement, laid down in January, 1942, that the Japanese language be "adopted as the fundamental principle in teaching in the local schools," delayed for months the opening of Hong Kong's regular schools (as distinct from language schools), since very few of the members of the teaching profession in the colony knew enough Japanese to give the minimum required courses in it. Some three weeks after the surrender of the colony to the Japanese, the educational and cultural officers of the Japanese Army staff brought together a number of the leading educators in the community and prevailed upon them to form a body called the Hong Kong Overseas Chinese Committee on Education. Under Army guidance this committee shortly began holding meetings to discuss the reopening of the schools; it was at one such meeting that the Japanese announced that all former school-teachers would have to enter schools set up by the military administration to learn the Japanese language. Teachers who grad-

uated from these courses would then be assigned to lower schools until such time as the higher schools were opened.

At about the same time a notice was issued in the press directing all former headmasters of schools to register with the authorities, and the public was warned that without the permission of the Japanese military no school could open.

No further progress in the matter appears to have been made until the following April, when the Education and Cultural Department of the Government General had gotten well into its functions. In the latter part of that month the department promulgated specific regulations requiring a detailed application for registration by the headmaster of any school that desired to reopen and specifying the curriculum.

In the usual statement to the press accompanying these regulations, the department stressed the importance of the teacher's task:

"Teachers of schools here must realize their responsibility to aid civilization in the Greater East Asia Sphere. In the past the Hong Kong education system has been an obstacle to the progress of East Asia reconstruction. Therefore a stop should be made to this and future education programmes must be shaped in accordance with the natural tendency of East Asia thought, with the object of spreading Nipponese civilization."

At the close of April the department expected that some twenty schools which had completed their registration applications would have complied with all requirements and be able to open May 1 (1942). Perhaps by way of publicly demonstrating how strictly its regulations were to be interpreted, however, the department's investigators did not find any of the twenty schools up to standard, and it was not until May 15 that twelve schools were finally found satisfactory; nine more were opened later. In June it was reported that some forty-six private Chinese schools (out of more than six hundred that had flourished in the colony before Pearl Harbor) had been permitted to reopen. The forty-six employed over two hundred teachers, of whom, it was noted with considerable dissatisfaction, 80 per cent knew no Japanese. To correct this situation, those ignorant of the language were obliged to take special three-month cram courses; and

to be sure that a more careful selection of such teachers was henceforth carried out, a Chinese committee of five members was delegated by the Education Department to hold fortnightly meetings to examine the qualifications of all teachers applying for permission to resume classes. The approved names were forwarded to the chief of the Education Department for final sanction, whereafter the accepted applicants were issued teacher's certificates.

The need for developing a nucleus of indoctrination teachers had been early realized, and in the first month of the colony's captivity the Civil Administration Department of the Japanese Army announced its intention to open a teacher-training institute. According to a descriptive circular issued by the authorities, applicants for appointment to the institute were required to have had prior teaching experience in Hong Kong and to pass a competitive examination. The course was two months in length and was calculated to provide intensive training in (1) Japanese, (2) general knowledge, (3) Japanese affairs, (4) lecturing, and (5) physical culture.

Press reports claimed that over three hundred persons completed the application forms and took the competitive examination to enter the first class in the institute. Of these, one hundred and fifty men and women were selected and inducted. They were housed in what before the Pacific war had been the establishment of a fashionable girls' school for the daughters of wealthy Chinese and were provided with free board during the period of training. Each student was also given thirty dollars Hong Kong for spending money.

On the second of the following April a formal ceremony of graduation for this first class was held, Mr. Nagao, the chief of the Education Department, handing their certificates to the 148 who successfully completed the course. He told them that "a new cultural field was now open to them, and it was up to them to seize their opportunities and help in the construction of Greater East Asia."

Mr. Lau Tit-shing also spoke to the students, apprising them of how "a new Asiatic spirit now prevails; the British depended on their material resources, whereas the Japanese rely on their spirit. The result of the recent hostilities in Hong Kong demonstrated which is better." He hoped that the teachers would impart this spirit to the younger generation.

Responding for the class, one Wong Chak-lau vowed that the graduates were "determined to surmount all difficulties in helping to

create a Greater East Asia Sphere, and faced the road to this goal with confidence."

A second training class was inaugurated on April 17 with the expression of similar sentiments, Mr. Nagao pointing out to the beginning students that the Nipponese language was to be the main subject of study "because in the future the students, by understanding it, would have a perfect understanding of conditions in Nippon and her spirit to help the reconstruction of Asia, to promote Sino-Japanese co-operation and friendship." A Mr. Ichiki, speaking for the Government General, congratulated the group (evenly divided between men and women) on being the two hundred and fifty selected from over a thousand candidates and advised them to realize that they were "now working to make a good foundation for education in Greater East Asia."

New classes were still entering this "normal school" at intervals of a little less than three months in the fall of 1944, although the numbers of students in each class tended to grow smaller after the first year.

The schools which we have described as being reopened in the spring and summer of 1942, and into which most of the graduates of the institute went, were what would be called in the West "middle schools." In 1943 the Governor General turned his personal attention to the problem of re-establishing, under Japanese control, the primary-school system of the colony. Prior to the opening of the Pacific war there had been well over a thousand primary schools in Hong Kong, but the Japanese did not contemplate anywhere near as great a number: they wanted fewer primary schools, with more complete control over each. In 1944 there were forty-three schools functioning on the island and in Kowloon, the total student enrolment in February of that year being 16,346.

The problem of higher education for Hong Kong youth was also met in a characteristically Japanese fashion. In the fall of 1942 it was the expressed purpose of the Government General to reopen Hong Kong University, with Japanese professors "doing all they could to help." This project was subsequently abandoned, and on April 1, 1943, there was opened instead the "Hong Kong East Asia Academy," using part of the properties and physical plant of the university but dedicated to an entirely different purpose. The avowed object of the academy was purely functional: its students were to be trained to undertake specific tasks in the office of the governor, in the district bureaus,

*hsien* governments, or in government-owned factories. The courses were a year in length, those in the Japanese language, history, and classics being compulsory for all students and taught by instructors brought in from Japan. The first class of a hundred students was graduated on March 20, 1944, in a ceremony graced by Sir Robert Kotewall and the usual quisling audience and addressed by General Isogai, who hoped that the graduates would remain true disciples of the "ideals of East Asian culture."

No facilities—beyond those which this academy afforded—for anything remotely resembling a college or university education were available to any except a very few of the students in Hong Kong under the occupation. These latter were specially selected for outstanding promise and their devotion to the cause of Japan in Asia and were sent to Tokyo itself to be trained.

To edit the textbooks used in the schools which had been permitted to open, there was set up an "Association of Primary and Secondary School Principals" which made a lengthy and evidently exhaustive survey of the current texts, preparing from them, and from corresponding Japanese school texts, approved readers in mathematics, geography, history, and "general knowledge." These were printed by the Hong Kong branch of the Commercial Press under Japanese supervision and direction in the spring of 1944. It was stated at that time that the "Association" was also revising other courses.

The minute control which the Japanese had secured over the general business life of the community gave them at the same time the facilities with which to regulate very closely the bookstores and presses of the colony, so that no published matter which did not accord with the "new spirit in Asia" could reach the population of the "Captured Territory."

Public libraries would then have remained the only means of access to free information left open to a resident of Hong Kong, but these, too, were the recipients of the careful attention of the Japanese. When they entered Hong Kong, the Japanese military seized the famous Chinese library at Fung Ping Shan, as well as the large English and Chinese library that had been the property of Hong Kong University. Other libraries, both public and private, disappeared in the first days and weeks following the occupation. At that time, when the Peak was being looted of every portable thing, a stream of books poured into the Thieves' Market in Hong Kong; more often than not the looters

could read neither Chinese nor English, and the volumes that they did not burn for firewood they sold to the market for a few coppers each.

A Captain Hidaki of the Education and Cultural Department of the Civil Affairs office of the Japanese Army was assigned to superintend the collection and collation of both English and Chinese books in Hong Kong. He gathered them from every available source, and in March (1942) it was announced that as the result of his labors a great general library, to house one of the finest collections in Asia, was to be opened. Later the Japanese evidently thought better of that project, and although other librarians were brought in from Japan after Hidaki's transfer, and the establishment of one or more public libraries was still being considered as late as the summer of 1944, there is no record that any had actually been opened up to that time. Meanwhile at least a part of the collection made earlier had been shipped back to Japan.

Moving forward hand in hand with the shift in language and the absorption of the educational system were the measures taken by the Japanese authorities to convert the press into an obedient instrument of their aims. When Hong Kong surrendered to the Japanese Army, its numerous daily papers suspended publication. Immediately after the entry of Japanese forces, the Information Bureau of the occupying army began to contact reporters and editors of these papers. On January 1 the *Hong Kong News*, an English-language Japanese-controlled propaganda organ under the British regime prior to the Pacific war, resumed publication, issuing at first only a single sheet printed on one side. Thanks to the persuasive powers of the officers of the Information Bureau, as well as to the pressure of circumstances, the *News* was successful in employing several of the ablest Chinese and Eurasian writers on the staff of the old *South China Morning Post*; it was edited by one E. G. Ogura, a Japanese believed to have been brought in from Japan for that purpose. The *News* had two sister-publications, one in Japanese, the *Hong Kong Nippo*, and the other, the *Hong Kong Yat Po*, in Cantonese.

On January 25 the Information Bureau gave a luncheon for Hong Kong's newspapermen. Major Saida, the acting chief of the bureau, addressed the guests, explaining to them the important part they had to play in the development of the "Co-prosperity Sphere." The chief of the Press Section of the bureau, a Mr. Takao, outlined for them the

future course of newspaper work in Hong Kong and urged them to co-operate fully with him. A Mr. Li, president of the *Tin Yin Yat Po*—the “Heaven’s Discourse Daily,” one of Hong Kong’s Cantonese newspapers—“suitably replied,” assuring the Japanese of the earnest assistance of the colony’s press and asking for appropriate guidance.

At about this time the Japanese authorities permitted the reissuance of some ten Chinese-language papers under the close scrutiny of the Press Section, which handled press censorship as well as press relations.

In the latter part of May, 1942, to permit the closer supervision of these papers, the Information Bureau decided to effect an amalgamation of them, and on June 1 of the same year the ten papers accordingly became four, the names given to the survivors, rendered into English, being the *Fragrant Isles Daily News*, the *South China Daily News*, the *Overseas Chinese*, and the *East Asia People’s Press*.

To this number there appear to have been only two subsequent additions. A Tokyo broadcast of April 6, 1943, stated that on the previous day a popular magazine, the *Pai Hsing Chou Pao* (“The People’s Weekly”) had made its debut in Hong Kong. The new magazine carried articles on both national and international affairs, together with short stories; representing the Japanese idea of a cross between *Time* and the *Saturday Evening Post*, the weekly provided the Japanese rulers of the colony with another effective means of propaganda among literate Chinese. At the same time a daily tabloid, the *Pai Hsing Pao* (“The People’s Journal”)—a Japanese-edited *PM* in Chinese—made its appearance, evidently from the same presses. It was claimed that 75,000 copies of its first edition were sold.

The closest and most assiduous attention was from the beginning paid to the journalists as a group. They were taken on tours of the repaired railway line and of the rebuilt fortifications and were eagerly shown every other evidence of Japanese industriousness that could be mustered together for them to see. They had their way paid for them on trips to Canton, to Shanghai, and—for the more fortunate—even to Tokyo. They were shown propaganda films, supplied with special passes, and generally courted as a specially influential group.

To provide them with their own organization, as well as to simplify the problem of their control, it was decided in February, 1942, at a meeting of the Japanese Press Club of Hong Kong that there should also be a Pressmen’s Club to which Chinese could belong, and in June

of the same year, with the active co-operation of certain among the Chinese reporters, the Japanese authorities were successful in bringing the Chinese journalists together to form the Chinese Press Association.

It was through these means that Hong Kong's press was subverted and its pressmen seduced. These things had been accomplished facily enough, but in the field of radio broadcasting the problem was even simpler, since there one had only to exploit the physical control of the plant secured by virtue of the colony's surrender. In the first week in January following the city's fall, the old Station JBW—"Hong Kong calling"—went on the air as Station JPHA, operating on 1,154 kilocycles or 260 meters on the medium wave, with a daily scheduled broadcast from 6:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M., including recorded music and news in Japanese, Cantonese, and Mandarin.

During the following month the capacity of the station was considerably increased, and on February 11 it began broadcasting simultaneously on short and long wave, presenting also an extended local program. The controlled press welcomed the arrival of this brother-in-bonds: "The station will serve as a mighty wireless fort for preventing detrimental enemy waves from reaching here."

A third medium of propaganda, more effective than either the press or the radio taken alone because it provided at the same time both auditory and visual stimuli, was provided the Japanese in the use of motion-picture films and the theater. The theater-loving Chinese are almost inordinately fond not only of their own plays but of "movies" and "talkies" as well; in recognition of this fact, the Japanese political warfare experts attached to the Army Information Bureau secured—as one of their first acts—the reopening of the larger movie houses in both Hong Kong and Kowloon for the showing of propaganda films. Houses which were not showing propaganda films showed Chinese movies of the ancient dramas or Japanese movies sound-tracked for Cantonese.

On January 20, 1942, for instance—less than a month after the surrender of the island to the Japanese—there were five motion-picture houses open in Hong Kong: the Central, showing propaganda film of war news; the Cathay, showing a Chinese picture in Mandarin, with appropriate propaganda shorts; the King's, offering a Japanese film; the Queen's, one in Mandarin; and the Oriental, one in Cantonese. On the same day nine motion-picture houses in Kowloon were showing Cantonese films, one was showing a Japanese film, and two

were giving Cantonese stage shows. All these shows and showings were, of course, interlarded with propaganda.

A Domei broadcast from Hong Kong on January 27, 1944, contained a very convincing revelation of the extent to which this medium was being exploited, as well as the degree to which it was now controlled. According to this report, there were twenty-seven motion-picture houses open in Hong Kong. During the year 1943 they had shown 137 new pictures; of these, 56 were Japanese produced, 67 were Chinese produced, 3 were produced in Germany, and 1 in France. Of the Chinese pictures, 53 were made by the Kinkuan Picture Corporation in Shanghai, while the remainder were filmed by producers in North China and Manchukuo.

Movie attendance for the year was stated to have run to more than six million; considering the fact that by the beginning of 1943 the Japanese had brought the total population of the city down to less than a million and that it shrunk further during the year, this figure is a good indicator of the effectiveness of this particular vehicle of propaganda. Films that were shown over and over again were the "Naval Battle of Malaya," "Occupation of Hong Kong," "Occupation of Singapore," "American Defeat at Pearl Harbor," "Japanese Heroes of the Air War," etc. We need not be gifted with very active imaginations to form a fair idea of the extent of the impact of such pictures on the mind of a half-illiterate dockyard worker or shop-runner for whom an infrequent visit to a "garden of the electric shadows" is an important adventure in an otherwise very restricted life. And for the Chinese of education and sensitivity, who had put so much faith in his Western learning and his Western friends, the total effect of the constantly repeated shock could only have been just that much more profound.

The "legitimate" drama carried the same refrain. There were ten theaters in Hong Kong devoted exclusively to showing the old-style Chinese plays; they were always heavily attended, and since the villain was traditionally known as a "big white-face" anyway, it was not difficult, by a deft touch here and there, to give them a subtle propaganda content. Modern drama was also introduced and for the same purpose. In 1942 an anti-British propaganda play, with Chinese and Japanese actors, called "Hong Kong's Hundredth Christmas"—the story of an incident in an air-raid shelter—was acted on the island's

stages, attracting, according to the Japanese, large audiences and wide acclaim.

A circumstance which made motion pictures and theaters such peculiarly effective mediums of propaganda after the fall of Hong Kong was that they shared to so large an extent the patronage that the extraordinary mood of the populace brought to all places of amusement. Reference has been made earlier to the extent to which the Chinese took up gambling as a pastime after the surrender of the city: the only rivals to "Pawn the Jewel" were the poolrooms and the shows. For many months of the occupation hundreds of poolrooms opened early every morning and were crowded all day, but the craze seemed gradually to wear off, in contrast to that for the movies and the theaters: both the latter have continued to "pack 'em in," in Hong Kong as in Washington, with the same long, patient lines of patrons waiting their turn to buy tickets.

To channelize this impulse further, and guide it into outlets acceptable to the Japanese, the authorities undertook the organization and control of various forms of recreation in the colony. They revived the South China Athletic Association, reorganized its baseball teams, reformed other teams to compete with them, and opened a series of league games, in which the teams formed by the various individual Japanese military units also took part. By this means baseball, of which both the Japanese and the Cantonese are ardent fans, was brought back into its own as one of the colony's most popular sports, but with the difference that it was now being consciously used as a means of contact between individual Chinese and Japanese and of making more friends for Japan. Table-tennis competitions between the various district bureau areas were also inaugurated. These games were open on an equal basis to Chinese and Japanese alike; of the 1944 series a Japanese sports commentator speaking from Hong Kong said, "The mingling of players from various districts is sure to lead to the establishment of numerous friendships, thus enabling the carrying-on of work on a smoother basis." It is obvious that it was friendships between Chinese and Japanese that were hoped for.

Consonant with their policy of organizing the recreation facilities of the community, the Japanese authorities reopened the Hong Kong Race Club, organizing under their patronage an all-Chinese race-club committee. It was required that owners register their ponies; those

unregistered—some seventy—were sold at auction for ridiculously low prices, several going for H.K. \$5.00. These ponies had all previously been known under typical English race-horse names; they had now to be renamed in Chinese or Japanese. The first race meeting, held on April 25 and 26, was not heavily attended, and the betting was light, probably because the public was expected to “put up” small notes—of full value—and to accept whatever dividends they might win in the large notes, worth only half their face value at best. At subsequent meetings the attendance was better, and by fall it was clear that, whatever else might have passed from Hong Kong, it would still have its races.

Amusements of a somewhat different sort also burgeoned under Japanese direction and care. The old “red-light” districts resumed their trade, and new areas were marked out to house the influx of geishas who followed the Japanese into Hong Kong. As has been suggested earlier, they shortly came to be a familiar part of the Hong Kong scene, and it was later not uncommon for the waitresses in the larger restaurants to be Japanese girls.

Religion is a function of communal social life very different in nature from those which we have just been discussing, but it, too, received its share of attention from the Japanese. That this was to be true in Hong Kong, as it had earlier been proved to be in Occupied China, was indicated very soon after the arrival of the Japanese. In January, 1942, the *News* carried a Domei story from Tokyo assuring the subject peoples, or those about to assume that status, that Japan would not interfere with the activities of religious bodies in Japan, the Philippines, or other occupied areas. “Protection of religious work is our fundamental policy,” the Tokyo Information Board spokesman is quoted as having said.

Not until May of the same year, however, were overt steps taken to extend that “protection.” At that time all religious bodies and missionary societies were informed that they must register. By about the middle of June (1942), seventy-one religious organizations in Hong Kong had registered, and all seventy-one had been granted permission to carry on their activities. Recounting these facts, the Japanese-controlled press carried at the same time a stern warning: “If any of the [religious] bodies which have been granted permission to continue are found to be acting contrary to the interests of the Government, they will be suppressed immediately.”

For the Protestant churches in Hong Kong the final pay-off in this gracious policy of "noninterference" came in February, 1943, when, under orders from Tokyo, the Government General of the "Conquered Territory" issued a proclamation declaring the unification of the eighteen different Protestant sects represented on the island into a single Hong Kong Christian sect. The inauguration ceremony was held on February 27, representatives of each of the sects being required to be present. This step, which simply extended to Hong Kong a "reform" which had already been carried out in Japan, in North China, and in Shanghai, placed all of the eighty-two Protestant churches and groups in the colony, with their twenty-thousand-odd worshipers, in one organization, subject to the control of one general board, and presided over by a single individual who, no matter how staunch he might be, was much more completely accessible to Japanese control than eighty-two or even eighteen separate and unrelated persons would have been.

Following the policy laid down in Tokyo, where the same thing had earlier been done, the registration of the Catholic church in Hong Kong was accepted as of a single separate entity, apart from the Christian sect.

The fact that the existence of the Christian church in Hong Kong, as well as in other parts of Asia, still depended to a considerable degree on support from missionary organizations in England and America, and that its leadership was still in a good part foreign, placed the church at the mercy of the Japanese. Its Western leaders and missionaries were now interned as enemy aliens, and its foreign sources of support cut off. Having then only to deal with the native adherents, who could individually be subjected to countless controls unrelated to their faith, the Japanese shortly began to apply strong pressure to procure active support from native or third-national Christians in the colony—as in the rest of occupied Asia—for Japanese military and political objectives. Efforts were made to enlist their assistance in various "Pan-Asia" drives and programs, and they were repeatedly instructed that their teachings were expected to be in harmony with the aims of the New Asia. Such support as was forthcoming was blown up for propaganda purposes to a point beyond any relation to its intrinsic strength. Any statement, however innocuous in itself, that a Protestant leader or Catholic prelate could be got to make was liable to be perverted into a blanket approval of Japan's policy. An instance

of this was the statement alleged to have been made by an Italian Catholic bishop in Hong Kong, to the effect that the Catholic church admired the qualities of discipline, orderliness, and loyalty which the Japanese people possessed and that the possession of the same qualities by the Catholic church would doubtless commend that faith to the Japanese people. This supposed observation, not in itself untrue or wrong, was repeatedly broadcast throughout Asia and appeared in the Japanese-controlled press everywhere in the occupied territories.

While they were working with such assiduousness to seduce Christianity into a ruinous and suicidal role, the Japanese were equally fervid in their courtship of other faiths. Mohammedanism was encouraged, and—for the particular benefit of the Moslems in the Southern Regions as well as those in India and in Northwest China—Japan was portrayed as the new Protector of Islam.

Buddhism likewise was reactivated to become a function of Japanese propaganda. Its doctrines were hailed as the “spiritual heart of Asia” and an indissoluble cultural bond linking India, China, and Japan. Throughout 1942 considerable publicity was given to the not infrequent visits of leading Buddhist monks from Japan to Hong Kong, and the faith began to emerge, perhaps for the first time, as an important factor in the life of the colony. In September, 1943, this new status was given appropriate emphasis in a ceremony participated in by some two hundred leading Chinese and Japanese in Hong Kong, inaugurating construction work on a large Buddhist temple. Elaborate rites were performed, in the course of which an urn, asserted to contain a portion of the sacred ashes of the Buddha himself, was placed in the cornerstone. This rite was intended as a further bond between Hong Kong and other Buddhist centers in Asia, since similar ceremonies were being held in each of several leading cities in the occupied territories to which a part of the Lord Gautama’s remains had been presented.

Meanwhile the Japanese appeared to take it for granted that Shintoism, the official religion of the Japanese state, had assumed a similar position in the erstwhile colony. In the summer of 1943 work was begun on the Hong Kong Shinto Shrine, which was to be completed in 1945 and would become the “center of the spiritual life of the 1,000,000 residents of Hong Kong.”

Labor organization also became—in Japanese hands—an important instrument of social control. In the discussion in Chapter 2 of the labor

problem in Hong Kong prior to Pearl Harbor, it has been suggested that the absence of unions in the colony was later to provide the Japanese military with just one more situation to exploit in their efforts to discredit the West. We may now see in what way, and how promptly, they took advantage of that opportunity.

They took action immediately, not in the direction of aiding the laborer, but of controlling him, and of using the groups into which they organized him for propaganda purposes.

Early in January a meeting of Chinese seamen was called. The meeting, under the guidance of officers of the Civil Affairs Department of the Japanese Army, elected one Mr. Wu Wei-hing as its chairman and formed an organization called the "Chinese Seamen's and Associated Seafaring Trades Union." The "union" subsequently opened regular offices in Kowloon, and in an interview with the controlled press Mr. Wu asserted that it was in fact not new but had a long history: it was the lineal descendant of the Chinese Seamen's General Union formed nearly twenty years before, which had won a great strike against the Hong Kong government in 1922, but which had been suppressed in 1925. Mr. Wu went on to describe what he alleged to have been the exploitation and mistreatment to which Chinese seamen had been subjected in the intervening years and how they had been (he said) forbidden even the right to organize. He was confident that under the beneficent rule of the Nipponese all that would now be changed.

There is no indication, however, that—in spite of this bombastic beginning—the so-called union was ever allowed to do anything more than to listen to anti-British and anti-American tirades and, when occasion required, to transmit orders to its membership from its Japanese overlords. There is, in fact, some reason to believe that, after its formation had been played up for propaganda purposes, it was allowed to fall into disuse. This would explain a Domei report broadcast from Tokyo a little over a year later—on January 26, 1943—to the effect that "in view of the large-scale enlistment of mariners which will become necessary with increased construction of merchant vessels, the Government General of Hong Kong is planning to establish a seamen's association in order to secure unified co-operation of the local sailors for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

The "Seamen's Union" was not the only venture of the Japanese

in Hong Kong labor organization. In the first month of their control of the colony, they also contacted the heads of the various trade guilds which have been earlier described and secured their association in what was named the "Hong Kong and Kowloon Labor Assistance General Guild." Under the direction of the local authorities and of the East Asia Board, one Ma San-sin was nominated the secretary of the General Guild, which claimed in its membership such numerous organizations as the Engineers' Guild and the Tramway Workers' Guild. One Mr. Lam Kin-yan was later made president of the General Guild. Mr. Ma, who acted as the guild's spokesman, asserted that "labor holds the most important position in social conditions" and that "the wages to be applied after workers have returned to work are now under consideration." He claimed also that, subject to the assent of the authorities, all matters concerning Hong Kong labor would henceforth be dealt with either through the guild's president or by himself as its secretary.

As the various forms of labor in the colony became subject to more and more complete Japanese control, the Government General developed from the General Guild a more elaborate "Hong Kong and Kowloon Laborers' General Association," which was formally chartered by the governor of Hong Kong in August, 1943. The principal objectives of this association, as set forth in its charter, were (1) to serve in the reconstruction of Greater East Asia; (2) to assist workers in the "Conquered Territory" to find work; (3) to render mutual aid; and (4) to help the workers acquire the techniques necessary to improve the quality of their labor.

The organizational web in which the Japanese military were enmeshing Hong Kong may thus be regarded as having made adequate provision—from the conqueror's standpoint—for the workingmen of the colony. On the other end of the traditional Chinese social scale from the men who earn their bread in bitter labor are those who devote themselves to study as an artist devotes himself to his art and who would think it obscene to dirty their fingers in manual toil: these men, too, the Japanese remembered. To reach the circles of higher scholarship, to secure access to those Chinese learned in their language and classics who still write beautifully with the old brush pen—and who still wield a very real influence among the Chinese—the Japanese Army Press Section formed, within a month of Hong Kong's capture, a local branch of the East Asia Cultural Association. This organiza-

tion had its headquarters in Tokyo, and branches were opened wherever Japanese power could reach. In Hong Kong, as elsewhere, "all persons in cultural circles" were invited to join. Because there is no real "Japanese culture" different and apart from the authentic culture contributed by China, and because in every sizable group of Japanese there are men who have a sincere and deep affection for the older learning, there exists the basis for a firm fellowship between such men and Chinese inspired by a similar love. The Japanese manipulators of political warfare have not missed the opportunity for the further spread of their doctrines which this cultural kinship affords.

A much more powerful and pervasive institution than the so-called Cultural Association, and one devoted outright to the promotion of the over-all idea of Pan-Asia—"Asia for the Asiatics"—was the Hsing Ya Chi Kuan. This title, literally translated, means the "Promote [or Revive] Asia Organ"; it, too, had its headquarters in Tokyo and its branches everywhere in Japanese-controlled Asia. Known in English under various translations of the ideograms in which its name is written, it is perhaps most widely called the "East Asia Board." Its Hong Kong branch assumed the public position of a function of the Information Bureau; in this aspect of its labors it represented just another vehicle of the official theme, but the principal work of its large military and civilian staff appeared to be the organization of subordinate cadres operating against specific weak spots in the West-erner's political armor.

Of these weak spots, the Japanese have long conceived of India as being the weakest. India has been at once the theme and the object of much of the most effective propaganda of the Japanese: they have never tired of holding it up before the other peoples of Asia as a "horrible example" of the "white man's imperialism." They regarded India itself as offering the promise of a political victory of incalculable proportions.

The mechanism through which Japan undertook to exploit the opportunities which the West afforded her in this rich field of action was the India Independence League. The League was formed in Tokyo by *émigré* Indian nationalists who had fled to the protection of the Japanese, and the speed with which it went into action after Pearl Harbor suggests that at least the framework of its organization had been prepared well in advance. A branch of the League was estab-



receiving at the hands of the Japanese, which is such a welcome relief from the tyranny they suffered under the rule of the Union Jack."

From that time forward the Indians in the colony were evidently "allowed" to avail themselves of this opportunity almost continuously, but a single typical example will suffice. On April 9, 1942, Mr. H. M. Parwani, described as having been associated with the Indian National Congress for over twenty years, and a former provincial congress leader of Sind, broadcast an appeal to India to rise against Great Britain:

"We see before our very eyes the once proud British Imperialism crumbling to pieces before the onslaught of the Imperial Forces of Nippon. . . . Today, Japan stands at the doorway to India. Japan desires to see her Asiatic brethren freed from Western Imperialism.

"In my humble opinion, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt the intentions of Japan with regard to India."

He recalled the "massacre" at Amritsar, the jailing of Nehru, urged that Indians be not beguiled by the Cripps mission, and closed: "The Goddess of Freedom is knocking on your door. Have the courage and wisdom to receive her with open arms!"

Shortly after the fall of Singapore, which occurred on February 15, 1942, the League dispatched nine of its members to that port for propaganda among the large Indian community there.

An appeal to all Indians everywhere in the world to unite to throw off the British yoke was broadcast from Tokyo on the night of March 1. Several days later this was echoed in a broadcast from Hong Kong by D. M. Khan, now described as the president of the Hong Kong branch of the Independence League, who closed with the extraordinary exhortation: "Drive the common enemy out by force, to save yourself and your country from the most dreaded and obnoxious disease of the whole human race—Britain!"

The local press gave the widest display to reports of difficulties in India, a story in the *News* of March 15, for instance, providing an excellent example of the way in which Japan used the situation there for propaganda purposes. The article—published under the headline "Open Indian Rioting Leads to Bloodshed"—stated that "press dispatches indicate that a slowly rising tide of unrest is spreading in

India, and from India to Arabia, as the British Crown in the Far East totters dangerously."

Indian independence thus—and in many other ways too numerous and too delicate to report—served Japan well as one of her most telling propaganda themes. Another typical, if less concrete, vehicle—used intensively during the first months of the occupation, when the minds of the people were still suffering so much from shock as to be peculiarly accessible—was the celebration of victories. In the use of this type of propaganda the Japanese showed a shrewd understanding of how much the mind of a man is engaged, even against his will, by the motions he makes. Preparations for the fall of Singapore, for instance, were begun four days before that event. They involved elaborate planning on the part of a Chinese committee of five selected with the approval of the Japanese to run the show. Everyone was invited to participate, and those who wished to do so were asked to submit their names to the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee not later than 4:00 P.M. on February 17.

The actual celebrations were held the next day. The account of them which appeared in the *Hong Kong News* alleged that thirty thousand Chinese joined in the parade held on the Hong Kong side, and twenty thousand in the one in Kowloon. The Hong Kong parade was started off by the Honorable Sir Robert Kotewall, who seemed to think it necessary to stand on a table in Statue Square and jump up and down three times, yelling "Banzai!" The procession was stated to have been two miles in length and to have been featured by the customary long "dragons" traditional with the Chinese. Besides the Chinese and Japanese, who formed the bulk of the celebrants, Indians, Filipinos, Macanese, and Thais were represented. There were 25,000 posters attacking Anglo-American perfidies and praising the "Co-prosperity Sphere" pasted up in conspicuous places in Hong Kong, 15,000 in Kowloon, and 10,000 in Taipo; 20,000 leaflets were distributed by hand in Hong Kong, 10,000 in Kowloon and another 10,000 in Taipo, while 280,000 were dropped from the air by planes. There were banners across the streets, and loudspeakers, both portable (on cars) and stationary. All business houses and private homes were ordered to fly Japanese flags, the exact dimensions of which were prescribed. It was said that 40,000 flags were distributed in Hong Kong, 20,000 in Kowloon, 13,000 in Taipo, and 1,000 assigned to the Peninsula Hotel, beloved of "big-shot" Japanese.

The Kowloon parade was featured by the antics of two clowns who led the march, following directly after the big "victory banner." In full dress, complete with top hats, they were supposed to represent President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. They were continually beaten with sweep brooms and spades and kicked about. Their performance was repeated in front of the Peninsula Hotel, where it was witnessed by the commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces, who was said to have found it very amusing.

A similar celebration, started with the same hopping up and down and "banzai-ing" on the part of the Honorable Sir Robert, was held a month later, on March 17, to mark the capture of Rangoon and the Dutch East Indies. Six planes took part, and one stunt plane performed. Thousands of pamphlets were dropped; there were eighteen "lion displays"; it was even claimed that some neutral foreigners participated. Bags of rice were handed out as a reward for those who marched, and some fifteen days later every participant received a small gift as a memento.

Between celebrations the Japanese kept up routine propaganda work in the streets of the city; for these purposes they used small automobile vans equipped with loudspeakers which reproduced recordings of lectures and speeches urging the co-operation of the "yellow races" and the expulsion of the white man. Picture slides were also used by street propagandists, to catch and hold the attention of passers-by while the evils wrought by the Westerner were explained to them.

Apart from these formal methods of propaganda—although sometimes employing them—were the numerous and diverse sorties against the white man that, grouped together, formed one of the subtlest of the means which the Japanese found to stamp the consciousness of the Chinese in Hong Kong. They were symbolic acts, expressive of a deep and abiding contempt. Of the countless illustrations of this technique with which one was confronted in the colony after its capture by the Japanese, we need cite only two. Above Murray Field on Garden Road the British had newly built an officers' mess hall; the Japanese stabled their horses in it. The fact that the average Anglo-American muffs the point of a gibe like this does not make it any less telling on the Chinese audience for whose benefit it is intended. The fetish which, under the British, the colony made of its statuary—a weakness which the city shared with Washington—gave

the Japanese an opportunity for another such display. These statues were removed with great ostentation, to be melted down for scrap, the first one to go being that of Queen Victoria in Statue Square, which was "taken for a ride" on March 12, 1942.

A more direct assault on the white man's "prestige" was involved in the treatment accorded the whole British and American communities in their internment. This is a subject which would require a volume in itself adequately to describe, and to which several whole books have already been devoted by the present writer's fellow-internees. Here we need only assure the reader that the Japanese lose no opportunity to accelerate or exploit for its implications in propaganda the degeneration which was inevitable in the conditions which they created for their captives.

But for the great mass of the people in Asia who lived through the first six months of the Pacific war it was not these symbolic acts, nor any paraphernalia of propaganda, nor even the celebration of victories, which most powerfully affected their minds. As well contrived as they were, these things only served to give point to the central fact—the fact of the victories themselves.

A representative Chinese, a resident in the colony under the occupation, when asked what kind of Japanese propaganda was the most effective, answered:

"The continual victories in the field. The fall of Hong Kong would not have seemed to prove so much had it not been followed by the surrender of the British Army at Singapore, by the capture of the whole of the Dutch East Indies, and then by the fall of Rangoon and Corregidor. This succession of victories, one after another, over countries that we had always thought were so much stronger than Japan, was almost overwhelming. Chinese—particularly those in Hong Kong—were amazed. Some were dazed by it, some were disillusioned and embittered, and a few were happy and gloating."

Like the Chinese rickshaw men in Tientsin who watched the Japanese soldiers forcing white men to take down their pants in the center of the busiest street, the residents of Hong Kong were left by the things they were witnessing with an impression which only the most complete retribution could ever wipe out. Here, as in their earlier conflicts with the hated Westerner, the Japanese were favored

by circumstance: with the American fleet crippled by the treacherous attack at Pearl Harbor and Great Britain preoccupied in Europe, they were able to pile up a string of such brilliant victories in Asia as to leave an ineradicable mark in the history of the East.

A startled Asia that sat wide-eyed watching the unrolling of the events themselves was forced to face them in their full and stark reality, their impact heightened by the splendor with which the Japanese invested them. But when this procession of victories was over, and it came the turn of the Japanese to suffer defeat after defeat, no sharp or clearly defined perception of that fact was allowed to enter the mind of the bemused inhabitant of the "Co-prosperity Sphere." Naval battles won by American forces were in several actual instances celebrated throughout occupied Asia as further Japanese victories, and even where this was not feasible, some plausible explanation was always advanced. The press and radio, rigidly controlled, never really acknowledged a reverse until the occupation of Saipan, and then its defenders were extolled as heroes whose example all Asia should follow.

The effect of the situation which permitted the Japanese to gain all their victories in a row, and then, by virtue of the control which those victories gave them, to prevent the peoples who were now subject to them from knowing the truth of what followed, may well be greatly heightened by a curious trait common both to the Eastern and the Western mind: we read the report but disregard the retraction of it; we watch the act but not its sequel.

Hannibal's crossing of the Alps is one of the epics of history: how many people remember the names of the field generals who opposed him, who outmaneuvered him in his stupendous march, and who brought his armies and his people to defeat? On whose brow does the light of immortality shine most brightly, Napoleon's, or the men who beat him? Is it the "Little Corsican," to whom we devote whole libraries of books, whose campaigns are memorized in military schools, and whom Goethe likened to a divine being, or the aged Kutuzov, who brought Napoleon and his empire to ruin on the fields of Borodino, whom we honor more?

The answers to these questions carry implications for the coming decades of Far Eastern history which cannot be avoided. The followers of the Mikado made the most of the time that was theirs. In the midst of the forward blitz, the Japanese-controlled press hammered home

the lessons that the conquerors wanted to be sure would not be forgotten by their subjects:

“Singapore will be another Hong Kong when the truth is known. In Malaya, as formerly in Hong Kong, there are the same type of supine colonial administrators and sycophant minor officials, all suffering from the same disease—the desire for material advantages, which lays them open to corruption—and the same dislike of hard work and disinclination toward realities, which result in a slow corrosion of mental and physical processes and hasten their own day of doom.”

Written—under Japanese inspiration—by a Chinese, a former editorial writer on a British paper, *before the fall of Singapore* (it was printed in the *Hong Kong News* on January 23, 1942—and Singapore fell February 15, 1942), this comment reflects the bitterness, the deep sense of betrayal, shared by many of the most intelligent and cultured Chinese in Hong Kong. Only the wreaking of the wrath of the victorious Allied armies over Tokyo could ever ease that memory, could even partially rehabilitate the Westerner in Eastern eyes.

## THE PERIL

IN NOVEMBER, 1943, there was assembled in Tokyo the "Greater East Asia Conference" under the presidency of Shigemitsu, the foreign minister of Japan. He was supported by some ten Japanese delegates, among whom were the then chief of the Greater East Asia Affairs Ministry and the then minister of the navy. The "National Government" of China was represented by its head, Wang Ching-wei, as well as by Chou Fu-hai, Chu Min-I, and other of its leading quislings; the representative of "Manchukuo" was its "premier," Chang Ching-hui; the "Republic" of the Philippines was represented by no less a dignitary than its "president," Josep Laurel; the "government" of Burma had dispatched its "prime minister," Ba Maw; and Thailand was represented by a prince of the blood, serving as the special delegate of its prime minister. Subhas Chandra Bose, head of the "Provisional Government of Free India," also participated in the conference and associated himself and his "government" in its decisions.

Let us turn for a moment to consider what it was that these gentlemen represented in fact. Wang Ching-wei's "capital" was supposed to be in Nanking; he spent most of his time either in Shanghai, hidden in the depths of an immense gangster fortress into which poured the receipts of the opium and prostitution rackets of a great city, and where the Japanese gendarmerie and its underworld confederates "protected" him, or in Tokyo, in "conference" with his masters, as he was now. In the territories in which his "National Government" was nominally sovereign, the actual power was in the hands of a Japanese commander-in-chief whose military forces were everywhere dominant and whose gendarmerie controlled the police functions of the state; the functions which he did not discharge were in the

province of the Japanese “ambassador” and the network of civilian Japanese administrators, who, as “advisers” and “experts,” directed the economic and financial life of the area, diverting it to Japanese purposes and placing it physically under Japanese ownership. The example of Hong Kong will have made us familiar with the means by which this was achieved; here, too, as in Hong Kong, the social and cultural life of the community was closely regimented; the same textbooks were used, the same movies were shown, the same tactics had been used in the assimilation and manipulation of religion. Everything had been simplified and formalized and subjected to rigid control: the number of religious sects had been reduced, the number of primary and secondary schools had been cut down to a fraction of their former figure, and higher education had been almost completely done away with, except for technical schools or Tokyo scholarships; here also the language of the person who knew how to get on in the world was Japanese. Even the heads of the boys in primary school were ordered to be close-cropped, as they are in Japan. In a word, although the forms sometimes varied, the objectives were everywhere the same as we know them to have been in Hong Kong, and the basic techniques were always identical.

If this statement is true of Occupied China, it is even more true of “Manchukuo,” where the world was first made aware of these objectives, and where the techniques by which they were to be accomplished were brought to their first high perfection. There the Japanese Kuantung Army is sovereign, and the strings that pull a whole troop of puppets are firmly held by an even more numerous group of Japanese “vice-ministers” and “advisers.” In Burma and the Philippines the story has been the same; in Thailand it differs only in that, rather than resist the Japanese forces which stood on their border after Pearl Harbor, the then government of that country permitted it to be occupied by them. Thereafter, in common with the rest of occupied Asia, the Thai government took its decisions in the face of *force majeure*, and its erstwhile independence faded like mist before the wind.

Of the character of the “Provisional Government of Free India” we have already written.

This was the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” whose southern regions were literally to supply Japanese industries with the wealth of the Indies in oil, ores, foodstuffs, hardwoods, quinine, and

rubber, whose northern regions—Manchuria, Korea, and North China—were to produce coal, iron, and steel, while Japan proper was to be the industrial heart of a great empire, the products of whose highly developed manufactories would be absorbed by the immense markets of Asia, to provide the economic basis of a political power which would rule half the world from Tokyo and dominate the culture of the East.

Against this background the statement drawn up by the Japanese delegation at the conference, subscribed to by the other delegates present in the name of their respective "governments," and issued on November 9, 1943, as the "Greater East Asia Declaration," makes strange reading.

The first of its five points asserted that Asia was no longer to be a colony or "semicolony" of the Anglo-Saxons but was to be "delivered from alien aggression and exploitation and restored to the Asiatics."

The second point was to the effect that Asia "should arise again; there should be constructed a New East Asia of sovereign and independent countries." The third pledges the signatories to the defense of the now "liberated areas" and sets forth that they would regard it as "intolerable for the peoples of East Asia if their territories which have been liberated at no small cost should be made again the object of aggression and exploitation."

The fourth point asserted that the conferees stood for "free access to natural resources, freedom of communication and trade, and unrestricted cultural interchange." The fifth demanded that the "principles of equality and reciprocity should be extended to govern international relations throughout the world" and particularly condemned race prejudice.

From the day of its promulgation to the present time, the five points of this Greater East Asia Declaration have been a constant theme of Japanese propaganda throughout the occupied areas; continual references are made to them in Diet interpellations, in the statements of Japanese and puppet leaders, and in the controlled press from Rangoon to Harbin. It would perhaps not be exaggerating the importance which the Japanese have attached to this declaration to say that they are attempting to make it one of the principal instruments of their political warfare.

The immediate purpose of the declaration is obvious: Japan hoped, by a formal pronouncement of her aims in Asia, with which the

puppet leaders of the subject peoples had associated themselves, to procure more widespread support in the decisive battles of the Pacific war that still lay ahead. But the apparatus that was employed, and even some of the words that were used, suggested that the Japanese were more intent upon a subtler purpose, one for the accomplishment of which the declaration and correlated courses in policy which were subsequently taken were even better adapted. That purpose is the projection of the political struggle in Asia beyond the issue of the present war.

To achieve that purpose, it would be necessary to create a situation in which the most overwhelming victory of the United Nations in Asia would seem to be only the ultimate vindication of the Mikado's leadership and of the valiant struggles of his warriors against impossible odds. Then the victory of the West in whatever year would only lead it on more infallibly to a subsequent and inevitable defeat whenever the bells of destiny should toll again.

Many of the basic lines for such a trap had already been laid. A major shift in Japanese policy toward the occupied areas began to be manifest early in 1943, when it was clear that at best the war was to be a long one and a Japanese victory was coming to seem more and more questionable. This shift was followed by a series of maneuvers which in a sense had their culmination in the declaration: a conciliatory policy toward the puppet regime in China, and the whole "China question," was adopted; Burma was "granted" her "independence" on August 1, 1943; the "Provisional Government of Free India" was set up in Singapore; and on October 14 of the same year the "government" of the Philippine Commonwealth was declared to be "free and independent." These acts cost Japan nothing; no actual change occurred in the condition of the subject peoples, and, were the war to end in her victory, she could easily enough allow these "independent governments" to slide quietly into oblivion. But only a very naïve person could believe that they were set up in contemplation of such a victory; rather they looked toward defeat and were calculated to make history plead the cause of Yamato before the bar of the East at some later judgment day.

The official statement of "the aim of the Japanese war operations in China which are now in progress" issued by the Imperial Government on July 5, 1944, at the opening of the great offensive to reduce the whole of China to the status of a secure rear base, shares this charac-

teristic dual motivation: it is a move which may help to win the present contest and at the same time a gambit to fend against defeat in the longer game. Essential to both these services was the widespread publicity which it was given, particularly in China. Typical portions of it read:

“Since the outbreak of the War of Greater East Asia, Japan is actuated solely by her earnest desire for the liberation and stabilization of Greater East Asia and for the establishment of a new World Order and has been fighting vigorously to defeat the evil designs of America and Britain in co-operation with the various countries and peoples of the region. . . . On the Chinese continent . . . America and Britain are manifesting even more nakedly their sinister design of aggression and domination. By taking the initiative, however, the Imperial Japanese forces have captured enemy bases in various areas and are everywhere dealing shattering blows to the hostile forces.

“The aim of our military operations in China now in progress being simply to frustrate the attempts of America and Britain at aggression and domination, the Chinese people are, it goes without saying, our friends, and even the armed forces under the Chungking regime who are opposed to co-operation with America and Britain are not our enemies. What Japan earnestly desires is to bring to a consummation a permanent relationship of good neighborliness and friendship between Japan and China on the basis of respect for sovereignty and independence in conformity with the Japanese-Chinese pact of alliance and the Joint Declaration of the East Asiatic Nations.”

On the same day the puppet “National Government of China” at Nanking dutifully issued its own statement:

“In its statement issued today, the Japanese Government clearly expressed that Japan will respect China’s independence and sovereignty in accordance with the principles laid down in the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration and complete permanent friendly neighborly relations between Japan and China. The statement made it clear that Japan’s present campaign in China is to smash the Anglo-American design at aggression against East Asia. Moreover, the statement clearly enunciated that Japan regards the Chinese people not as enemies but considers even the Chungking troops as friends provided they realize

Japan's just cause and rid themselves of their Anglo-American masters. ...."

By this chicanery the presence of Japanese armies in China fighting the armies of the rightful sovereign of that country is "legalized," and the historical record is more cunningly perverted than it ever was in the memoirs of Napoleon and for an even more dangerous purpose.

A move just as definitely predicated on the victory of the United Nations in the Pacific war and baldly calculated to alienate China as an Asiatic power from her Allies in the West was that initiated by Toshio Shiratori, a member of the Japanese House of Representatives and chairman of the (Japanese) "Committee for the Study of Postwar Problems," in a brochure widely disseminated throughout Occupied China in which the latter country is reminded that she "has been kept down in a semicolonial status by Britain and the United States and other western powers . . . [which is] the root cause of the tremendous hardships which the Chinese masses now are encountering." He then proceeded to suggest that China "work out a program for the wholesale emigration of at least one third of its population to the Southern Regions."

It is obvious that this proposal, which was given such a prominent play-up by Domei and other official Japanese publicity organs as to indicate that it had at least the tacit approval of the Japanese government, could not have been made if Japan herself expected to retain control of the Southern Regions, if only because the resistance to such a course on the part of the present inhabitants of those areas would make it political suicide for the colonial power who tried to follow it. But as a counterpropaganda irritant used for wholly destructive purposes the idea is extremely difficult to combat.

Following this same general line of policy, the Japanese prime minister, General Kuniaki Koiso, issued a declaration in the first part of September, 1944, assuring "independence" to the Dutch East Indies. In the Japanese-controlled press this announcement was reported to have "electrified the four million Indonesians," who now "understood" that, without victory by Japan in the current war, "there will be no Greater Asia, nor will they ever be prosperous or even secure in their very existence."

The actual intent behind this promise was revealed by a Domei report from Switzerland:

"Observers of Asiatic affairs described [the announcement] as a clever stroke of combined military and political strategy which places the Anti-Axis Coalition in a difficult position vis-à-vis the Asiatic peoples. . . . Instead of being 'liberators' the Anglo-Americans with their Dutch and de Gaulle allies are seeking to turn back the clock in Asia by restoring the old colonial order. . . . Holland has now been placed in the same position as Britain in relation to Burma. That is, she must either promise to recognize the independence of the Dutch East Indies, thereby losing her Asiatic Empire which she exploited in order to keep her metropolitan population in comfort, or refuse it, thereby automatically augmenting the ranks of Japan's supporters among her former subjects, who will be fighting not only for the ideal of Greater East Asia, but for their own freedom as well. . . ."

In mid-September, 1944, the official spokesman of the Japanese embassy to the puppet Chinese government, in an interview given in Shanghai for Japanese propaganda purposes, pointed out that the success which the Japanese were then having in their campaign in China was proof that the "military might of Japan was anything but on the wane." He then added what is for us a much more pertinent and revealing claim: "In the political field, too, the Japanese Government has made speedy progress toward the ultimate objective of uniting East Asia into a solid bloc. . . . The statements of leaders of China, Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, and the East Indies are all expressive of the reactions of the East Asiatic peoples to Japan's ideals regarding the future of Asia . . . it is evident to them that the principles of the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration are actually being put into practice."

We know that the "leaders" to whom the spokesman refers are Japanese puppets and that their "statements" are, more often than not, made at the dictation of their Japanese "advisers" and are therefore not likely to be, in the first instance, "expressive of the reactions of the East Asiatic peoples." But the strings by which these puppets are pulled are carefully hidden from the masses of the subject peoples; they have no way of knowing who the real authors of all these brave-sounding proclamations are or what their actual purpose is. Meanwhile they are being told daily and with deadly repetition the things that the Japanese want them to know and remember.

And there are many who are ready enough to listen. There are

whole areas in Asia where the dead past has refused to bury its dead but has wilfully left the body for vultures to batten on. Nor need we examine the darker aspects of this problem to discover ample foundations upon which the Japanese could build their structure of propaganda and perversion. Even in what were in many respects model colonies there had been, as we know, fairly articulate sections of the population who were, for differing reasons and to differing degrees, disaffected. In some countries these minority groups did prove in the issue of war to be accurately reflecting the political sentiments of large numbers of their compatriots. It is now recognized, for instance, that in one of their conquests the Japanese received a certain amount of support from the natives.

In our effort to assess the prospects of success for the Japanese in their present political offensive, the fact that they received such support in their initial military action forces us to admit that part of their work has already been done for them.

But what of other areas, where the populace itself resisted the Japanese? What of the Philippines, where thousands of Filipino soldiers laid down their lives, fighting side by side with the armies of the United States against the invader?

On September 23, 1944—less than a month before the American landings on Leyte on October 20—"President" Josep Laurel of the "Republic" of the Philippines "declared war" on the United States and Great Britain. The proclamation read in part:

"Whereas the Filipino people during the whole period of subjection to alien rule unremittingly labored for freedom and independence and to this end fought two wars and countless revolutions; whereas upon the attainment of the cherished goal of freedom . . . on October 14, 1944, the President appealed to all the nations and peoples of the world for amity and good-will, and to the United States especially, that the Philippines be spared the suffering and destruction incident to the resumption of military operations . . . ; whereas, on September 21, 1944, the United States and Great Britain attacked from the air certain parts of the Philippines, thereby violating the territorial integrity of the Republic and causing death or injury to the citizens thereof. . . . Now, therefore, I, Josep Laurel, President of the Republic of the Philippines, do hereby proclaim a state of war. . . .

"Face to face with the grim realities of war, I earnestly call upon

every Filipino at this momentous hour to show unswerving loyalty and give support to the government . . . so that . . . we may closely and firmly unite to safeguard the free and independent existence of the Philippines. . . .”

The Japanese “ambassador to the Philippines,” who had had his part in phrasing this declaration and forcing its issuance, deftly greased the ways at the launching of this new propaganda weapon: “Philippine entry in the war is encouraging to all Asiatic peoples, since the united strength of the one billion souls joined in an inseparable common destiny should be displayed to the whole world now and forever!”

This let loose another monsoon of twisted language profuse enough to drench the driest spot in the East, and it is easy to understand the confusion and conflict which it brought to the heart of any average Filipino.

That some of the legitimate leaders of the Philippine people were aware of the potential long-term effects of this constant flood of propaganda was evidenced by a statement attributed in a United Press release of September 5, 1944—prior to the declaration quoted above—to the Resident Commissioner of the Philippine Government in Washington, Colonel Carlos P. Romulo, in which he is quoted as having said that the first task of the Philippine government after the Japanese were driven out would be the unification of the Filipino people behind the program of co-operation with the United States. “Schisms have been developed among the Filipinos under Japanese rule which must be adjusted quickly to enable the reconstruction of the Islands without delay. A strong man will be needed to prevent a civil war . . . reconstruction will take at least five years, because the Japanese have done terrible damage to my country.”

Readers of the earlier chapters of this book will understand readily enough the character and extent of the material damage which the Japanese have done in the Philippines: they need only imagine the effect of the application to Manila and to the islands of the same general techniques and practices which the Japanese have used in Hong Kong to visualize in what manner the “little men” might have secured a mortal grasp on the very vitals of the Commonwealth and have sucked out the whole substance of its political and economic life if Japanese control had continued indefinitely.

But however terrible the material damage in the East, it cannot be

so grave as the sickness which the miasma of a long-continued racial warfare on a cultural plane causes. It is in the Japanese identification of imperial aims with the appeal to a race revolt, and the opportunity which access to the minds of millions and millions of people throughout a quarter of the world for one year on end after another has given them to stamp that identification in the hearts of their subject peoples, that the real peril lies. The deadly fact is the fact of the continued advance of the swift, crippling spread of a virus that may yet poison the whole soul of Asia, and which might ultimately commit the world to a racial war that would destroy the white man and decimate the Asiatic, with no possible future again. The very essence of Japanese cunning finds expression in the success with which they have woven into one tight fabric the rope of Yamato rule and the silk of a Free Asia. At that instant in history when they perceived that Asia would soon be free in any case, they attacked the West, through whom that freedom would have come, so that they could force the East to accept Japanese dominion and leadership as the price for a prize which otherwise would have belonged to Asia in fee simple.

Since the fall of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Corregidor, the Japanese have labored well and effectively to weld the destiny of the Empire and the "revival" of Asia into one indissoluble fusion. They have been intent upon binding the two strands so inextricably together that to sever one will seem to Asiatics to involve the destruction of the other.

If we are led to act as if we accepted this identification, if the political course which we follow at the close of the war is such as to bring the peoples of Asia to believe that the Japanese were not deceiving them, that the two strands were in fact of the same cloth, we shall have walked into the trap, and will have lost a battle of incalculable proportions, even though we have utterly defeated the armies and navies of Japan.

Fortunately for us, we are not compelled to follow the road that these Japanese land mines have made so dangerous. We have no need to be trapped. Given the situation created by their precipitation of the Pacific war, the Japanese themselves have in effect cleared for us a path on which we can safely move forward. Their imperial propaganda promised the peoples whom they were subjugating a boundless prosperity when the latter were finally "freed" from the "domination"

of the white man, but—although the Sons of Yamato were favored by every other circumstance—the fact that throughout the period of their rule in occupied Asia there has been no peace has made it impossible for them actually to produce the benefits which they promised would flow in such lavish abundance from the establishment of the “New Order.”

On the other hand, the fact that a military victory of the United Nations will bring about a cessation of hostilities, and thus end the active warfare which has itself been the direct cause of so much privation and suffering in the East for almost a decade, affords us a favorable opportunity to encompass as complete a defeat of Japanese political objectives as that to which their military forces will have been subjected.

In attempting to assure the full exploitation of that opportunity, our first concern is, of course, to prolong the peace which offers it to us.

The three fundamental requirements of continued peace in Asia were succinctly set forth by Henry Agard Wallace, then the vice-president of the United States, in the speech which he made in Chungking on June 21, 1944, at a luncheon given for him by Generalissimo and Mme Chiang Kai-shek. He said, in part:

“Our armies and navies will win the war . . . that is, they will re-establish peace. But it will not be enough simply to re-establish peace; we must maintain it.

“The demilitarization of Japan is essential to the maintenance of peace. At the same time, the way to orderly, law-abiding self-government should be left open to the Japanese.

“Our relations with China, now as in the post-war period, may be described as the cornerstone of our relations in eastern Asia. . . . No balance-of-power system would serve to maintain peace. . . . It is essential, therefore, not only that relations between China and the United States be maintained on the historic basis of close friendship, but that the relations between the four principal powers in the Pacific—China, the Soviet Union, the British Commonwealth, and the United States—be cordial and collaborative. China and the Soviet Union have the longest common boundary of any two nations in the world. The British people for over a century have played an important

part in the development of the Far East. Co-operation among these four powers offers the most promising basis for maintenance of peace in Asia and the Pacific.

"Territories forcibly taken from China by Japan will be returned. Independence for Korea has been promised. We favor a restoration of national sovereignty to Thailand. In Asia there are other political and racial entities, now in a state of colonial dependency, whose aspirations to self-government should receive prompt and positive attention after victory. . . .

"I have described what I consider to be the three essentials to the maintenance of peace in eastern Asia and the Pacific: demilitarization of Japan; understanding and collaboration among the nations of the Pacific; and self-government for the peoples of Asia. I am convinced that we—Chinese and Americans—should devote our thought and energies toward the attainment of this goal, in order that the sacrifices of war shall not have been made in vain."

In connection with the third of these essentials for peace in the Far East, Mr. Wallace quoted a statement made by the then secretary of state, Mr. Cordell Hull: "There rests upon the independent nations a responsibility in relation to dependent peoples who aspire to liberty. It should be the duty of nations having political ties with such peoples . . . to help the aspiring peoples to develop materially and educationally, to prepare themselves for the duties and responsibilities of self-government, and to attain liberty." As the vice-president informed his hearers, "This statement points the way to a new era in Asia."

The first formidable obstacle to the introduction of such a new era is economic. The Japanese propagandists have not used the word "co-prosperity" as the central core of the word symbols by which they hoped to trick their subject peoples because they liked its sound, but rather because it seems to promise Asia a thing actually and more immediately necessary to it even than liberty, and that is the means of continued life, food for the mouths of its children. The West sometimes puts out of its mind the terrible poverty, the horrible suffering, of the masses of the East, not in wartime alone, but always. Walking one early morning in the summer of 1944 along the old stone pathways of the ancient city of Kunming, the present writer turned outward from his thoughts of himself for one moment, and in that moment saw a small, dirty, barefoot figure moving down the path toward

him, bent under the weight of two heavy buckets, one at each end of a shoulder carrying-pole. It was a girl about eight years old, and as she came closer to me she turned her face upward and tried to smile, but the effort was ghastly. In that wan little visage one eye was a blind mass of pus, and the other was so infected that it did not seem possible that she could hope to retain for very much longer the little sight that it allowed her. She could hardly see the outlines of the person to whom she had turned her head. Instead of crying, "For God's sake, help me save what light there is left to me!" she said simply, "You have risen early," and stumbled on down the path. The rest of that morning walk was a parade of people in need, a reflection of sick figures from a sink of misery that is the breeding ground of world fever and of racial war.

The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was created to bring such immediate relief as is possible to areas of the world borne down in such distress, and at the Bretton Woods conferences in 1944 plans were laid down, which will, if they are adopted by the governments concerned, provide a firm international basis for the development of sound national economics in which such poverty would have no place. The establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would open a way by which China, for instance, could secure capital for her industrialization without becoming the arena for bitter rivalries between national interests each bent rather on its own gain than on the welfare of the people of China. She would then be able to secure long-term loans at reasonable interest rates without having to accept the slightest measure of political subservience and would thus be freed from a bitter choice between trying to maintain her national integrity or accepting aid for her people.

In the field of international political relations, the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks conferences for the setting-up of a formal United Nations organization that would provide us with a new and better League of Nations hold a promise that is even brighter: the realization of these plans should make possible the establishment of an international trusteeship for colonial peoples in a form acceptable both to the colonial powers and to those peoples themselves. Through them the nations of Asia that are not now wholly autonomous might come to full independence along a solid path of adequate education and a firm economy.

For, taken together, the Bretton Woods and the Dumbarton Oaks proposals contain the essence of the answer to Yamato in Asia: through the instrumentalities which they would provide it would be possible to make sure that the great masses of the peoples of the East would gain through the defeat of Japan, that their living standards would be higher, their food more abundant, and the horizons of their lives wider. If we fail of this, the false dreams of Japanese militarism might well take substance and harden in the hearts of many in the East and come to represent objectives worth the risk of another war to achieve. But if we succeed—if the largest numbers of Asiatic peoples, even of those in Japan, find a true prosperity and freedom from repression through the triumph of our arms—then the political offensive of Tokyo's war lords will shrivel as completely in this universal sunlight as did her military might before the united strength of the democratic powers.

We would then have unraveled the mesh which Japanese cunning has plaited together, discarding the coarse stuff of conquest, and with the silk of freedom and the fine threads of international co-operation would have helped to weave a garment that Asia could wear with glistening pride, to the joy of all the world.

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